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Abstract 
This dissertation explores how to conceptualise the production, reproduction and 
transmission of economic ideas. I highlight that a first step in such an exploration needs to 
consist in the recognition that theory and ideas not only describe reality but also help to 
constitute it. Language inherently frames our understanding in particular ways. We learn 
language, as well as other practices, by being socialised into particular communities. As a 
result, there is an inherent connection between our ideas and our identity. The task for this 
dissertation is to showcase different ways of understanding how we become socialised into 
particular economic ideas and what some of the consequences of this might be for how we 
think about economic theory in general. I examine two particular sites of knowledge 
production and two particular concepts. The two chosen sites are undergraduate economics 
textbooks and contemporary novels. I highlight that both partake in the production and 
transmission of economic ideas but that the strategies they employ to do so are markedly 
different. Economics teaching could benefit from using a greater variety of materials and I 
suggest that works of fiction are a very useful resource in this regard. The two concepts I 
examine are the concept of the market and the concept of violence. I argue that the concept of 
the market is not merely used to describe a place of exchange but that it is also used to 
express subjective and social notions. Last, I argue that much can be gained from following 
Johan Galtung’s approach to violence. His conceptualisation of violence allows one to 
understand the price of socialisation. Socialisation processes are inherently burdensome for 
individuals and the concept of violence can help one to appreciate the burden which 
particular conceptions of human agency have for those who are asked to internalise these.  
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As I adopt an autobiographical method for this thesis, it may be worth starting the discussion 
with a very rough sketch of how I came to write this thesis. Researching and writing this 
dissertation has given me an opportunity to really ponder some issues that have preoccupied 
my thinking for the last one and a half decades. The issues revolve around the status of 
knowledge of the economic and social sphere – how is this knowledge generated? What 
makes it reliable? Is it the same knowledge as about the natural world? If not, what 
constitutes this difference and what does it amount to? What is the relationship between our 
economic and social practices and the way we talk and think about them? And what role does 
the discipline of economics play in all of this? 
 Obviously, even in the space of an entire PhD it is not possible to do justice to each of 
these questions. But I have tried to find a way through which I can at least conceptualize a 
way in which to think about these issues. I have come to understand that the only way these 
issues become meaningfully understandable is if I reject the methodological foundation with 
which current economic theory is practiced and taught. This foundation relies on a division 
between object and subject – as if theory is only a question of accurately describing reality. 
Better theory means betters description of reality. What this view overlooks is the fact that 
there are always multiple criteria for better and there is no unique way of understanding 
reality. Rather, we need to learn to understand reality. This is another way of saying that 
nearly all learning takes the role of socialisation in some form.  
 Consequently, economics is not just a discipline that provides a neutral and objective 
account of social and economic phenomena. Rather, it is a deeply social and political process 
which contributes to the constructions of what counts as proper and acceptable ways of 
looking at reality. Unfortunately to my mind, economics constructs a very impoverished 
picture of what makes life and society ultimately meaningful. With this dissertation, I also 
want to find a way of doing economics that does not suffer from these pitfalls. In order to do 
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so, I try to recover an older tradition of doing political economy, in the spirit of Adam Smith, 
and I also connect to discussions in philosophy and social theory. In writing this dissertation 
in the way I have done, I try to show just how contemporary economics tends to socialise 
individuals in particular ways of doing things and how economics could also be done in a 
way that socialises people differently. I considered taking many possible routes to make these 
types of claims but in the end decided to try to bring an autobiographical approach to the 
subject matter. Because of this chosen route, it may be interesting to learn some of my 
autobiographical data so as to contextualise the thesis within a broader perspective of my 
person. 
 Quite possibly, I also wrote this PhD in the autobiographical way because I happen to 
have been socialised in radically different ways. Until the age of about sixteen, I lived what is 
probably a fairly representative life of a teen of upper middle class parents in Germany. My 
parents were supportive but never pressured me into doing anything (well or otherwise). 
After primary school, I went to a gymnasium (incidentally, the same school which my mother 
and grandfather had attended) but like most of my peers, I thought of school either as an 
inconvenient appointment to endure, or as an excuse to hang out with friends, but it certainly 
never occurred to me at that point that school or education had anything to offer which I 
could not also learn by myself. The motto, and this I think I shared with most of my peers, 
was to do the least possible amount of work in order to just about pass each year.
1
 And most 
teachers seemed to understand, if not share, this attitude. I judged myself exceedingly good at 
treading this fine line, regularly receiving failing grades in individual exams but never 
enough to put me in any real danger of flunking the year. One further advantage of not 
spending too much time on school work was that I had most days completely free to follow 
                                                          
1
 It may be necessary to give a bit of context to an Anglo-Saxon reader here. If you manage to get into a 
gymnasium after fourth grade, the education system is set up in a way that as long as you pass each year, none 
of your marks before grade eleven (so the year I would leave Germany) play any relevance for your later 
opportunities.  
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activities outside school (school in Germany only runs from 8am to 1pm): I played an 
immense amount of sports, probably at least three to four hours every day (football, tennis, 
triathlon, and skiing among others). I also acted in a theatre group.  
 At some point in 1999, so when I was 15, one of my best friends told me about this 
boarding school where we would get to skip a year of schooling and where every accepted 
student received a scholarship. So we filled out the application form together and were 
astounded when we both received a letter inviting us to attend a three-day interview and 
selection process. At the selection weekend, we soon learnt that basically all accepted 
students had perfect grades and were also outstanding students in other respects. Neither of us 
fitted this bill in the least and so we decided to simply enjoy three days with a bunch of 
interesting young people by going out drinking and partying. To my greatest surprise, a few 
weeks later (or months, I really do not recall), I received a letter informing me that I had in 
fact been selected. I was so incredulous that I called the foundation to inquire if they had not 
made a mistake. When they reassured me that I was actually meant to receive this letter, I 
was obviously elated and I set off a few months later to attend my new school in Wales. 
  The school, known as Atlantic College, could not have been more different from my 
schooling experience in Germany. It was housed in a 14
th
 century castle and the atmosphere 
was one of utmost collegiality but also of extreme competition. The official raison d'être for 
Atlantic College was to foster international understanding. And it certainly delivered on that 
front. But unofficially, it was also a stepping stone to either Oxbridge or the American Ivy 
League universities with many students applying to each. Every year, each of the universities 
selects about 5 students (this was clearer for the American schools due to the centralized 
admission system) and so you knew that not all of your friends would be able to get into the 
same university that you applied to. Outside of athletics (and possibly girls), this is the first 
time I had encountered competition amongst friends. The truly interesting aspect for me 
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today is how naturally I adjusted to the changing environment.  From today’s perspective, but 
I clearly did not think about it like that at the time, I had previously played a game according 
to one set of rules but now the rules had changed. One thing that would never have occurred 
to my teenage self is to question or refuse to play the game. Maybe this was because I was so 
used to accept the rules as given in athletics. From the perspective of my current self, I would 
say that my teenage self was remarkably adept at being completely socialised (or as near as 
this is possible).  
During my two years at Atlantic College, I started to study properly for the first time 
and my grades steadily improved. I had little hope of getting into Oxford or Harvard but I still 
managed to play the game quite successfully – managing to secure a full scholarship to 
Macalester College, one of the premier liberal arts colleges. If Atlantic College had laid the 
groundwork for a vision of individuality as that of the always competitively striving for the 
next-bigger-thing kind of person, Macalester cemented it. However, taking economics classes 
from professors trained in the Chicago tradition also led to what I would now regard as the 
first cracks in a previously immaculate shell of socialisation. It just all seemed too reductive, 
too simplistic. Of course, the Chicago tradition also meant that personal success was entirely 
attributable to the individual who enjoys it. As somebody who enjoyed being able to play a 
game – no matter if that was football, Monopoly, or getting into a selective university – there 
was something immensely comforting in this vision. For you do not really have to care for all 
those who play the game less successfully than you do. You do not make the rules. As the 
slang saying has it, “Don’t hate the player, hate the game.” 
When it came to the final year of my college experience, for the first time I was 
unsure as what I wanted to do. I had originally thought I wanted to apply for a PhD in 
Economics and had taken all the necessary prerequisites. But I also had grown disillusioned 
with economics as it was practiced at an American university. I also applied to work in the 
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corporate sector but found the work/life balance offered by the desirable (meaning popular) 
jobs after graduation in investment banking and consulting highly suspect. So I returned to 
Germany to contemplate what I should do next. I reluctantly continued applying to various 
corporate jobs but luckily for me (from today’s perspective) nothing seemed to work out. I 
eventually thought it might be worthwhile to go back to learn more about economics, as I had 
hoped to originally, but not in an economics department. Through a number of routes too 
long-winded to recount here, I ended up at Oxford, reading for an MPhil in Economic and 
Social History. Oxford was great because it meant I could feel that I had managed to arrive at 
the top of the game after all and I met some genuinely inspiring people there. However, 
Oxford was also a difficult place to be because it assumed anybody who went there to possess 
financial resources which were simply beyond my means. Despite a scholarship, it was only 
the financial support of my parents that made this experience possible and even this generous 
support would only be enough for about a year (and I was on a two-year program). So it was 
not exactly inconvenient when I met the representatives of a hedge fund who were speaking 
at a conference held in Oxford in my second week of studying there. As they seemed 
interested in hiring some juniors, I decided to apply, and after enduring seven hours of 
gruelling interviews, I was offered a job. The job not only offered a very lucrative salary and 
the promise of an equally lucrative bonus but I was also told I would immediately receive a 
hefty sign-on bonus. Being offered such good terms, I decided to accept the job, and change 
my degree into a one-year MSc. My supervisor at the time accepted this decision but also 
offered that I was welcome to return for further studies whenever I wished. 
I joined Bain Capital in the midst of the worst financial crisis since the Great 
Depression. Somewhat weirdly, I was never truly worried about losing my job or the firm 
going bankrupt. It all still seemed a bit too surreal to really grasp. So I actually experienced 
the financial crisis as not unpleasant – it also meant that there was not a lot of work for junior 
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employees which meant that there was none of the dreaded late-night work. But as the worst 
of the financial crisis passed, and asset prices began to recover, this changed. Even though I 
enjoyed the adrenaline of making or losing lots of money, I also found the actual mechanics 
of investing (as frequently practiced by Bain) either dull or pointless. A lot of the actual work 
involved building highly specific operational models for companies to predict future 
performance, even though I and the senior partners of the firm knew that the results of these 
models were always (or mostly) wrong. I found myself having to predict how many 
bathrooms would be constructed in Germany in 10 years’ time, knowing full well that my 
predictions were going to be worthless. But this was how the company decided to model 
performance, and no fact-based arguments would convince the senior partners to do things 
differently. It is probably this experience above all others that finally convinced me that the 
image of a homo economicus, making perfectly rational calculations given the available 
evidence, was not only worthless but also misleading for how we organise society. I also 
realised that although I had previously been invited to think of work only in terms of the 
income one receives, I actually did not care about the money all that much except for the fact 
that making more of it than all my friends allowed me a certain cockiness (which was also 
justified in their eyes). Eventually, I decided there must be more to life than just making 
money – and I decided to leave my job for a chance to travel around the world for half a year. 
Upon my return, I set off to explore how economic ideas and knowledge are generated, the 
results of which are to be found in the following pages.             
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Introduction 
The dissertation as knowledge, art, and experience 
At the most general level, this dissertation marks an attempt to explore how to conceptualise 
the production, reproduction and transmission of economic ideas. I am particularly interested 
in exploring these issues within the context of the United Kingdom and the United States 
during contemporary times. I want to highlight that a first step in such an exploration needs to 
consist in the recognition that theory and ideas not only describe reality but also help to 
constitute it. Language inherently frames our understanding in particular ways. We learn 
language, as well as other practices, by being socialised into a particular community. As a 
result, there is an inherent connection between our ideas and our identity. The task for this 
dissertation is to showcase different ways of understanding how we become socialised into 
particular economic ideas and what some of the consequences of this might be for how we 
think about economic theory in general.  
The dissertation proceeds in three parts (and each part has two or three chapters), each 
of which is meant to provide a different variation on the theme of how economic knowledge 
is produced and transmitted. My aim is to explore the reciprocal, overlapping, and sometimes 
contradictory relationships between the particular understandings of human subjectivity and 
sociality that are produced within academic writings in economics and those that are 
produced within wider cultural settings and circles. Economics is one source for 
understanding how one is to act as a person and this understanding can either reinforce or call 
into question understandings internalised from other sources. But academic texts in 
economics also provide a seemingly authoritative basis for justifying particular beliefs or 
courses of actions, so economics is implicated on multiple levels in these processes. In order 
to provide some foundation to discuss the generation of economic ideas, the first part of the 
dissertation offers some general theoretical reflections about knowledge production and the 
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role which language plays in shaping our understanding. The second part of the dissertation 
analyses different kinds of narratives – economic textbooks and contemporary novels – and 
how each of them can contribute to the production and transmission of economic ideas. The 
third part of the dissertation offers a more in-depth analysis of the way particular concepts – 
the concept of the market and the concept of violence – are used and can be invoked to 
understand the process of economic knowledge production. 
 The variations notwithstanding, each chapter is united by the intention to question the 
supposed universality of economic knowledge. Rather than seeing economic knowledge and 
ideas as the objective and neutral result of science, I want to highlight the local, contextual, 
interested, and social nature of economic knowledge and ideas. My position here very much 
mirrors the position taken by Nitasha Kaul in her Imagining Economics Otherwise. Kaul has 
managed to capture her sentiments so beautifully that I would like to invoke them as my own:   
I am therefore starting from the position of trying to question the presupposed 
universality of economic knowledge, and trying to ex-pose it as contingent not 
only methodologically and epistemologically, but also argue that its creation and 
perpetuation is more generally ideological and interested. Any story of interested 
particulars passing off for disinterested universals draws attention therefore to 
both the structuring of knowledge in terms of an inadequately conceived relation 
between the part and the whole, and to the submerging of difference in such a 
venture. The first inaugurates the question of the dynamics of theory, and the 
second points to the Others of knowledge. These will accordingly be my threads 
of concentration in the present undertaking. What is at stake here is not only a 
critique of economics, but a wider multi-layered interrogation of modernist 
knowledge in general.
2
 
 
It is worth noting that I only came across Kaul’s work for the first time four weeks before I 
was supposed to hand in this thesis. My immediate reaction to the book was the much 
dreaded ‘If only I had come across this before’. In fact, I share such a wide variety of 
concerns with Kaul that this thesis may have looked quite differently if I would have come 
                                                          
2
 Kaul, Nitasha, Imagining Economics Otherwise: Encounters with Identity/Difference, London: Routledge, 
2008, pp.4-5. 
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across her work earlier.
3
 But it is also true that despite our shared concerns, we have very 
different ways of writing about these issues. And we also have very different biographies 
which may at least partially inform our different ways of approaching these issues. 
The way I have decided to question the supposed universality of economic ideas and 
categories is by thinking about how knowledge and ideas are generated in general and then to 
apply these insights to the reciprocal relationships between economic ideas as they emerge 
out of the discipline of economics and economic ideas as they can be found outside academic 
writings. As I have come to believe that the gravest obstacle for a proper appreciation of the 
ways in which ideas in economics interact with ideas in other areas of society is a continued 
ill-founded belief in the separation between subject and object, I have opted to approach this 
dissertation methodologically as an autobiographical work. At the same time as I inquire into 
the nature of how others generate economic knowledge, I also have to explore my own 
subjectivity as part of this inquiry. At the same time as I try to understand how economic 
knowledge becomes constituted, I am also trying to understand how I came to hold certain 
economic ideas. I am indelibly rooted in some of the same ways of generating meaning and 
knowledge as others. Theories are also performative devices.
4
 They inform individuals and 
collectives as to what are expected ways of thinking and behaving, encapsulate a common 
vision as to what makes us human. To a large extent, therefore, the object of my research is 
the subject, the subject also the object. 
 Given that this choice of methodology is highly unusual for a work in social science, 
even though it should not be, I would like to start by offering a sympathetic reader three 
                                                          
3
 I am not really able to say how this thesis might have looked differently. But I feel that having had access to 
another piece of writing which approaches the same subject matter in a very similar ethos would have been 
bound to have changed my thinking in some ways.  
4
 There is a large and growing literature on performativity. I will discuss some of the relevant literature in 
chapter six. 
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different ways of approaching this piece of writing as I have intended it be read.
5
 The first 
way is to approach this dissertation as explicitly anti-disciplinary. This is also an idea 
emphasized by Kaul. She writes about her book that “it is not simply inter- or multi-
disciplinary, but, to an extent, it can be called anti-disciplinary.”6 In presenting her text this 
way, Kaul wants to highlight the fact that disciplinary boundaries are at the same time 
arbitrary and hugely important in the way knowledge claims are administered. Since her 
interest, like mine, is concerned with how knowledge claims become constituted, her inquiry, 
like mine, must necessarily run afoul of thinking of a subject matter in terms of fixed 
boundaries. Kaul also shares my concern with the fact that the very definition of what counts 
as economic is also at the same time always a political and social question:   
This book does not squarely locate itself in a pre-given field which can be 
understood as ‘economics’. Rather, it constantly seeks to question and challenge 
how we come to see something as belonging to economics, how this has been 
constructed as seemingly invariant but actually varies over time and across place, 
how a belief in the invariance of what economics is in relation to a wider terrain 
of knowledge actually serves to depoliticise the economic context, and how this 
seemingly invariant depoliticised economic context is rendered substantively 
unengageable by any means other than those recognised as legitimate and valid by 
those who have a monopoly on favourably defining the economic context.
7
  
 
Kaul correctly highlights that the question of how economics as a discipline becomes 
constituted is also related to the question of how knowledge is understood to be constituted in 
the first place. As such, the question of what economics is and how it is practiced is also a 
variation on the broader themes of the Enlightenment with its idea of knowledge being the 
result of a neutral observer. Kaul refers to this as “the enlightenment interest in the general 
man, the average being who can represent systematically, without any inference of the 
theorist, in the practice of positivist and potentially universal modernist disciplinary 
                                                          
5
 This is of course not to say that the ways I have intended the text to be read are necessarily the only ways of 
reading it, nor even the best way necessarily. Every reader fundamentally needs to decide how to approach this 
text and how to engage with it. But the suggestions that follow seem useful to me so I want to share them. 
6
 Kaul, Nitasha, Imagining Economics Otherwise: Encounters with Identity/Difference, London: Routledge, 
2008, pp.3. 
7
 Kaul, Nitasha, Imagining Economics Otherwise: Encounters with Identity/Difference, London: Routledge, 
2008, pp.4. 
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knowledge.”8 Kaul offers the writing of Theodore Litt as a great example of this line of 
enlightenment thinking: 
In order to create this world of conceptual objects, it is essential that the thinking 
being must raise itself onto the level of ‘pure’ and entirely general thinking. This 
means, in effect, that all considerations which restrict the thinking individual to 
his particular context in time and space and which distinguish him in a qualitative 
sense from other individual beings must be eliminated in this sphere of thought. In 
this sense, the elevation of one’s thinking faculty to the sphere of mathematical 
ideas implies an act of self-elimination; of the conquest of one’s own personality.9 
 
I think this vision of knowledge is immensely misleading and I will try to offer a 
number of different theoretical arguments as to why this is the case in chapters one and two 
of this dissertation. One way of highlighting that economic ideas do not exist apart from 
economic subjects is by showing that knowledge does not exist apart from subjects. There is 
no neutral ground from which to analyse and speak about knowledge and subjectivity.  
The idea that economic ideas do not exist apart from economic subjects also provides 
an understanding of why this dissertation can be regarded as both the product of a journey 
and as constituting a journey in and of itself. To approach this dissertation as a journey would 
be my second piece of advice.  On the one hand, the intellectual journey undertaken during 
this project highlights that there are important autobiographical aspects to almost any kind of 
research.
10
 On the other hand, the notion of a journey is also literally involved with not only 
how this dissertation came to be but also in what it is trying to say. To begin, most of the 
ideas for this thesis were probably formulated in embryonic form during one of the many 
walks and journeys I took over the course of my research. There were both longer journeys, 
walking for many days or even weeks at a time, or travelling to and through other countries, 
as well as numerable smaller adventures. During the final months of writing, in particular, I 
                                                          
8
 Kaul, Nitasha, Imagining Economics Otherwise: Encounters with Identity/Difference, London: Routledge, 
2008, pp.8. 
9
 Litt, Theodore, quoted in Kaul, Nitasha, Imagining Economics Otherwise: Encounters with Identity/Difference, 
London: Routledge, 2008, p.8. 
10
 For some good introductions to the literature in autoethnography see: Ellis, Carolyn, The ethnographic I: a 
methodological novel about autoethnography, Oxford: AltaMira Press, 2004; Chang, Heewon, Autoethnography 
as Method, Walnut Creek: Left Coast Press, 2009. 
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took a daily one hour walk in the afternoon in order to organize the multitude of thoughts, 
intuitions, and ideas that had accumulated during the previous hours and that I had often 
failed to capture in ways that I felt did them justice once expressed in writing. These daily 
walks in the Warwickshire countryside were crucial in helping me gain a better perspective 
on how I could bring to light all the ideas I carried within myself and how I could express 
them in ways that may make them understandable to others. At the time, I approached these 
walks simply as a necessary means and part of my daily routine. But as I am now writing 
these sentences with a few months of hindsight, it also seems to me that this relationship 
between my walking, my ideas and myself also echo some of the points I try to make in the 
thesis more generally.  
In fact, there is a long history of literature that stresses the importance of journeying 
and walking as a means to knowing. Jean-Jacques Rousseau writes: “I can only mediate when 
I am walking, when I stop, I cease to think; my mind only works with my legs.”11 Nietzsche 
similarly writes that “only those thoughts that come from walking have any value.”12 And 
Richard Kearney notes that “in antiquity, Irish scholars were known…for their practice of 
‘navigatio’…a journey undertaken by boat…The aim was to undergo an apprenticeship to 
sign of strangeness with a view to becoming more attentive to the meanings of one’s own 
time and place – geographical, spiritual, intellectual.”13  Each of these sentiments expresses 
something that I have also come to intrinsically understand: That there exists no solid 
separation of subject and object and that some kinds of knowledge can neither be arrived at 
through propositional means nor be expressed in propositional terms. This is also a 
conclusion which Robert Macfarlane shares. In his The Old Ways, probably the single best 
overview and discussion of the reciprocal relationships between walking and knowing, 
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Macfarlane tries to understand just what it is he experiences during a walk. Macfarlane writes 
about the work of Edward Thomas, who he has been greatly affected by, that to “Thomas, 
paths connected real places but they also led outwards to metaphysics, backwards to history, 
and inwards to the self.”14 Macfarlane notes how  
in Thomas’s imagination, text and landscape overlap…The paths are sentences... 
[h]e understands that reading and walking expire into one another, that we carry 
within ourselves evolving maps of the worlds which are as Wordsworth put it, ‘of 
texture midway between life and books’. Thomas starts to think, too, about 
thinking, and the ways in which the physical world might incite in us those kinds 
of knowledge that exceed cognition.
15
  
 
Macfarlane goes on to explain that Thomas and other writers like him had come to 
understand, through their experiences of walking and journeying, the vacuity of the 
commonplace dualisms of Western philosophy, whether it be those of subject and object, 
mind and body, mind and matter, external and internal, self and other, knowledge and 
opinion, emotion and reason, or nature and nurture. The problem with having come to such 
an understanding, however, is how to express the embodied knowledge attained during 
walking as unembodied knowledge in words on a page. In order to even attempt to do so, one 
needs to work out not only a model of thought but also a model of the self. Macfarlane writes 
about Thomas: 
He is slowly working out a model of thought – no, more than thought, of self – 
not as something rooted in place and growing steadily over time, but as a shifting 
set of properties variously supplemented and depleted by our passage through the 
world. Landscape and nature are not there simply to be gazed at; no, they press 
hard upon and into our bodies and minds, complexly affect our moods and 
sensibilities. They riddle us in two ways – both perplexing and perforating us. 
Thomas knows this to be true because he felt it on foot, with his feet…The 
challenge, of course, is how to record such experience – apprehended, but by 
definition unsayable – in language, using the ‘muddy untruthful reflection of 
words.’16 
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In many ways, my own understandings and difficulties in this dissertation mirror those of 
Thomas. In fact, as I further explain in the next section, the requirements for the award of a 
doctoral degree in the social science may even exacerbate these problems further. 
 Another dimension to the idea of this dissertation as a journey is provided by and the 
way he approaches the notion of pilgrimage. Bauman invites the reader to think of life as a 
pilgrimage. However, unlike the pilgrims of old whose “truth was elsewhere…some distance, 
some time away”17, the modern pilgrim “invented the way of embarking on pilgrimage 
without leaving home and of leaving home without becoming homeless.”18 They could do 
this, writes Bauman, because modern life means that rather than the man going into the 
desert, the desert is coming to man. In other words, man has turned the world into a desert in 
order to no longer have to reach out to it. This desert-like state of the world means that each 
of us has to shape our own desert and we can do so by constructing our own meaning. 
Through meaning construction we also construct an identity. As Bauman beautifully writes:  
The desert-like world commands life to be lived as pilgrimage. But because life is 
a pilgrimage, the world at the doorsteps is desert-like featureless, as its meaning is 
yet to be brought into it through the wandering which would transform it into the 
track leading to the finishing line where the meaning resides. This 'bringing in' of 
meaning has been called 'identity-building'. The pilgrim and the desert-like world 
he walks acquire their meanings together, and through each other. Both processes 
can and must go on because there is a distance between the goal (the meaning of 
the world and the identity of the pilgrim, always not-yet-reached, always in the 
future) and the present moment (the station of the wandering and the identity of 
the wanderer).
19
 
 
I would like to suggest that this dissertation should be read both as a product but also as a 
process. Writing this dissertation was a process of my own wandering through the desert and 
constructing meaning in the process. But this image also highlights the inherent 
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incompleteness of this dissertation as there always remains a distance between the present 
meaning and identity and those meanings and identities yet to come. 
 A crucial aspect to being on this journey has been the need to unlearn what I thought I 
had previously known. In line with the previous metaphor, I would say I had to turn back on 
paths I had previously trodden. Richard Francis Burton touched upon this point long ago in a 
poem when we wrote: “Indeed he knows not how to know who knows not also how to 
unknow.”20 This connection between knowledge and unlearning further undermines the 
image of knowledge as a purely linear cumulative process (as is usually held in positivist 
accounts). But, following Nietzsche, I would even go further with this claim. Not only is 
unlearning a necessary ability to gain new knowledge but it is also an important aspect for a 
functioning personality. Nietzsche talks about the role of forgetting as central to the 
development and maintenance of a personality saying that “it will be immediately obvious 
how there could be no happiness, no cheerfulness, no hope, no pride, no present, without 
forgetfulness.”21  
Unlearning and forgetting are not perfectly synonymous, however. The idea of 
unlearning grants a much larger amount of agency to the unlearner. Forgetting, by contrast, is 
mostly regarded as a passive operation. One has no power of what to forget; it just happens. 
The idea of unlearning involves an active rejection of some previously held beliefs or 
presuppositions. Despite a larger amount of agency in the action, unlearning also involves 
elements that are beyond our conscious control. The repercussions of successfully unlearning 
something have ramifications that are beyond the confines of foresight. By unlearning a given 
practice or belief, we might forget others. And by forgetting some, we might decide to 
unlearn yet others. So rather than seeing unlearning and forgetting as opposites, it might be 
more fruitful to regard them as complements. Both in unlearning and in forgetting what we 
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previously knew, we are also changing who we are in multiple ways – some intended, others 
accidental. This reciprocal relationship between unlearning and forgetting highlights that 
there is no strict separation between thinking, speaking, and being. Knowledge, language, and 
identity are inextricably bound together in complicated and overlapping interrelationships. 
But there is another dimension to forgetting which it is worth highlighting at the 
outset – namely that one needs to wistfully ignore the shaky starting ground for any academic 
endeavour. In other words, in order to write what I am currently writing (and what you are 
now reading), I needed to forget that my thinking on these issues remains fragile and prone to 
multiple subsequent revisions. But the point is that one needs to forget this in order to have 
the courage to start.  Gayatri Spivak put this point wonderfully when she writes: 
If we want to start something, we must ignore that our starting point is, all efforts 
taken, shaky. If we want to get something done, we must ignore that, all 
provisions made, the end will be inconclusive. This ignoring is not an active 
forgetfulness; it is, rather, an active marginalizing of the marshiness, the 
swampiness, the lack of firm grounding in the margins, at beginning and end. 
Those of us who "know" this also know that it is in those margins that philosophy 
philosophizes. These necessarily and actively marginalized margins haunt what 
we start and get done, as curious guardians.
22
 
 
Not only did I have to unlearn particular economic ideas – about economic agency and 
how it becomes constituted and how all economic agency is mediated in multiple, 
overlapping, and sometimes contradictory ways by various structures – and to ignore my 
shaky foundations, but I also had to unlearn what it means to write academically. In fact, I 
have consciously written this dissertation in ways that go against many of the expectations 
about what constitutes a doctoral dissertation in the Social Sciences. In this way, the 
dissertation itself can be seen as a performative device. The form of writing I have chosen 
performs the contents of my arguments at a different level of abstraction and understanding. 
The way I have written the dissertation, its form, is meant to exactly mirror and reflect its 
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argument, its content or matter. Both form and content are meant to call into question 
particular preconceptions about what constitutes economics subjectivity as well as about what 
constitutes scholarship.  
Thinking of the dissertation in terms of form and content also brings me to my third 
suggestion for how to approach this dissertation, namely to regard this dissertation as much 
as an artistic product as a scientific one. There are two connected points to this issue. The 
first point concerns the fact that this thesis is best regarded as the product of a genuine 
aesthetic experience. The second point is that it also aims towards constituting an aesthetic 
product by itself. To begin, I want to note that not only is there no categorical difference 
between arts and science but that all good scientific work is also artistic. Both arts and 
science generate meaning and knowledge – both for the one doing the work and for the one 
reading or receiving it. My view of aesthetics is very much influenced by the work of John 
Dewey. Dewey criticises the view of art and aesthetics as being intrinsically tied to particular 
objects, say a painting or a piece of music. Instead, he argues that the nature of art is the 
result of a particular sort of experience. For Dewey, the defining feature of an aesthetic 
experience is that it is unified and complete, or, as he writes, “I have spoken of the esthetic 
quality that rounds out an experience…”23 An important aspect to any experience that is 
complete is that form and content perfectly complement each other. Form and content 
together form a unified whole. Dewey calls this “the immediate fusion of form and matter.”24 
Dewey further explains that a genuinely esthetic experience can be had anywhere we 
allow an experience to come to its own fulfilment, be it during a meal, or when playing a 
game. In all of these cases form and content are unified into a whole. Dewey writes that 
we have an experience when the material experienced has run its course to 
fulfilment. Then and then only is it integrated within and demarcated in the 
general stream of experience from other experiences. A piece of work is finished 
                                                          
23
 Dewey, John, Art as Experience, New York: Perigee Books, 2005, p.43. 
24
 Dewey, John, Art as Experience, New York: Perigee Books, 2005, p.135 
20 
 
in a way that is satisfactory; a problem received its solution; a game is played 
through; a situation, whether that of eating a meal, playing a game of chess, 
carrying on a conversation, writing a book, or taking part in a political campaign, 
is so rounded out that its close is a consummation and not a cessation. Such an 
experience is a whole and carries with it its own individualizing quality and self-
sufficiency. It is an experience.
25
 
 
Thinking of this dissertation in terms of the aesthetic experience that it constituted for me as 
the writer also in some way questions the status of what it means to write a doctoral 
dissertation, or any piece of academic writing for that matter. The standard view holds that 
good academic writing is characterised by the disinterestedness and separateness of the 
author from his scholarship. This, or so it is commonly thought, is the way to arrive at 
knowledge and truth. In Dewey’s writing about aesthetics, and Macfarlane’s writing about 
walking, however, the exact opposite is the case. Not disinterestedness and a standing apart 
from the subject matter but the complete immersion in it and with it results in a genuine 
understanding and knowledge. In fact, Dewey goes so far as to argue that any intellectual 
activity, as far as it is true and honest, is also an aesthetic activity. He writes: 
Hence an experience of thinking has its own esthetic quality…the experience 
itself has a satisfying emotional quality because it possesses internal integration 
and fulfilment reached through ordered and organised movement. This artistic 
structure may be immediately felt. In so far, it is esthetic. What is even more 
important is that not only is this quality a significant motive in undertaking 
intellectual inquiry and in keeping it honest, but that no intellectual activity us an 
integral event (is an experience), unless it is rounded out with this quality. 
Without it, thinking is inconclusive. In short, esthetic quality cannot be sharply 
marked off from intellectual experience since the latter must bear an esthetic 
stamp to be itself complete.
26
  
 
It may be the case that there are different types of knowledge: some types are better 
arrived at through disinterestedness; other types through complete immersion and 
identification with the subject matter. Yet, most research in social science as it is practiced 
would not even admit of this possibility and even if it was admitted, there seems to be a lack 
of insight into what it would mean to practice social science in a way that involves the 
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complete immersion of the researcher in his or her topic of research. So one way of 
approaching this dissertation is also as a piece of scholarship that tries to openly merge the 
subject and object into a single product.  
In trying to merge the subject and object of my research, I have also tried to make the 
dissertation into a work of aesthetics. In writing this dissertation in the way I have done, I 
have tried to share the nature of the aesthetic experience which I had when writing and 
researching it with the reader. I will be the first to admit that I probably did not succeed in 
this regard. The period of time allotted for this doctoral research simply did not suffice for me 
to perfectly round out and unify this product in a way that would justify calling it a genuine 
work of art. However, considering where I started, I think I have made considerable inroads 
in this regard. With a bit of luck, I will be able to return to this dissertation at some point in 
the future and turn its budding artistic pretensions into a fully-fledged work.  
In approaching and writing this dissertation in the way I have done, I also try to pay 
homage to previous scholarship which has called into question the academic conventions 
regarding the division between scholars and their scholarship. Naeem Inayatullah has called 
this tendency the precarious fiction of academic writing. Inayatullah highlights that no matter 
how hard we pretend as academics to remove any trace of our own individuality from the 
ideas we present, the suspicion never truly goes away that our position somehow reflects who 
we are as a person: 
Academic writing supposes a precarious fiction. It assumes the simultaneous 
absence and presence of the writer within the writing. The writer presents 
herself/himself as absent, as distant, as indifferent to the writing and ideas. The 
ideas are believed to speak for themselves while the writer serves as a vehicle 
for their expression. The author’s absence qualifies him or her as “objective” 
and “scientific”. This fictive distance, as we all know, dominates academic 
prose. And yet, the reader always uncovers the presence of a particular person 
in the writing. As readers, we suspect that the writing emerges from a point of 
22 
 
view, a gender, a class, a race, a nationality, a cultural heritage, a historical 
specificity, a biography.
27
   
 
As a result, the general academic convention to remove the individuality of the author from 
their research is not practicable. In fact, the continued insistence by many academic writers to 
pretend as if they were writing and speaking from a purely objective point of view devoid of 
their own person and interest is deeply damaging and counter-productive for arriving at an 
appreciation of the way in which social knowledge is produced and maintained. Rather than 
negating the subject who is producing (and by the time you read this, has produced) this 
work, I want to emphasise him at the outset. This work is the product of “a point of view, a 
gender, a class, a race, a nationality, a cultural heritage, a historical specificity, a biography.”  
This kind of admission in no way discredits the points and arguments I am trying to 
make. In fact, I think it strengthens them. In admitting the influence which my life has had on 
my ideas, I am also admitting the fact that the lives of other people will genuinely have led to 
different ideas. Only by bringing the subject undertaking social science research from the 
outside to the inside of the analysis, can we appreciate what Blaney and Inayatullah have 
called the problem of difference: How to reconcile a vision of a common humanity with the 
existence of unalterable subjective differences.
28
 I am therefore in full agreement with Peter 
Mandaville, who suggests that greater awareness of our own self makes for better social 
science research. Even though his comments are originally aimed at an audience in 
International Relations, they are just as applicable to nearly all work in the social science and 
humanities: 
The more we insert the ‘I’ into the lie that is disciplinary IR, the more we enable 
and reveal crucially important conversations about why and how we do 
International Relations in particular ways. Better social science, as one might be 
led to believe, is not so much the negation of self as it is the thorough 
interrogation of self from a positionality that crafts the world at the same time as 
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it engages in an auto-critique that lays bare the self-generated conditions of 
possibility that articulate the limits of the world.
29
 
 
The urge to emphasise my own person as part of this research project is itself an 
outcome of having undertaken four years of research on the subject matter. When I originally 
began with my research, I imagined that the problem with contemporary work in economics 
was that it misrepresented reality. In other words, reality was truly one way and economics 
wrongly claimed that it was another. And this mismatch between theory and reality could tell 
us a lot about why Anglo-Saxon countries suffered the financial crisis and its consequences. 
However, as I proceeded with my research, it slowly dawned on me that the crux of the 
matter lay elsewhere. It was not just a matter whether theory agrees with reality because 
theory also creates reality: It is only by bringing some theoretical presuppositions to reality 
that reality becomes comprehensible. With the aim of hindsight, I can see how the multiple 
and overlapping ways of forgetting that happened during the course of researching and 
writing this dissertation also influenced my own vision of who I am as a person. Prior to 
deciding to embark on this research, I had a fairly clear vision of what economic identity I 
ought to aspire to: I received my education at elite private institutions throughout the Anglo-
Saxon World. I was instructed, both explicitly and implicitly, in the ways of appearing, 
speaking, and performing a particular model of individuality and success: Smart, focused, 
hard-working, always in control, team-oriented, well-spoken, and confident. In appearing to 
be this kind of person, and to some extent internalising these goals as my own, I was offered 
many of the advantages which modern capitalist systems offer to the select few: Massive 
upward social mobility, high earnings potential, social recognition, and the promise of 
material well-being and security. But asking how economic knowledge is produced also 
made me ask how I had produced economic knowledge for myself. How had I made sense of 
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what it is that I was doing? Over time, I proceeded to peel away layer after layer of my own 
subjectivities. I suspect this process can be continued ad infinitum: There is no eternal core 
which houses an unalterable self and at the same time as layers are peeled back, new layers 
are created by new thoughts, influences, and interactions. Like an Escherian stairwell, we 
have a starting and end point in time but no absolute point of reference.  
 I would like to believe that these introductory reflections are more than just self-
indulgent on my part. I hope to point out how I viscerally experienced what Anthony Giddens 
has called the ‘double hermeneutic’ for my own research. Unlike the natural sciences, the 
social sciences and humanities study self-reflecting humans. As a result, the concepts used in 
order to study economic knowledge are often already part of the self-understanding of those 
who one studies. As Giddens writes: “The concepts of the social sciences are not produced 
about an independently constituted subject-matter, which continues regardless of what these 
concepts are. The ‘findings’ of the social sciences very often enter constitutively into the 
world they describe.”30 But this also has ramifications for how one can work as a researcher. 
Bent Flyvberg has pointed this out wonderfully when he writes: “Just as the people studied 
are part of a context, research itself also constitutes a context, and the researchers are a part of 
it. The researchers’ self-understanding and concepts do not exist in a vacuum, but must be 
understood in relation to this context.”31 Put differently, one crucial aspect of a positivistic 
understanding of knowledge sees theory as only describing reality. As part of this image of 
knowledge, the role and individuality of the researcher can be ignored. One way of rejecting 
the positivistic image of knowledge is therefore to give centre stage to the individuality of the 
researcher. In doing so, I hope to highlight the local, contextual, and social, and political 
nature of all economic knowledge. 
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Primary Contributions to the literature 
One potential hurdle I have to face is that the image of knowledge which I am criticising is 
also the image which tends to guide how academic work is assessed.  In fact, the criterion for 
the award of a PhD is that it provides ‘an original contribution to knowledge’.  This might 
seem innocuous at first but it actually contributes to the theory of knowledge I am trying to 
break away from. After all, would Shakespeare’s collected works pass the muster for the 
award of a doctorate in the social sciences? To those steeped in a positivistic understanding, 
the answer is clearly negative. Shakespeare’s writings are works of fiction; fiction does not 
accurately describe reality; thus works of fiction cannot constitute knowledge. Shakespeare’s 
writings do not correspond to events that have actually taken place, therefore whatever ideas 
are contained in his writings do not count as genuine knowledge. But this view is much too 
narrow. Some of our ideas matter mostly to the extent that they correspond to reality. But 
what underlies even those ideas is that they matter because these ideas are considered to be 
meaningful. Knowledge is inherently tied to meaning. What truly matters is whether we grant 
ideas the status of being meaningful to us – either individually or collectively. Existential 
status is of secondary concern. It is not an overstatement to suggest that I argue that what is 
meaningful is also true. This means that works of fiction can be as strong and enduring a 
basis of knowledge as works of non-fiction.
32
 Even more, it also means that to the extent that 
works in economics create meaning for people, economists produce fiction in the same way 
as novelists. As Deirdre McCloskey put it: “Economists are novelists too, and again they 
don’t know it.”33   
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 If the interconnection of knowledge and meaning is taken seriously, the nature and 
aim of a doctoral dissertation differs from that of a positivistic understanding. The positivistic 
understanding pictures knowledge generation as a slow cumulative process. Consequently, 
individual research is meant to provide a small contribution to a carefully selected area of 
inquiry. Hence, a doctoral dissertation should be an exhaustive exploration of a very narrow 
research area. The idea is that little by little, each individual contribution will help to exhaust 
the totality of possible knowledge. However, once the role of meaning is admitted to what 
counts as knowledge, knowledge generation can no longer be seen as cumulative. Rather, 
there is now space in which the same facts can be re-described and reinterpreted in myriad 
ways. In other words, research can also be concerned with exploring and even attempting to 
transform the basis of meaning generation itself.
34
 Rather than providing a small exhaustive 
contribution to a specialized subject field, I hope to provide an expansive re-description of a 
broad area of inquiry.  
Given this background, this dissertation is first and foremost intended as a treatise in 
political economy. I understand political economy in broad terms as involving explorations 
about the nature of economic processes and institutions, as well as the narratives and 
discourses that try to make these processes understandable. The aim of this dissertation is to 
explore some fundamentally important issues about how economic knowledge is generated 
and transmitted and what role economics as a discipline plays within these processes. Rather 
than seeing economic knowledge necessarily as the outcome of technically sophisticated 
practices, I also want to highlight its everyday dimensions.
35
 The everyday dimension 
highlights that economic knowledge and ideas are intrinsically related to a broader vision of 
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the political and social. For the individual, this also means that economic knowledge is 
connected to an understanding of personal identity within the political and social community 
in which one finds oneself. Framing economic knowledge production and transmission in this 
light emphasises that economics as a discipline is necessarily a political undertaking. 
Exploring the methodological and technical choices which economics makes is one way of 
uncovering the nature of these political commitments.  
I should admit at the outset that I am by no means the first to notice the points I am 
raising in this dissertation. So for the sake of honesty, as well as to help the reader anticipate 
what is to come, it might be worthwhile to contextualise this work a little bit. In one 
dimension, this dissertation very much continues the kind of work done by scholars in what 
can be broadly termed economic methodology. To ground the discussion, it may be 
worthwhile to recall some episodes in the development of economic thought, especially as far 
as concerns the development of positivism. The standard history of positivism, which is of 
course debatable, sees the birth of the field in the work of Henri de Saint-Simon, Pierre-
Simon Laplace, and Auguste Comte during the late 18
th
 and early 19
th
 century. Positivism 
was further developed under the banner of logical positivism during the 1920s and 1930s by 
scholars working as part of the Vienna Circle and Berlin Circle. Logical positivism advocates 
verificationism – that truth is the result of confirming sensory data.  
Karl Popper was one of the first critics of logical positivism. Rather than advocating 
verification, Popper advocates falsification. For Popper, only potentially falsifiable 
statements can produce preliminary truth. He writes: “In so far as a scientific statement 
speaks about reality, it must be falsifiable: and in so far as it is not falsifiable, it does not 
speak about reality.”36 Despite his critique of logical positivism, Popper still shares many of 
the underlying beliefs of logical positivism, namely that knowledge is somehow the result of 
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exact procedures. Even though knowledge can never be neutral, the scientific method 
somehow produces the most reliable and best knowledge available. Even though Popper, in 
typical Popperian modesty, answers his own rhetorical question about who killed positivism 
by stating that “I fear that I must admit responsibility”37, I judge much of the ethos which 
informs Popper’s writing still as positivistic.38 
 Economics as a discipline developed alongside, and in conversation with, the debates 
surrounding positivism.
39
 One of the first methodological works in economics which was 
directly informed by logical positivism was Terence Hutchison’s The Significance and Basic 
Postulates of Economic Theory, published in 1938. However, and this may be surprising from 
a modern standpoint, the reception which logical positivism and Hutchison’s work received 
was far from benign. In fact, none other than Frank Knight went to the length of writing a 
thirty-two page review of the book, discrediting most of what Hutchison had written. Knight 
concludes by saying that:   
Concrete and positive answers to questions in the field of economic science or 
policy depend in the first place on judgments of value and as to procedure on a 
broad, general education in the cultural sense, and on "insight" into human nature 
and social values, rather than on the findings of any possible positive science. 
From this point of view the need is for an interpretative study (verstehende 
Wissenschaft) which, however, would need to go far beyond any possible 
boundaries of economics and should include the humanities as well as the entire 
field of the social disciplines.
40
 
 
For a number of historical, institutional, and intellectual reasons, which I will not be able to 
comment on further, however, logical positivism became the dominant and only acceptable 
methodological outlook in economics.
41
 Lawrence Boland’s assessment that “positive 
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economics is now so pervasive that virtually all competing methodological views (except the 
most defeatist hard-core mathematical economics) have been eclipsed”42 remains as true as 
when Boland wrote it in 1997. Even worse, the idea that methodology is something that 
ought to be discussed and that there are choices to be made has been entirely lost to the 
discipline. Sheila Dow argues wonderfully how the disregard for methodology has cut off 
economics from methodological debates in other disciplines with the consequence that 
economics still practices and preaches what to scholars in other disciplines seem like 
outdated methodological standpoints:  
In the 1990s, we were potentially in transition to a synthesis consisting of new 
ways of generating knowledge which aim to identify a version of the truth, while 
admitting the impossibility of identifying absolute truth on the one hand but 
asserting the feasibility of different versions of the truth on the other. The 
continuing inattention to methodology in mainstream economics indicated a total 
lack of preparedness for this way of thinking; thoughtful mainstream economists 
had perceived its necessity, but impeded its development by discouraging 
methodological discussion.
43
 
 
Dow’s essential point, and this bears repeating, is that one cannot do social science without 
taking a methodological standpoint. Every methodological standpoint also has policy 
implications. This recognition has been lost in contemporary economics. My contribution is 
therefore also another call for what Dow and others have called New Economic Thinking – a 
greater awareness of how methodology affects the practice of economics and how the 
practice of economics in turn affects policy choices. Dow writes: 
We all use some methodology – and some philosophy of science – or another, 
whether we are aware of it or not. New economic thinking could well involve 
changing methodology and/or philosophy of science, with implications for theory 
and for policy. But we need first to bring to the surface the methodology and 
philosophy of science on which we and others implicitly base our theory and 
policy if we are to contemplate considering possible changes. Even more, we need 
to bring to the surface the mode of thought we employ: how we conceptualise the 
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world, communicate about it and form arguments about it. This is not easy; we 
normally function by taking these things for granted.
44
 
 
A number of economic methodologists have highlighted how the prevalence of 
positivism inhibits the study of how ideas and knowledge become constituted. Over fifteen 
years ago, Alfred Coats and David Colander remarked in their The Spread of Economic 
Ideas: “Given the importance of ideas it is strange that the process, and institutions, through 
which economic ideas are transferred from individual brains into the general inventory of 
ideas and eventually into policy has not been considered seriously.”45 Warren J. Samuels’ 
Economics As Discourse: An Analysis of the Language of Economists, Mary Poovey’s A 
History of the Modern Fact: Problems of Knowledge in the Sciences of Wealth and Society, 
Tony Lawson’s Reorienting Economics, Uskali Mäki’s edited volume Fact and Fiction in 
Economics: Models, Realism, and Social Construction, Peter Howlett’s and Mary Morgan’s 
edited volume How Well Do Facts Travel?: The Dissemination of Reliable Knowledge, and 
Tiago Mata’s and Steven G. Medema’s edited volume Cultures of expertise and the public 
interventions of economists stand out as other good examples. However, these interventions 
have amounted to very little in the way ideas are treated in mainstream economics. 
But even when the role of ideas is seriously considered, one frequently encounters a 
certain amount of unease. Coats and Colander’s discussion is exemplary in this regard. They 
are quick to point out that there are two quite understandable reasons why the role of ideas 
has not really been considered. The first issue is the sheer complexity of the subject. They 
note that “the concepts are vague, the institutions hazy, and the process messy. Studying the 
spread of ideas is like studying subatomic particles with half-lives of nanoseconds.”46 The 
second reason is that according to the dominant methodology of economics, the issue of the 
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production and reproduction of ideas is really a non-issue since it is practically assumed from 
the outset that ideas only ever get replaced by better ideas. Coats and Colander rightly note 
that according “to standard scientific methodologies - positivism, falsificationism, and 
modernism - it is a nonsubject. These standard methodologies implicitly assume that the 
"best" ideas necessarily win out. If this is the case, why study the process?”47 In order to 
avoid these methodological shortcomings, Coats and Colander rightly identify the importance 
of language, saying that in “the spreading of ideas language is crucial.”48 
 Despite all these perfectly relevant considerations, Coats and Colander ultimately shy 
away from engaging with the issue in the depth that would be desirable. They ineffectively 
take three shortcuts in order to simplify their task. The first shortcut is that even though they 
note the relevance of the concept of truth in the production of ideas, they refuse to consider 
how this issue actually influences economic ideas, preferring for scholars in other fields to 
deal with this question. They write: “Whether "truth" is attainable, or whether unambiguous 
criteria of "best" ideas can be established, are matters that can, for present purposes at least, 
be left to the epistemologists and philosophers.”49 But if this issue is as central to the 
production of ideas as Coats and Colander rightly point out, it surely needs to take a central 
place in the analysis and not be considered something of an afterthought. The second shortcut 
is that despite the promising title of their book, they actually do not deal with the 
popularisation of economic ideas at all saying that “the popularization of economic ideas, as 
such, is not considered because it is too large and amorphous a subject.”50 Clearly, any 
thorough account of how economic ideas spread also needs to include an account of how they 
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become popular. The last shortcut that Coats and Colander use is a particularly narrow 
conception of the nature of ideas. For Coats and Colander, an idea is “a conception or notion 
of something to be done or carried out; a plan of action.”51 However, this is clearly a small 
subsection of the role which ideas play in the production of economic knowledge. Ideas such 
as personhood, identity, justice, fairness, commitment, obligation, etc. all play a crucial role 
in the production of economic knowledge even though they clearly do not contain any plan of 
action. Rather, these ideas are invoked when thinking about what course of action should be 
chosen. Given this framing of the issue, Coats and Colander then provide three kinds of 
models through which to conceptualise the production and transmission of ideas which they 
term the “the infectious disease model, the marketplace for ideas, the information theory 
model.”52 Thus, despite the right intuitions and intentions, Coats and Colander end up 
reproducing the kind of positivistic understanding they found problematic in the first place. 
 One way in which economic methodologists have attempted to circumvent the 
problems associated with studying ideas is through a greater appreciation of the way 
language works. This is an inclination I share. Works that should be mentioned in this regards 
include Willie Henderson’s edited volume Economics & Language, Arjo Klamer’s Speaking 
of Economics: How to get into the conversation, John B. Davis’ The theory of the individual 
in economics: Identity and Value, Uskali Mäki’s edited volume The economic world view: 
Studies in the ontology of economics, David Ruccio’s edited volume Economic 
Representations: Academic and everyday as well as Deirdre McCloskey’s Knowledge and 
Persuasion in Economics and The rhetoric of economics (as well as numerous other works). 
 One revealing aspect about the literature in economic methodology is that I had read 
and used a substantial portion of it to research and write both my bachelor and master theses. 
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So I was very familiar with this literature. However, as I began to explore other literatures, 
my reading and understanding of the literature in economic methodology began to change 
imperceptibly. So this is another aspect where I had to return to paths previously trodden.
53
 In 
fact, my reading of the literature changed to such an extent that when I first started to write 
up this thesis, I did not think of including it at all. Part of the reason is undoubtedly that I was 
previously most attracted to scholars such as Mark Blaug who epitomizes the Popperian 
tradition of stressing the importance of the testability of theories. At one point Blaug writes 
that my “own contention, by way of contrast, is that the central weakness of modern 
economics is, indeed, the reluctance to produce the theories that yield unambiguously 
refutable implications, followed by a general unwillingness to confront those implications 
with the facts.”54 I have since moved away from focusing on the testability of theories to the 
importance of socialisation. So at another level, this dissertation is also a testimony to how 
my thinking has evolved within a single literature, although this is probably one of the less 
important issues to point out. Right now, I am most comfortable with the way in which 
somebody like Roy Weintraub frames the relevant issue. Weintraub wonderfully connects the 
issue of economic methodology with the issue of how ideas are transmitted through language 
in discourse communities. In many ways, this dissertation is also an elaboration on a short 
section found in Weintraub’s How Economics Became a Mathematical Science. There he 
writes:  
Too often histories of economics engage the charming conceit that economic ideas 
are autonomous free-floating ethereal objects, which pass from one disembodied 
mind to another quite unmediated, though they are occasionally transformed by 
other products of pure thought. The evidence our professional lives provides a 
reality quite different. Real people (like you and me) have beliefs, those beliefs 
are what we take to be ideas, and these ideas are transformed, reconfigured, and 
reinterpreted in cascades of representation and re-representation in intentional 
(and sometimes unintentional) discourse communities….As infants are not born 
speaking a language of supply shocks and heteroskadasticity, the process by 
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which individuals become economists conditions and shapes the practices, 
including the speech practices, of those who identify themselves as economists.
55
 
 
A slightly different way of framing the issue of economic methodology is to argue that 
economics might benefit from approaching the subject matter with a different kind of 
attitude. This attitude is best exemplified by some writings that are not usually part of the 
economic methodology curriculum. Besides the authors mentioned, I draw on the work of 
three different scholars for inspiration: Michel Foucault, Jürgen Habermas, and Richard 
Rorty. All of them have contributed tremendously to a vision of the social sciences and 
humanities that breaks with a positivistic notion of knowledge. Despite working in different 
fields, their writing shares a common debt to the pioneering work of the later Wittgenstein. 
Michel Foucault emphasises that academic work in the social sciences and humanities 
does not begin with some concrete theories but with a decision how to approach the human 
experience in its totality. Foucault terms this the critical ontology of ourselves: 
The critical ontology of ourselves must be considered not, certainly, as a theory or 
a doctrine; rather it must be conceived as an attitude, an ethos, a philosophical life 
in which the critique of what we are is at one and the same time the historical 
analysis of the limits imposed on us and an experiment with the possibility of 
going beyond them.
56
 
 
For Foucault, like for myself, this critical attitude consists of how we approach our 
experience of the world vis-à-vis others. It consists of a particular type of resistance. 
Resistance against the tendency to begin theorizing and academic work with an implicit or 
explicit theory of the subject. However, it is important that this needs to be understood in 
context. There are clearly things that in some sense do consider a theory of the subject but 
these are not the ones that concern us: No human can fly, no human can live underwater, all 
humans die, etc. These facts constitute the external circumstance within which human 
experience becomes meaningfully understandable. Consideration of these external 
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circumstances in some way does provide a theory of the subject but only in the shallowest 
sense. The deep, and problematic theory of the subject, concerns how humans create 
meanings, how they create knowledge by which they evaluate the circumstances of their 
existence.   
What I refused was precisely that you first of all set up a theory of the subject - as 
could be done in phenomenology and in existentialism - and that, beginning from 
the theory of the subject, you come to pose the question of knowing, for example, 
how such and such a form of knowledge was possible. What I wanted to know 
was how the subject constituted himself, in such and such a determined form, as a 
mad subject or as a normal subject, through a certain number of practices which 
were games of truth, applications of power, etc. I had to reject a certain a priori 
theory of the subject in order to make this analysis of the relationships which can 
exist between the constitution of the subject or different forms of the subject and 
games of truth, practices of power and so forth.
57
 
 
This point has also continuously been emphasised in the work of Habermas. Commenting on 
the work of Hegel, Habermas writes that “the species can have no fixed essence, either as a 
transcendental form of life or in the empirical form of a biologically conditioned basic pattern 
of culture.”58 
In other words, I am planning to synthesise some perspectives from the literature in 
economic methodology with a number of perspectives in other disciplines to show how such 
a synthesis can provide a grounded starting point for a different way of practicing and writing 
economics. I rely on the work of scholars who have tried to understand and explain how 
knowledge creates meaning and how the creation of meaning is related to all aspects that we 
consider special about the human experience: empathy, wisdom, and hope.
59
 Different 
scholars outside economics have touched upon many relevant issues but there has been no 
                                                          
57
 Fornet-Betancourt, Raúl and Helmut Becker et al., “The ethic of care for the self as a practice of freedom: an 
interview with Michel Foucault on January 20, 1984”, Philosophy & Social Criticism, 12, 1987, p.121. 
58
 Habermas, Jürgen, Knowledge and Human Interests, Boston: Beacon Press, 1972, pp.29-30. 
59
 For a great exploration on the interrelationship between economic knowledge and practice and empathy and 
wisdom see : Schwarz, Barry and Kenneth Sharpe, Practical Wisdom: The Right Way to Do the Right Thing, 
London: Penguin, 2011. 
36 
 
concerted attempt to make this into a fully-fledged research project.
60
 Somewhat ambitiously, 
this dissertation is meant to lay the groundwork for such a research project.  
However, maybe my ambition becomes more understandable and more acceptable if 
one remembers that the attitude I am trying to bring to economics merely attempts to revive 
an older sprit of political economy. The spirit I have in mind is that of the classical political 
economy of Adam Smith. Contrary to some commentators, like James Buchanan, who 
suggest that Adam Smith was the founder of today’s laissez-faire philosophy, or those who 
see a fundamental contradiction in the work of Smith (which became known as the Adam 
Smith problem)
61
, my understanding follows the interpretation of scholars who advocate a 
reading of Smith that highlights the sociality of all economic interactions.
62
 I see another 
important dimension to my contribution in this dissertation to become yet another voice in the 
choir that emphasises the older, Smithian tradition of practicing political economy.  
 Smith occasionally played with an intriguing idea but for some reason never pursued 
it at any length: The economic activity is but a manifestation of the ability of communication. 
For Smith, the chief determinant of wealth is the division of labour, the ability and 
willingness of workers to concentrate on one small step in the overall production process. In 
the famous example of the pin factory, Smith notes that a single individual “could scarce, 
perhaps, with his utmost industry, make one pin in a day” but when each person focuses on 
one small aspect of the overall production process, Smith claims, each person “might be 
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considered as making four thousand eight hundred pins in a day.”63 When Smith 
contemplates how it is that people decide to focus their attention to one particular operation 
rather than the overall process, he argues that this is not due to some economic calculation. 
Rather, he sees it as a direct result of a certain trait of human nature. For him, the most 
obvious candidate for the responsible trait is “the propensity to truck, barter and exchange 
one thing for another”: 
This division of labour, from which so many advantages are derived, is not 
originally the effect of any human wisdom, which foresees and intends that 
general opulence to which it gives occasion.  It is the necessary, though very 
slow and gradual, consequence of a certain propensity in human nature which 
has in view no such extensive utility; the propensity to truck, barter, and 
exchange one thing for another.
64
 
 
This paragraph has often been quoted in support of the idea that all human interactions based 
on economic motives. The idea of homo economicus was supposedly born. However, such an 
argument disregards the fact that in the very next sentence Smith admits that he is actually 
quite unsure whether this propensity of truck and barter is a fundamental part of human 
nature or merely a manifestation of much more basic human inclinations. In fact, he goes so 
far as to suggest that “as seems more probable” our economic activity is but a derivate of 
some more basic human features, namely our ability to communicate. Sadly, however, Smith 
did not want to take this train of thought any further. He writes: 
Whether this propensity [to truck and barter] be one of those original principles in 
human nature, of which no further account can be given; or whether, as seems 
more probable, it be the necessary consequence of the faculties of reason and 
speech, it belongs not to our present subject to enquire.  
 
In his earlier Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith had already vocalized this idea to say that 
the ability to speak and communicate is what truly makes humans special, not our ability to 
exchange one thing for another.   
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The desire of being believed, the desire of persuading, of leading and directing 
other people, seems to be one of the strongest of all our natural desires. It is, 
perhaps, the instinct upon which is founded the faculty of speech, the 
characteristical faculty of human nature. No other animal possesses this 
faculty, and we cannot discover in any other animal any desire to lead and 
direct the judgment and conduct of its fellows. Great ambition, the desire of 
real superiority, of leading and directing, seems to be altogether peculiar to 
man, and speech is the great instrument of ambition, of real superiority, of 
leading and directing the judgments and conduct of other people.
65
 
 
Stephen McKenna has made a very similar claim about another famous passage in The 
Wealth of Nations, namely the famous brewer passage where Smith writes that it “is not from 
the benevolence of the butcher or the brewer or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from 
their regard to their own interest.”66 This passage is frequently cited in support of the idea 
that Smith holds that humans only act out of their self-interest. McKenna, however, argues 
(correctly I think) that before and after this quote Smith is writing about “the centrality of 
persuasion as a means of achieving the cooperation necessary in a civil society.”67 McKenna 
tries to highlight how “Smith saw humans as being in a constant state of persuasion, 
perpetually trying to alleviate the discomfort of disagreement through the endless making and 
remaking of social consensus.”68 For Smith, it is never a question of some very narrowly 
defined self-interest. Rather, all economic actions are taken on the basis of social 
considerations.  
The idea that language, speech, and communication might drive important insights to 
our understanding of economic activity seems mostly to have gotten lost in economic 
theorising since Smith. In one sense, then, I am urging political economy to go back to what 
is often considered the beginning of modern economic thought. To take Smith’s suggestions 
seriously and to inquire how processes of meaning generation produce, maintain, and 
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transform economic activity. It is not a question of homo economicus but homo 
communicandis. This image of homo communicandis rather than homo economicus is one of 
the central threads of this dissertation. It reappears at a number of places and connects the 
different issues I am discussing. 
 
Secondary contributions 
The idea of homo communicandis also encapsulates four related secondary contributions 
which I hope to make with this dissertation. The first of these is to contribute to a softening of 
the perceived difference between art and science. Under a positivistic view of knowledge, art 
and science are purely antagonistic. They are opposites. I think this supposed dichotomy 
between art and science obscures both the ultimate aim of science as well as art. They both 
play a role in how humans generate meaning for their life so they are both inherently part of 
the field of knowledge. Both art and science are two activities through and by which humans 
understand their place in the universe. They are both sources of understanding but also of 
confusion. Like the authors in Autobiographical International Relations, I would like 
emphasise the complementarity or arts and science, rather than their opposition: 
Science aims at a mystic’s goal – to explain and understand life’s fullness. 
However, as scientists, we exclude the mystic’s tool – poetry, dance, music, 
and meditative contemplation. These authors try to blur this boundary as they 
move towards a kind of artistic science with their writing. In the process they 
disclose themselves and their writing bares itself. I find myself feeling neither 
pride nor shame in their exposure. What we get instead is that I assume many 
of us actually desire from our reading – a substantive look at life/lives in 
process. Seamlessly, we are shown the mundane and the dramatic, the 
empirical and the theoretical, the structures and the processes that constitute 
and change humans.
69
 
 
This point has also wonderfully been made by Mary Morgan. In Travelling Facts, Morgan 
argues that even though it might at first appear that there is a categorical difference between 
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facts in the natural sciences, social sciences, and art, all facts share the fact that they are 
transmitted as part of larger narratives. Morgan writes that:  
It is usually assumed that the sciences and the humanities have different ways of 
knowing things, yet our account of travelling facts suggests that we can tell the 
same sorts of stories about the travels of facts in both domains….We have 
demonstrated how various kinds of associates: stories, models, labels and good 
companions, as well as a good dose of character, will help to set them off and 
keep them moving to some useful destination. That travel process, however, is 
quite unpredictable: it is dynamic, extended and interactional.
70
 
 
The second hope is to provide a contribution to the way scholarship in political economy is 
written. I often feel that social science research involves an unnecessary amount of jargon. 
My vision is for a way of writing political economy that is easily accessible to a vast 
audience which requires a limited amount of highly specialised terminology. Like the authors 
in Autobiographical International Relations, I want to show that “there is a way of 
speaking…about social theory, that is subtle, attuned to complexity but largely jargon free.”71 
But I think this commitment to a jargon free way of writing also has positive effects beyond 
accessibility. I think it furthermore contributes to a way of better and easier learning. In other 
words, better writing is also a pedagogical commitment. As Inayatullah writes: “To the 
degree that….social theoretical knowledge [can be presented] without alienating prose, [it] 
can move students and teachers towards engaged and precise learning.”72 This call has 
already been made by Roger Tooze and Craig Murphy nearly twenty years ago.
73
 Sadly, I do 
not think it has received much attention so it is worthwhile to repeat it. 
 A third contribution is to outline a different way of thinking about the pedagogy of 
economics. Teaching economics is not just a matter of accurately describing reality but the 
                                                          
70
 Morgan, Mary “Travelling Facts” in Howlett, Peter and Mary Morgan, How well do facts Travel?, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,  2011, pp.35-36. 
71
 Inayatullah, Naeem “Falling and Flying: an introduction”, in Inayatullah, Naeem (ed.), Autobiographical 
International Relations: I,IR, London: Routledge, 2010, pp. 9-10. 
72
 Inayatullah, Naeem “Falling and Flying: an introduction”, in Inayatullah, Naeem (ed.), Autobiographical 
International Relations: I,IR, London: Routledge, 2010, pp. 9. 
73
 Tooze, Roger and Craig N. Murphy, “The Epistemology of Poverty and the Poverty of Epistemology in IPE: 
Mystery, Blindness, and Invisibility”, Millennium: Journalal of International Studies, 25(3), 1996, pp. 681- 
707. 
41 
 
way these subjects are taught also contributes to the constitution of social and economic 
issues. In learning the language of economics, students also learn how they ought to frame 
particular social and economic problems. They learn what kind of considerations are relevant, 
and which ones are not, and why. In short, learning the language of economics is also a 
vehicle in which students become socialised into a particular way of thinking. Since the way 
in which to teach economics is not given by reality itself, there is also an important issue of 
responsibility for the teachers of economics. In deciding how economics is taught, a decision 
is also made how to socialise students and in what ways. Even though teaching economics is 
only one source of socialisation amongst many, I think it nevertheless plays an important 
role. The recognition that the educators of economics bear some responsibility for certain 
beliefs and practices still seems very much underappreciated, and in writing this dissertation I 
would also like to draw attention to this fact. 
 This issue has also played out during some of my activities outside the writing of this 
thesis. During my doctoral research, I have become involved with the activities of what is 
probably the largest movement advocating for curriculum reform in economics – the Institute 
for New Economic Thinking. I have been invited to attend and speak at a number of their 
events over the last two years, but even though this curriculum reform movement has some 
right ideas about some of the things that are currently lacking in economics, it is still entirely 
unwilling to embrace some of the ideas advocated in this dissertation. And I have grown 
more and more convinced that the reason for this is precisely the unwillingness to let go of 
the subject/object distinction that informs positivistic methodology. In most of my 
conversations with different economists, who moreover believe in the need to transform the 
way economics is taught, the issue of methodology has come up. And because economists 
have received no methodological training besides being told that methodology is not 
something they need to worry about, it proves a nearly insurmountable hurdle. Therefore, in 
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order to substantially transform the way economics is taught at university, it is necessary to 
consider methodology properly.  
The last secondary contribution I would like to make is to advance an understanding 
of how economic ideas become accepted in society at large. This issue is barely treated 
explicitly in traditional economic theory, but the underlying idea seems to be inspired by the 
Platonic philosopher king: The economic theorist, having found out the truth about the 
economic system, subsequently teaches these insights to future economist-kings or 
implements actions that bring about the desired outcomes. The non-specialist population 
learns of the findings as if by decree and has no choice but to accept their validity. There can 
therefore be no room for genuine democratic debate when it comes to economic knowledge. 
Positivism about economic knowledge in the social sciences and humanities ultimately leads 
to totalitarian and authoritarian economic management. Against this somewhat caricaturized 
version of the envisioned transmission mechanism of economic knowledge between 
economic theorist and the general population, I want to emphasise the importance of non-
academic material in the process. Even though economic textbooks and research in 
economics and related discipline is one source of economic knowledge, it needs to be 
understood that this is not the only source, nor necessarily the most important one. Instead, 
we find economic knowledge all around us: In novels, films, TV-Shows, advertising, 
conversations with friends and foes, in primary and secondary education. But if this is the 
case, then economic knowledge cannot exclusively and predominantly be about formal 
theories. Rather, economic knowledge is contained in narratives about what counts as 
success, what one should do, and how one should act. In writing this dissertation, I also hope 
to provide a first attempt how we might begin to think about the variety of narratives which 
produce economic knowledge.     
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Relation between economics and other disciplines 
Having outlined my intended contribution to the literature, or my intended literary 
contribution, I want to make some introductory comments on the relation between economics 
and other disciplines that explore economic and social knowledge. Throughout the thesis, I 
maintain what at first sight appears to be two directly contradictory positions: I argue at the 
same time that disciplinary boundaries are completely irrelevant and absolutely crucial. I 
want to differentiate between two important contexts by which to consider disciplinary 
practices: The content of knowledge and the power relations between disciplinary divisions.  
In terms of the content of knowledge, disciplinary boundaries do not matter. In terms of their 
intrinsic power relations, they are absolutely crucial. 
 So what exactly is the content of economic knowledge? I mean to use this term in the 
broadest possible sense. I use economic knowledge and ideas as an aggregate umbrella term 
to denote the total stock of different ideas, norms, and beliefs about the goals and functioning 
of the economic system that exist in a given community at a particular point in time. I do not 
want to suggest that these ideas, norms, and beliefs need to be held equally strongly by 
everybody or that each and every member of the community needs to hold them. I just mean 
that they would be accepted by a substantial majority of the community but what exactly 
counts as substantial can vary. To better understand this, it might be worthwhile to consider 
that knowledge is not the same as information or data.
74
 Information and data by itself are 
meaningless. We need to know what to do to make sense of the information. Is a particular 
piece of information good or bad? It is the ability to make sense of information that 
constitutes knowledge. As such, knowledge always involves interpretation and meaning 
generation. Different examples of economic knowledge may therefore include:  
After eating in a restaurant, one has to pay the bill 
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Printing money causes inflation 
If you work hard, you get rewarded 
Money is power 
Politicians are corrupt 
Going to university will allow you to earn more money 
Increasing the minimum wage will cause unemployment 
People on welfare are lazy 
Who is responsible for managing economic processes 
The elasticity of the demand for heroin is higher than the elasticity of the demand for 
movie tickets 
 
Some economic knowledge clearly requires specialised training; other types do not. I 
will make some further observations on this in later chapters but I simply want to highlight 
for now that all disciplines in the social sciences and humanities can in principle make 
equally important contributions to understanding and shaping economic ideas. In other 
words, all disciplines studying economic knowledge share the same subject matter. Some 
methodologies are undoubtedly better for studying particular types of problems and this may 
be reflected in disciplinary differences. However, this does not mean that a single discipline 
is a priori better equipped to study and understand economic processes. In terms of the 
content of knowledge, there is no difference between the various disciplines which study and 
provide economic knowledge. 
However, there is a crucial difference in whose knowledge gets recognised as 
authoritative. In all matters of economic knowledge, the crucial question is who gets to speak 
for the economy, so to speak.  I do not mean to reify economic processes here. I mean who is 
called upon to say they understand economic processes and how to solve economic issues. In 
this context, disciplinary boundaries play a massively important role. As it stands at the 
moment, those trained and working within economic departments are often recognised as 
being the sole bearers of economic knowledge. However, given the narrowness of the 
economic training in Anglo-Saxon countries, this is highly problematic. In this sense, I am 
hoping to contribute to scholarship that challenges the dominant position of traditional 
economists in speaking for the economy.  
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A different way of saying this is to invoke Foucault’s notion of regimes of truth. 
Economics, and the training it provides, functions exactly as a regime of truth as outlined by 
Foucault. It steers what kind of economic statements make sense; it guides who can speak 
truthfully about the economy. As he writes: 
Each society has its regime of truth, its general politics of truth: that is the types 
of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and 
instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by 
which each is sanctioned, the techniques and procedures accorded value in the 
acquisition of truth, the status of those who are charged with saying what counts 
as true.
75
  
 
By showing that another vision of what economic life looks like is both legitimate and 
justified, my vision for political economy is to provide a challenge to the particular regime of 
truth of standard economics.   
 A very important ramification of this discussion is the self-image and self-
understanding of practitioners working within economics and related fields. Even at first 
glance one can notice how deeply the positivistic understanding of knowledge underlies the 
study of economics. Lionel Robbin’s now taken for granted definition states that “economics 
is the science which studies human behaviour as a relationship between ends and scarce 
means which have alternative uses.”76 This definition, which has taken on seminal status, 
pretends as if economics is merely about describing external reality. As if economics is 
merely about the relationship between ends and means. What is entirely missing from this 
definition, and it simply cannot be combined with it, is that economics is also about self-
formation. It provides self-understanding for individuals and it also provides understanding of 
what society ought to be like. The kind of things that count as economic knowledge or 
economic ideas do so because they in some way contribute to bringing about what is 
considered a desirable economic outcomes, or they help in avoiding undesirable outcomes. 
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Without positivism, it simply does not make sense to maintain that economics is only about 
the relationship between means and ends.  
 
Structure of thesis 
Before proceeding further, I would like to give a brief outline of the structure of the thesis 
and the arguments that are to follow. The thesis is divided into three parts. Part one is formed 
by the introduction, chapter one, and chapter two. Part two consists of chapters three to five. 
Part three is made up of chapter six, seven, and the conclusion. The general aim of this 
structure is to move from the most general to the most specific arguments. Part one deals with 
broad questions about the nature of knowledge, language and socialisation. Part two 
highlights two broad ways in which the reflections of the first part can be applied. Part three 
very specifically looks at two very narrow cases. This also means that a reader who finds the 
arguments of part one convincing, may nevertheless disagree with the arguments presented in 
parts two and three. The converse, however, is unlikely to be the case. It is unlikely that one 
can accept the arguments of parts two and three if one does not accept the broader theoretical 
and methodological outlook provided in part one.  
 The structure has also been chosen to allow my writing to simultaneously function in 
different narrative dimensions. On one level, this thesis can be read as an argument against 
the standard claim that economic theory is only concerned with providing an accurate 
description of how something called the economy really functions. There is really nothing 
original or novel about this idea. However, it still reigns supreme in economic departments 
and most political economy programs throughout the Anglo-Saxon world. Consequently, it is 
worth to repeat and to remind the scholarly communities in question that there is a lot more 
going on in economics than a description of processes and consumption and production.  
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At another level, I am trying to show how one might do research in economics once 
economics is no longer seen solely as a description of economic processes. To my mind, this 
is where I can hope to bring in some new ideas to discussions in economics. One of the 
problems I encounter is that even scholars who share my assessment about the nature of 
economic theory generally appear to feel obliged to continue writing and teaching the subject 
as if they had not made this realization. In other words, there appears to be a large gap 
between how economic theory and political economy is theorised and how it is practiced and 
taught to students. In structuring the dissertation in the way I did, I am trying to provide one 
example to show how research economic and political economy can be practised differently 
(and also taught differently). 
At another level yet, I also want to give you, the reader, some understanding and 
appreciation for how I, the writer, came to believe the arguments I am trying to make in this 
dissertation. In this dimension, this dissertation can be read as a structured intellectual diary. I 
want to emphasise that at the same time as I am trying to tell you, the reader, something that I 
feel is important in this thesis, at the same time as I am trying to convince you to look at the 
world in a particular way, the processes that led to these realizations, that led me to look at 
the world in this way, were also important to me – intellectually and personally. In fact, when 
I started the research for this project, I was still very much convinced of the very argument I 
am now trying to discredit: that the main concern of economic theory and political economy 
is accurate description of reality as it really is. As a result, the dissertation can be read as a 
document of my own intellectual journey, of how I was convinced that my previous beliefs 
were inadequate and why I think my current beliefs are better. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, perhaps paradoxically, there is a certain asymmetry between 
the importance to be attributed to the various dimensions of the narrative I am presenting for 
me, as the writer, and for you, the reader. What is most important to me as chronicler of my 
48 
 
own intellectual journey are the arguments presented in part one. The arguments and 
reflections in this part of the dissertation are ultimately the reasons why I changed my mind 
on very many issues and why I have decided to write the thesis which you are currently 
reading. Without part one, the writing of the other parts would literally have been impossibly. 
In this way, part one forms the very condition of possibility for the existence of part two and 
three. Consequently, I had an inclination to devote more time and space on elucidating this 
part than you will find in the version you are currently reading. In the end, I decided to 
shorten this part of the thesis for two reasons. First, any reader who is sympathetic to my 
theoretical assessment on the nature of economic theory will undoubtedly have come across 
the original arguments which convinced me and which I am now repeating in my own 
version. In other words, there is not much new or original to find in this part for the 
sympathetic reader. The unsympathetic reader, somebody who is still convinced that 
economic theory is only about description of reality, by contrast, is probably better off going 
back to the original sources which I have used. There is no way for me to do full justice to the 
complexity and eloquence of the arguments I have relied on and appropriated. All I can offer 
an unsympathetic reader is a brief introduction as to why one ought to change one’s mind on 
these issues. 
The first chapter reviews what to my mind are some of the best arguments against the 
idea that there exists a methodology in the social sciences that can completely separate the 
researcher from the object of study. Essentially, this is what has to be possible in order for 
economic theory and political economy to be only concerned about the description of 
economic processes as they really are. If it is not possible, then our own outlook on life, our 
background supposition and beliefs, will somehow influence our description of economic 
processes, meaning that the same process could also be accurately redescribed in a different 
way. I review three separate but related arguments that make an overwhelmingly convincing 
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case against the separation of subject and object. I argue also that this vision of methodology 
is also a prerequisite for the vision of homo economicus. 
First, I review the argument developed American pragmatists, but particularly John 
Dewey and his later follower Richard Rorty, that it is misleading to believe that there is 
anything like unmediated experience. Dewey and Rorty emphasise that whatever we perceive 
and know only becomes perceivable and knowable by being put into categories and concepts 
which we have learnt. But these categories also shape how something is perceived. 
Unsurprisingly, this also holds for economic phenomena. Whatever economic processes we 
try to understand, the concepts and categories we bring to the analysis shape the nature of our 
understanding. This point is especially interesting because the theory of knowledge which 
underlies the belief in unmediated experience and the current practice of economics share a 
commitment towards the single individual as the only relevant unit of analysis in economics. 
In the same way as only my own perception is seen as a sure ground of knowledge, only my 
own self is seen as a relevant category for the evaluation of economic outcomes. Dewey and 
Rorty argue the opposite: The only basis for knowledge is social which means that the social 
is also a relevant category for an analysis of economic outcomes. 
 The second argument I reiterate has also been put forward by American pragmatists 
but it has also been developed by cultural theorist and literary critics. It is related to the 
argument that there exists no unmediated perception but its emphasis is slightly different. 
One of the implicit assumptions which fosters the belief that economic processes can be 
described as they really are is that there exists some unique standard by which the truth of 
economic propositions can be assessed. I argue that such standard does not exist. 
 The third argument I review is concerned with the testability of propositions. This 
point is also related to the previous two points but it has a different set of implications. This 
argument is especially directed towards anybody who believes that econometric analysis can 
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in fact be used to find proposition that are really true. I begin the discussion with the concept 
of falsifiability developed by Karl Popper. Popper is a useful starting point because, together 
with the work of Thomas Kuhn, he is probably the only scholar whose work in this area is 
known by non-specialists. I then reiterate the critique of falsifiability made by scholars like 
Duhem and Quine to show that falsifiability cannot be used to uniquely assess the truth of a 
proposition. I subsequently bring in the work of Helen Longino to reiterate a point I already 
made earlier: that the only basis of most types of knowledge is social.  
 The second chapter attempts to supplement and build upon the criticisms of the first 
chapter. In a way, the aim of the first chapter is negative. I want that a particular vision of 
knowledge is unconvincing and that scholarship which relies on this vision of knowledge 
misleads its authors and readership. The second chapter tries to be more constructive, giving 
some guidance as to how research in the social sciences and humanities should approach 
knowledge and what this might mean for the way political economy is practiced. For this 
purpose, I heavily rely on the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein, as well as scholars who have 
appropriated his insights in different ways, most notably Richard Rorty and Michael Shapiro. 
My argument emphasises the role of language. Language is not a neutral tool. As a result, 
there can never be one way of practicing economics. The question therefore becomes what 
difference does it make to practice economics one way, rather than another? Using Rorty’s 
differentiation of objectivity versus solidarity, I argue that too much economics has been 
practiced in line with Rorty’s sense of objectivity and that it would be desirable to have more 
economics practiced in the image of solidarity.
77
 The notion of objectivity vs solidarity is 
another of the main threads of this dissertation. The image of homo economicus is related to 
and fosters objectivity in Rorty’s sense. The image of homo communicandis I advocate, by 
contrast, is meant to emphasise and strengthen solidarity.              
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  Part two of the thesis traces some of the consequences of accepting the claim that 
economic theory involves more than accurate description of reality. The chief consequence is 
that the entire picture of what economics is and how it is learnt changes as a result. Rather 
than regarding economic theory as a tool to solve puzzles and problems, economic theory 
shapes how we view the world. Rather than just describing reality, economic ideas inherently 
influence how reality is perceived. This means that economic theory and economic ideas 
should also be regarded as particular ways of looking at the world. Learning economic ideas 
and knowledge can thus be seen as socialisation process. Part two of the thesis explores how 
we can conceptualise economics ideas as part of socialisation processes.  
 My starting point is to reject the notion that there is something akin to natural 
economic agency. Unlike the story of homo-economicus, children are not born with innate 
and inmalleable ideas of how to act economically. Rather, they are born with an innate 
instinct for sociality. Sociality can take many different forms, and in fact, historically has 
clearly done so. In other words, there is an enormous amount of plasticity in forms of 
economic behaviour. Economic behaviour does not exist in a socio-cultural vacuum but, like 
all other social behaviour, it needs to be learnt. As this behaviour is learnt, it is internalised 
and becomes habitual. Berger and Luckmann, in their seminal work The Social construction 
of Reality, make this point very nicely:  
The individual, however, is not born a member of society. He is born with a 
predisposition towards sociality, and he becomes a member of society. In the life 
of every individual, therefore, there is a temporal sequence, in the course of which 
he is inducted into participation in the societal dialectic. The beginning point of 
this process is internalization.
78
 
 
Once certain behaviours are internalised to a very high degree, they can be said to have been 
socialised. In this way, socialisation becomes a process by which individuals become 
members of a society. They learn to look at the world in similar ways to other members of a 
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society or community. Berger and Luckmann differentiate primary from secondary 
socialisation. Primary socialisation takes place during childhood and secondary socialisation 
refers to any subsequent processes of socialisation.   
Only when he has achieved this degree of internalization is an individual a 
member of society. The ontogenetic process by which this is brought about is 
socialisation, which may thus be defined as the comprehensive and consistent 
induction of an individual into the objective world of a society or a sector of it. 
Primary socialisation is the first socialisation an individual undergoes in 
childhood, through which he becomes a member of society. Secondary 
socialisation is any subsequent process that inducts an already socialized 
individual into new sectors of the objective world of his society.
79
 
 
It is important to note that economic ideas are internalised in both primary and secondary 
socialisation. Children learn early on that they cannot simply take items on display in a store. 
They need to pay for them. These early ideas later get supplemented with much more 
complicated ideas about consumption, production, and distribution. It may very well be the 
case that the overlap between primary and secondary socialisation of economic ideas makes it 
difficult to grasp how economic knowledge and ideas are reproduced. 
It is also important to note that processes of socialisation are never complete. Some 
individuals find it easier to be completely immersed in the transmitted ways of life than 
others. It is also the case that contemporary societies offer a multiple avenues through which 
socialisation can take place, allowing individuals within the same society to effectively 
become part of different communities simultaneously. It is not surprising that different 
processes of socialisation should place different requirements on individuals. Berger and 
Luckmann describe this in the following manner:  
Socialisation is never completely successful. Some individuals 'inhabit' the 
transmitted universe more definitely than others. Even among the more or less 
accredited 'inhabitants', there will always be idiosyncratic variations in the way 
they conceive of the universe. Precisely because the symbolic universe cannot be 
experienced as such in everyday life, but transcends the latter by its very nature, it 
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is not possible to 'teach' its meaning in the straightforward manner in which one 
can teach the meanings of everyday life.
80
 
 
Part two of the thesis attempts to explore a few means by which secondary socialisation 
of economic ideas takes place. At the same time, this is also an attempt to understand how I 
have internalised certain economic ideas for myself. Drawing on the arguments developed in 
part one, I argue the language we use to describe economic phenomena and processes play a 
key role in socialisation. If this is the case, economic concepts and narratives serve a double 
purpose. On the one hand, they will reflect the concerns and ways of looking at the world of a 
particular society; one the other hand, they can be used to challenge, resist, and transforms 
those way of looking at the world. I will use the all-embracing term culture to denote a 
particular way of looking at the world. The idea that concepts and narratives both reflect and 
shape culture has been around for a long time and Part two explores these ideas in greater 
detail.  
I start the discussion in chapter three by reviewing how undergraduate economics 
textbooks teach students what it means to study and think like an economist. My argument is 
not that economic textbooks should no longer be regarded as providing economic ideas and 
knowledge. They clearly still do so. However, the reason why they provide economic 
knowledge has shifted radically. Traditionally, economic textbooks are seen as providing 
economic knowledge because they accurately describe economic processes as they occur in 
reality. This, I argue, is not the reason why economic textbooks provide knowledge. Rather, 
they provide knowledge by virtue of the fact that whatever information they contain is 
regarded as the correct way of looking economic phenomena. Textbooks function not 
because they accurately describe reality but because they are vehicles of socialisation. 
Teaching economics at university is not only a matter of learning to describe reality 
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accurately but it is a way of approaching and understanding the world, thereby helping to 
produce a particular kind of culture. 
 In chapter four, I review how different seminal works in literary criticism have 
attempted to portray the relation between narratives and culture. I argue that economic ideas 
also become socialised through means that traditionally are not seen as containing economic 
knowledge, namely works of fiction. The argument I make reflects the dual nature of the 
reciprocal relationship between narratives and culture. One the one hand, I argue that works 
of fiction, particularly the novel, reflect particular ways of viewing the world, a particular 
economic culture. In this sense, novels from different periods can be appropriated to 
understand how economic ideas and economic knowledge have changed over time. On the 
other hand, however, novels are also a vehicle through which ideas become socialised in the 
first place. In allowing the reader to identify with certain characters, novels also foster 
particular economic ideas as the right ideas to hold for the individual reading the novel. In 
changing the nature of economic knowledge from accurate description of reality to a means 
of socialisation thus allows one to recognise previously disregarded channels of economic 
knowledge generation.  
Having paved the way for an understanding of the reciprocal relationship between 
works of fiction and culture, I want to examine two works of fiction in chapter five. This 
allows for a comparison between the ideas and narratives found in economics textbooks with 
those found in works of fiction. I examine how two best-selling American fiction authors, 
Jonathan Franzen and David Foster Wallace (DFW), incorporate and problematise economic 
ideas in their novels Freedom and The Pale King. My aims are three-fold. First, I want to 
give a sense of just how many economic ideas can be found in contemporary works of 
fiction. At one level, this should not come as a surprise. Daily concerns that include an 
economic component – what to buy, what profession to practice, how to balance pleasure and 
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work, and what counts as success – are not only something most adults can relate to but these 
are issues most adults constantly face in their own lives. It is no surprise that life-like 
characters in novels are also concerned with economics considerations. Second, I want to 
show how each author takes up particular economic ideas as part of the constitution of 
different protagonists and through their actions provides an assessment for the desirability of 
those economic ideas. And third, in showing particular ideas to be undesirable, novels can 
also be considered a form or resistance to particular ways of socialisation. Novels can also be 
a means for social transformation.  
 The third part attempts to flesh some of the ways through which economic theory 
approaches and understands the world. In particular, I am going to examine two concepts 
which play an important role in the socialisation of economic ideas: the concept of the market 
and the concept of violence. Discussion on of the concept of the market takes place in chapter 
six. The concept of violence is discussed in chapter seven. In conclusion, I review the main 
arguments in light of what I have learnt by writing this dissertation with an autobiographical 
approach.  
 The concept of the market (or markets) is central to how contemporary economic 
theory conceptualised the world. Markets are conventionally regarded as places where 
individuals freely exchange good and services.
81
 Arguably, the most central tool of economic 
theory is demand and supply – but it only makes sense to think of demand and supply within 
a single market. Because markets are conceived of as a pure platform of exchange, they are 
regarded as objective and neutral. They simply act so as to bring about the transfer of good 
and services. What this conceptualisation of markets overlooks, however, is that the concept 
of the market is also used in everyday language. And this usage differs markedly from the 
more specialised usage as a place of exchange. In fact, the concept of the market can be used 
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markedly differently, i.e. it has a variety of meanings in everyday discourse. I argue that the 
concept of the market can be used to make three completely separate types of claims. 
Borrowing a heuristic from the work of Jürgen Habermas, I argue that the concept of the 
market can be used to make claims about the objective, subjective, and social world. What 
tends to happen is that the different types of claims about markets get interchanged without 
any awareness that this is the case. As a result, many disagreements about what markets are 
or how they function are merely misunderstanding about the kind of claims a person is trying 
to make. In presenting my heuristic of different claims in which the concept of the market 
functions, I hope to bring some greater awareness and reflexivity to debates in economics and 
political economy. 
 In chapter seven, I want to think about how socialisation actually affects the 
individual. One of the shortcoming to many discussions of socialisation, the work of Berger 
and Luckmann is one example, is that socialisation is presented as a completely 
unproblematic and pain-free process for an individual. Individuals simply undergo primary 
and secondary socialisation as part of being a social creature. I think the story is more 
complicated than that. In particular, I think there is a considerable psychic cost during 
processes of secondary socialisation.
82
 In order to conceptualise why there may be psychic 
costs involved, I appropriate Johan Galtung’s work on violence. Galtung argues that violence 
is best regarded as a difference between potential and actual. As each individual could 
potentially become different people, each identity we choose involves a trade-off and this 
trade-off can be experienced as a kind of violence against ourselves. In other words, at the 
same time as modern capitalism allows individuals unprecedented opportunity to become 
whoever they would like,
83
 modern capitalism also necessitates unprecedented violence to 
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demarcate the actual from all the potential ways of being. It may be the case that this is one 
reason why Anglo-Saxon societies are currently experiencing such a strong rise in mental 
health disorders.  
I would then like to conclude this dissertation with a discussion of some of the things 
I have learnt during the writing of this dissertation as well as some of the limitations of an 
autobiographical approach for the study of economic ideas and knowledge. I do so by 
revisiting some of the issues which Judith Butler raised in her Giving an account of oneself. I 
highlight how this dissertation has given me a much greater appreciation for my own 
contingency but how the autobiographic method is also dangerous if it slips into a self-
glorifying narcissism. The best cure against narcissism, however, is a continual emphasis of 
the relation of the self with others.  
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Chapter 1: 
Against positivism 
Introduction 
My aim in this chapter is to discredit the key methodological underpinnings of nearly all 
current research and teaching in economics, namely that economics (and science in general) 
is exclusively concerned with the description and explanation of external reality. The belief in 
economics and science as an accurate description of reality is made on the basis of claims 
about the scientific method because the scientific method is supposed to provide a universally 
applicable procedure by which to distinguish true from false statements. This belief in the 
scientific method in turn is deeply connected to broader themes as part of Enlightenment 
philosophy. It is these Enlightenment presuppositions that I take issue with in this chapter. In 
order to pursue my argument, this chapter proceeds in three stages. After offering some 
further introductory thoughts, I take up what I think are the main three presuppositions which 
build the foundation of the belief in the scientific method. Each section provides one 
argument which ultimately convinced me to change my own mind about the epistemological 
and ontological status of economics. In the first section, I argue against the belief that there 
exists something akin to unmediated experience. In the second section, I argue against the 
presupposition that there exists a universal standard by which all experience can be assessed. 
In the third section, I argue against the belief that there exists a fail-proof way to test all 
propositions and statements. Taken together, these arguments make an overwhelming case 
that the current methodology of economics which is implicitly based on these three 
presuppositions should be abandoned. In the next chapter, I will then offer another way of 
how methodology could be practiced in economics.  
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My starting point is that the current practice and vision of economics only makes sense 
in light of these broader enlightenment ideas. As Kaul has remarked:  
Therefore, it is important to highlight that economics as a social science could 
have aspired to universal ideals of knowing only within a modernist 
comprehension of knowledge as characterised by Cartesian subjectivity and 
taxonomised separability. These terms of supposedly universal knowing are 
keenly dependent on maintaining a split between science and politics….84 
 
The idea of homo economicus is in many ways a direct outgrowth of this Cartesian 
subjectivity. In order to move from homo economicus to homo communicandis, the first step 
is to reject the notion of a Cartesian subject which underpins homo economicus. In other 
words, the notion of homo economicus also presupposes that “the economic ‘subject’ (subject 
of economic thought) of this unlocated analysis is a self-transparent unembodied and 
unembedded amoral utility maximiser propped up by Cartesian dualisms and interested 
narratives of Enlightenment reason.”85 
 The urge to move the vision of subjectivity from homo economicus to homo 
communicandis is also a reflection of the change in my self-understanding that took place 
during the research of this dissertation. With the aim of hindsight, I can appreciate that 
working on this thesis also lead to a change in my intellectual identity. At the beginning of 
this project, my aim was to learn more about economics and how economics misrepresents 
reality in certain ways. But as much as I have learnt about these issues, I have also ended up 
learning an awful lot about myself. This is not something I had expected to happen. One of 
the difficult things, however, is to recover my earlier intellectual identity or to offer an exact 
pathway of how arrived from ‘there’ to ‘here’ and from ‘then’ to ‘now’.  
There are no epiphanies or light bulb moments I can reconstruct so all I am able to do 
in this chapter is to offer retrospective fragments of how I now comprehend the intellectual 
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journey I have taken (which at the same time is obviously also a personal journey). What 
seems to have happened is that I started out studying current writings in economic 
methodology, especially the work of Deirdre McCloskey. McCloskey led me to the work of 
Richard Rorty. Both McCloskey and Rorty heavily credit American pragmatism for their 
inspiration and so I started to explore of American pragmatism. Their individual differences 
notwithstanding, the American pragmatists spoke to me with wonderful clarity. As I 
proceeded with the research, I realised that I could also count on the support from an 
impressive range of scholars – Hegel, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Wittgenstein, Gadamer, Quine, 
Derrida, Habermas, Foucault to name some of the most obvious choices only – to make very 
similar sort of claims. Although I am not entirely certain of this now, I think it was ultimately 
the writings of the American pragmatists that opened my eyes to the fact that theory not only 
describes but also helps to construct reality.  
I want to emphasise that this chapter is necessarily partial and incomplete – even more 
so than the other chapters in this dissertation. Each of the scholars I could have drawn on for 
support of my arguments has provided a more comprehensive and thorough account than I 
will be able to provide in this chapter. So while I am not able to improve upon their insights, I 
try to popularise them further. At the same time, this chapter reflects a desire to translate the 
insights of American pragmatism into my own words. So this chapter is also an attempt of 
finding my voice within a long ongoing conversation. If we regard various strands of 
previous scholarship as the background choir, I envision this piece as adding to the overall 
harmony of the song. That is to say, I keep in tune with the overall keys of the song but add 
my own distinctive voice to the song so that its message may carry further. And hopefully, 
through my voice, I will be able to find for myself a small spectrum on the vocal scale which 
I can occupy. 
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It may be worth closing the introduction of this chapter by quickly highlighting how 
closely economics follows the idea of the scientific method. I explore the issue of how 
economics textbooks rely on the notion of science as a justification for how economics is 
practiced and in much greater detail in chapter three but it is worthwhile one exemplary quote 
to anchor the discussion that is to follow. Mankiw introduces the methodology of economics 
as the same as that of all other sciences. He writes: 
Economists try to address their subject matter with a scientist’s objectivity. They 
approach the study of the economy in much the same way as a physicist 
approaches the study of matter and a biologist approaches the study of life: they 
devise theories, collect data, and then analyse these data in an attempt to verify or 
refute their theories. …The essence of science…is the scientific method – the 
dispassionate development and testing of theories about how the world works. 
This method of inquiry is as applicable to studying a nation’s economy as it is to 
studying the earth’s gravity or a species’ evolution.’86 
 
There is also a large literature in the methodology of economics that has pointed the affinity 
between economics, the scientific method, and positivism. Different scholars use different 
terms – positivism, hypothetico-deductive method, mathematical-deductivist method – but 
the central issue remains the same. In this vein, Tony Lawson writes that “academic 
economics is currently dominated to a very significant degree by a mainstream tradition or 
orthodoxy, the essence of which is an insistence on methods of mathematical-deductivist 
modelling.”87 Similarly, Lawrence Boland’s writes that “positive economics is now so 
pervasive that virtually all competing methodological views (except the most defeatist hard-
core mathematical economics) have been eclipsed.”88  
 What is particularly noteworthy is how economics, by and large, continues to 
reproduce the methodology of 19
th
 century physics and mathematics, even as the 
methodology of both these disciplines has long evolved. Roy Weintraub has made this point 
eloquently about the discipline of mathematics, saying that the “concept of a true scientific 
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theory has changed over the twentieth century as the image of mathematical knowledge has 
changed…..For mathematicians, acceptance is based on the communally agreed upon idea of 
a "good" mathematical proof.”89 Weintraub goes on to note that if “mathematical knowledge 
is communal and contextual, and mathematical knowledge undergirds scientific knowledge, 
then the idea of scientific knowledge—a fortiori the idea of economic knowledge—has 
changed, as has the very idea of a rigorous scientific argument because of the emergence of 
the axiomatic approach in mathematics.”90 Philip Mirowski has made the same type of 
argument for physics. In his More heat than light, Mirowski highlights how economics insists 
on reproducing a long out-dated version of physics because contemporary economics 
maintains “the explanatory structure of the nineteenth-century metaphor of utility as potential 
energy intact and unaltered, because it is thought to represent scientific explanation.”91 The 
methodology of contemporary physics, by contrast, would create a real need to think about 
what actually constitutes methodology. As Mirowski wonderfully puts it: 
Quantum mechanics drags in a train of cultural images that an orthodox economist 
would shudder to entertain. It preaches fundamental and irreducible 
indeterminism at the micro level, wreaking havoc with the neoclassical penchant 
for Laplacian determinism and methodological individualism. Were the quantum 
metaphor to be imported into economics, it would precipitate mistrust and perhaps 
full dissolution of the vaunted neutrality of the economic scientist with respect to 
the social object of his research, and hence force consideration of the interaction 
of the economist with the pecuniary phenomenon (at least under the Copenhagen 
interpretation).
92
 
 
In other words, economics keeps on appealing to the methodology of mathematics and 
physics as a justification of what constitutes science, when in fact both of those disciplines 
have long rejected this methodology for what constitutes science. However, one would never 
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get a sense of this evolving image of knowledge in mathematics or physics by reading the 
methodology section of an introductory economics textbook.
93
 I now turn to three theoretical 
arguments which highlight why the vision of knowledge and methodology has evolved over 
the last century. 
 
Unmediated experience 
The scientific method relies on the idea of a pure or brute fact. If we are carefully observe the 
world, we are bound to discover these facts. Somehow there is one unique perspective that 
adequately captures what has happened or is happening and this perspective will give rise to 
the facts of the matter. This means that there must be one unique way of accounting for the 
way the world is and works. No possible redescription of this perspective is possible. It alone 
entails the truth and the aim of science and research to discover this perspective.  
But how could one ever arrive at this perspective? Human beings do not approach the 
world as a blank slate, but as a particular person, part of a particular community at a 
particular point in time. As such, the very observational reports we make of the supposed 
facts are socially, culturally, historically specific. Suppose we take one random person from 
14
th
 century London and contemporary London, respectively, and let them watch an airplane 
fly overhead. We then ask them what they saw. The contemporary person would clearly say 
they saw an airplane but what would the person from the 14
th
 century say? Maybe she would 
answer that she saw a dragon. In any case, she could not have possibly have seen an airplane 
because that person has no concept for airplane. She has no way of connecting that object 
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with the experience that humans can fly through the air in metallic objects. So past 
experience is highly relevant to what we observe. Quentin Skinner put this point very 
eloquently when he writes that there is no direct path from observational evidence to the 
judgements we make:     
Even in the most primitive perceptual cases, even in the face of the clearest 
observational evidence, it will always be reckless to assert that there are any 
beliefs we are certain to form, any judgements we are bound to make, simply as a 
consequence of inspecting the allegedly brute facts. The beliefs we form, the 
judgements we make, will always by mediated by the concepts available to us for 
describing what we have observed. But to employ a concept is always to appraise 
and classify our experience from a particular perspective and in a particular way. 
What we experience and report will accordingly be what is brought to our 
attention by the range of concepts we possess and the nature of the discriminations 
they enable us to make. We cannot hope to find any less winding a path from 
experience to belief, from observational evidence to any one determinate 
judgement.
94
 
 
Morton Kaplan argues very nicely how the rejection of brute facts also necessarily 
leads to the rejection of the notion of a transcendental ego. It makes no sense to think of a 
person outside their actual environment, outside the life they are actually living. A person 
does not have a fixed inner core. We are not purely biologically determined. Kaplan writes: 
Thought as an object of thought is always localized as the thought of a particular 
being at a particular time and in a particular place. Thinking about the thought can 
never be localized in the same way except insofar as it is objectified at some other 
mental level. This process is recursive; and it is the failure to recognise the 
recursive aspect of this process that fives rise to the illusion of a transcendental 
ego. That which is not an object of thought, unless, in turn, it is subjected to the 
recursive processes of thinking; for it is only through the application of categories 
that experiences are transformed into thoughts or statements about identifiable 
objects.
95
  
 
Once we abandon the idea of an eternal knowing subject, we open the door for a 
consideration of the diversity of human experiences. In the vision of the scientific method, 
the subject is considered nothing but an obstacle between the external world and pure thought 
so anything unrelated to either direct sensory experience or the faculty of thought is to be 
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disregarded. As such, there simply is no room for our personal identity in the realms of 
knowledge. It does not matter whether you are a man or a woman, whether you live in 100BC 
Athens or in 1400AD South America, whether you are a king or a pauper. The subject 
imagined for the observation of the world is abstracted from all the actual experience she 
would have had and which made her into the person she was. Dewey puts this point nicely 
when he writes that “the bearer [of knowledge] was conceived as outside of the world; so that 
experience consisted in the bearer’s being affected through a type of operations not found 
anywhere in the world, while knowledge consisted in surveying the world, looking at it, 
getting the view of the spectator.”96 Abandoning the idea such a subject will thus open an 
epistemological space for different types of knowledge which can coexist next to each other.  
 Another grave complication in the story of unmediated experience is how different 
individuals are supposed to relate to each other. Observation is the result of a certain mental 
processes (whatever they may be). All access to the world is mediated by our senses. This 
would mean that all an individual can hope to experience is what Dewey called the ‘the 
fleeting, momentary, mental state.’97 If this is all we can experience, then mental states are 
the only thing we cognitively can be sure about and so ‘it alone is knowledge.’98 This makes 
the idea of a knower-in general so appealing. If two individuals provide different reports of 
the same phenomenon, one individual must have made a mistake. They should 
introspectively reflect on the matter more deeply and eventually one person would find that 
they had made a mistake, meaning that they had actually experienced the same thing. As the 
example of observing an airplane highlights, this seems impossible to be the case. How could 
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somebody use a concept they do not possess? But this might open the question how can we 
arrive at any type of knowledge without the existence of a general subject?  
The answer is that facts are not born out of straightforward observation. Rather, most 
of what we consider to be facts are the result of a complicated social process. To see why this 
is the case, consider that if facts truly rested exclusively on mental states, there would be no 
way of resolving any disagreements. After all, if you say you are experiencing a certain 
mental state on an issue and my mental states differs, how could I ever tell you that you are 
mistaken? Take an example: I hit my little brother and he starts crying. When asked why I 
made my brother cry, I answer that he is just acting and in fact not experiencing any pain. I 
have no way to access my brother’s mental state. It might be that I misjudged my strength, 
that I hit him harder than I wanted to, or that he is just acting. It is very hard to decide in this 
situation how we could arrive at an account that could be regarded as anything but 
representative of both of our mental states. 
 Luckily, the situation is not always as tricky as this. The true problem with the above 
situation is that it revolves around a one-time non-repeatable event with only two 
participants. I hit my brother once and he was the only person experiencing this event. 
However, in very many cases, events are repeated (or can be repeated).  Suppose now, that 
my sister and I are sitting in a sauna of about ninety degrees Celsius. My sister now reports 
that she feels cold. I tell her that she must be joking and she says no, I am really feeling cold. 
All the while, I am sweating. Again, there seems to be an issue with irreducible mental states 
and, if taken at face value, I need to concede that we cannot say whether the sauna is hot or 
cold. We have two conflicting observational reports and thus seemingly no basis by which to 
judge which report is right. 
 This example demonstrates nicely, however, that we do not treat all reports of mental 
states as equally valid. I can call on other members of the community to help. If they all 
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report to be sweating given the 90 degrees (i.e. the thermometer is not broken), and my sister 
decides to put on her winter coat, this would not lead to the conclusion that we do not know 
whether it is hot or cold in the sauna. Rather, the mental state of my sister would be 
considered abnormal and not representative. I think it is important to remember that my sister 
could very well feel cold. There really is no basis for telling how she truly feels. Maybe 
neuroscience will solve this problem one day. But we need to make the assumption that most 
people feel in ways that are at least comprehensible to us. Ninety degrees and feeling cold is 
not a comprehensible mental state. This instance of feeling cold at ninety degrees is not taken 
to undermine the knowledge that this temperature feels hot.  
 If we take this train of thought further, we can see that there are a whole number of 
ways by which we judge whose mental report is to be believed: Familiarity with the person, 
authority, official status, education, clothes, ways of speaking. Another example might help: 
Suppose a lay-men and a physicist are looking at the data-output of a sub-atomic particle 
collider. The laymen reports that he cannot see anything, the physicist reports some very 
intriguing story about what particles interacted and how. Do we believe that there is no way 
of knowing what really happened? 
These examples suggest that knowledge is not the result of simple mental states. 
Western epistemology has traditionally construed truth as a relation between experience 
(mental states) and reality. But this seems much too narrow a view. Since humans do not 
consider everybody’s experience of reality as equally valid, there are a number of ways in 
which our experience and reality can be compared with others. It is this comparison of our 
shared experience that results in knowledge, not the fleeting mental state. 
 The idea of unmediated experience and the knower in general brought about the entire 
project of epistemology. Without the knower in general, there can be no knowledge in 
general, and hence no epistemology in the way this has traditionally be construed. Dewey 
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pointedly observed this more than 100 year ago: “The problem of knowledge ueberhaupt 
exists because it is assumed that there is a knower in general, who is outside of the world to 
be known, and who is defined in terms antithetical to the traits of the world”.99  But if this is 
the case, the problem of knowledge, an issue that has occupied Western philosophy for a 
good portion of the last 2000 years, is somewhat of an invented problem. Dewey explains: 
The problem of knowledge as conceived in the industry of epistemology is the 
problem of knowledge in general – of the possibility, extent, and validity of 
knowledge in general. What does this “in general” mean? In ordinary life there are 
problems a-plenty of knowledge in particular; every conclusion we try to reach, 
theoretical or practical, affords such a problem. But there is no problem of 
knowledge in general. I do not mean, of course, that general statement cannot be 
made about knowledge or that the problem of attaining these general statements is 
not a genuine one. On the contrary, specific instances and failure in inquiry exist, 
and are of such a character that one can discover the conditions conducing to 
success and failure. Statement of these conditions constitutes logic, and is capable 
of being an important aid in proper guidance of further attempts at knowing. But 
this logical problem of knowledge is at the opposite pole from the 
epistemological. Specific problems are about right conclusions to be reached – 
which means in effect, right ways of going about the business of inquiry. They 
imply a difference between knowledge and error consequent upon right and wrong 
methods of inquiry and testing; not a difference between experience and the 
world.
100
 
 
The whole idea of epistemology is already embedded in a certain way of thinking. As soon as 
one regards truth as accuracy of representation, the problem of knowledge in general 
becomes inevitable, which in turn, makes scepticism of the Cartesian type the only applicable 
response. In this vein, Rorty writes that “[a]ny theory which views knowledge as accuracy of 
representation, and which holds that certainty can only be rationally had about 
representations, will make scepticism inevitable”.101 But the point to recognise is that 
regarding knowledge as accuracy of representation is not the only option. And if one 
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dispenses to hold onto this view, one can also dispense with the entire project of traditional 
epistemology. In Rorty’s words:  
to think of knowledge which presents a "problem," and about which we ought to 
have a "theory," is a product of viewing knowledge as an assemblage of 
representations–a view of knowledge which, I have been arguing, was a product 
of the seventeenth century. The moral to be drawn is that if this way of thinking of 
knowledge is optional, then so is epistemology, and so is philosophy as it has 
understood itself since the middle of the last century.
102
 
 
This dissertation is thus an attempt to move economics and political economy into a 
position where one can practice them outside the boundary of traditional epistemology. The 
study of economics and political economy should concern itself with social and economic 
questions and this necessitates the ability to consider diverse and even conflicting individual 
perspectives. The notion of epistemology implies a single right perspective and epistemology 
thus gives rise to a perspective antithetical to what is required in social science. 
 
The existence of a set standard? 
Another important presupposition of the scientific method is that statements are assessed 
according to whether they are true. A great example of this kind of narrative is provided by 
the work of Geoffrey Elton. According to Elton, historians ought to engage in “the proper 
assessment and proper study of evidence’, as their primary concern ‘with one thing only: to 
discover the truth.”103 The problem which Elton seems willing to face is that truth is not a 
standard by which facts or ideas can be judged. Truth is the end-point, i.e. when ideas have 
passes the test of truth but truth cannot itself provide this test. So where does the test come 
from? 
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 This is a really subtle but immensely powerful point. Luckily, J.L. Austin simplified 
this problem so beautifully and explained what is at stake here. He writes in How to do 
Things with words: 
Suppose that we confront 'France is hexagonal' with the facts, in this case, I 
suppose, with France, is it true or false? Well, if you like, up to a point; of 
course I can see what you mean by saying that it is true for certain intents 
and purposes. It is good enough for a top-ranking general, perhaps, but not 
for a geographer….But then someone says: 'But is it true or is it false?…. it 
has to be true or false it's a statement, isn't it?' How can one answer ..? ….It 
is a rough description; it is not a true or a false one. "True" and "false" ... do 
not stand for anything simple at all; but only for a general dimension of 
being a right or proper thing to say ... in these circumstances, to this 
audience, for these purposes and with these intentions.
104
  
 
Any statement can only be assessed given a certain purpose in mind. There is no unique and 
single standard that can be applied to all propositions or even to a single proposition. Stanley 
Fish expounded upon Austin’s point wonderfully when he writes: 
All utterances are ... produced and understood within the assumption of some 
socially conceived and understood dimension of assessment.... The one thing 
you can never say about France is what it is really like, if by "really" you mean 
France as it exists independently of any dimension of assessment whatever. 
The France you are talking about will always be the product of the talk about 
it, and will never be independently available. What the example of France 
shows is that all facts are discourse specific ... and that therefore no one can 
claim for any language a special relationship to the facts as they "simply are," 
unmediated by social or conventional assumptions.
105
 
 
The chosen standard of assessment is of crucial relevance to whether a proposition is deemed 
plausible. When an economist insists that they only relevant standard is efficiency, this is 
certainly one point of view, but there is nothing inevitable about this position. Deirdre 
McCloskey, who has discussed these issues in relation to economics in more detail than 
anybody else, puts it this way: 
You can always ask "So what?" And the answer will always depend on one's 
audience and the human purposes involved. Assertions are made for purposes of 
persuading some audience. This is not a shameful fact: it is charming that 
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human beings are cuddly, preferring to cling together against the indifferent 
cold. Their sociability leads them to make remarks they hope others will believe 
and use. Even scholars are human beings. When they come to interpret a "plain 
fact," such as the extent of the American market or the degree of similarity 
among Italic languages, the economic and historical and linguistic scholars must 
be appealing to other human beings.
106
  
 
Put differently, there is no single answer to economic and social problems. The use of 
statistics only allows for the quantification of the necessary data but the choice of what 
alternative should be selected, given the data, is neither straightforward nor easy. Neyman 
and Pearson make the interesting point that even statistical procedures cannot offer an 
unequivocal test since it is ultimately still the investigator who needs to decide about the 
desirability between the trade-off of committing a Type I or type II statistic error
107
:  
Is it more serious to convict an innocent man or to acquit a guilty? That will 
depend on the consequences of the error; is the punishment death or fine; what 
is the danger to the community of released criminals; what are the current 
ethical views on punishment? From the point of view of mathematical theory all 
that we can do is to show how the risk of the errors may be controlled and 
minimised. The use of these statistical tools in any given case, in determining 
just how the balance should be struck, must be left to the investigator.
108
  
 
So if there is no single standard of how we asses propositions, how do we asses them? 
 Those who believe, like many economists and political scientists do, that the mere 
fact that a certain phenomenon can be quantified somehow suffices as an unequivocal answer 
seem to forget what they are actually doing. Numbers do not say, or mean, anything. It will 
always be left to the investigator to present numbers in a meaningful narrative and the way in 
which numbers become embedded in the narrative is as important to the overall 
persuasiveness of any arguments as the magnitude of the numbers. McCloskey writes: “Do 
numbers tell? According to the official rhetoric, yes: only numbers. Most economists believe 
that once you have reduced a question to numbers you have taken it out of human hands. 
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That's where the rhetoric of quantification goes crazily wrong.”109 Numbers still need to be 
put in context and sometimes even numerical data do not appear convincing. Numbers are 
also evaluated against other background beliefs and through figures of speech. McCloskey 
explains: 
The best way to treat such pretentious inanities as that economics is distinct 
from other fields by virtue of a unique methodology is to translate them into 
comparatively concrete and sensuous terms. Which is the more persuasive 
evidence, a correlation coefficient of .90 or an uncontroversial piece of 
introspection? A rule of methodology claims to say, in general. But there is 
no point in knowing such a thing in general. An economist does not do 
economics in general. She does it in particular. Surely if she does it well she 
uses particular figures of speech from the common store.
110
 
 
 The belief in the ability of numbers to speak undermines the need for conversation 
and compromise. Since the numbers themselves have spoken, there is nothing left for human 
beings to disagree about. Like the notion of the market itself, where the aim of the market 
activity is to reach an equilibrium, the very same notion holds for the nature of inquiry itself. 
All an investigator aims for is epistemological certainty. Once this has been reached, there 
can be no single alternative point of view that needs to be considered. William James put this 
realization very eloquently: 
But the great assumption of the intellectualists is that truth means essentially an 
inert static relation. When you’ve got your true idea of anything, there’s an end 
of the matter. You’re in possession; you know; you’ve fulfilled your thinking 
destiny. You are we you ought to be mentally; you have obeyed your 
categorical imperative; and nothing more need follow on that climax of your 
rational destiny. Epistemologically you are in equilibrium.
111
   
 
One consequence of the previous discussion is that it is no longer important to draw a 
categorical difference between opinion and knowledge. Rather than viewing knowledge and 
opinion as two fundamentally different categories, knowledge and opinion can be regarded in 
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a much more fluid fashion. Opinion is concerned with issues a given group of people find it 
hard or impossible to reach agreement; knowledge can be considered where a given group of 
people who are deemed competent easily find agreement. Rorty makes this point nicely:  
the gap between truth and justification [should not be seen] as something to be 
bridged by isolating a natural and transcultural sort of rationality which can be 
used to criticize certain cultures and praise others, but simply as the gap 
between the actual good and the possible better….to say that what is rational 
for us now to believe may not be true, is simply to say that somebody may 
come up with a better idea. It is to say that there is always room for improved 
belief, since new evidence, or new hypotheses, or a whole new vocabulary may 
come along….the desire for as much intersubjective agreement as possible, the 
desire to extend the reference of “us” as far as we can. Insofar…..[there is] a 
distinction between knowledge and opinion, it is simply a distinction between 
topics on which agreement is relatively easy to get and topics on which 
agreement is relatively hard to get. 
112
 
 
This blurring of the knowledge/opinion boundary does not make knowledge any less 
important. Knowledge remains an important aspect of life but the standard as to what counts 
as knowledge is lowered from an eternal and transcendental sphere to the sphere of the 
community. In this vein, Rorty writes that 
to say that truth and knowledge can only be judged by the standards of the 
inquirers of our own day is not to say that human knowledge is less noble or 
important, or more "cut off from the world," than we had thought. It is merely 
to say that nothing counts as justification unless by reference to what we 
already accept, and that there is no way to get outside our beliefs and our 
language so as to find some test other than coherence.
113
 
  
This also implies that there is no singular kind of objectivity that guides all scientific 
reasoning. Rather, each type of inquiry may have a different standard of assessment as to 
what is regarded as objective within the discipline. This leads to a recognition that any 
problem may have a multitude of answers depending on what perspective one wants to take. 
Consider the question, is $50 a lot of money? Well, the answer would depend on the context. 
There is no single perspective which reflects all available positions. It would be a lot of 
money in the US in 1800, little money in Manhattan today, but still a lot of money in Papua 
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New Guinea today. Every question can be answered in different ways, all of which could be 
equally true. James makes a very similar argument: 
Our account of truth is an account of truths in the plural, of processes of 
leaning, realised in rebus, and having only this quality in common that they 
pay. They pay by guiding us into or towards some part of a system that dips at 
numerous points into sense-precepts, which may copy mentally or not, but 
with which at any rate we are now in the kind of commerce vaguely 
designated as verification. Truth for us is simply a collective name for 
verification processes, just as health, wealth, strength, etc. are names for other 
processes connected with life, and also pursued because it pays to pursue 
them. Truth is made, just as health, wealth, and strength are made, in the 
course of experience.
114
   
 
It seems futile, and unnecessary, to appeal to some superior notion of truth. We do not 
need, and in fact do not have, a universal and transcendental entity which can somehow guide 
the right standard of every inquiry. The ultimate truth is irrelevant to the way we live. 
McCloskey phrases this point this way: 
The "ultimate" way is not relevant. We need intellectual nourishment here and 
now, not epistemological pie in the sky. The appeal of epistemological 
methodologists since Bacon to experimental facts as the "ultimate arbiter," for 
instance, will dismiss mere reflection as an idol to be cast into the flames or at 
least pushed off its altar.
115
 
 
Rather than seeing truth as correspondence to ultimate reality, truth is whatever is 
deemed to be justifiable to our fellow beings. The criticism that this means that there is no 
way of guaranteeing that what our respective community has accepted as justifiable is 
actually true, is thus essentially meaningless since it already presupposes that there is another 
standard of truth but community ascent. But this standard cannot exist. The world can only be 
understood with the vocabularies we use. As Rorty writes: 
Truth cannot be out there - cannot exist independently of the human mind - 
because sentences cannot so exist, or be out there. The world is out there, but 
descriptions of the world are not. Only descriptions of the world can be true or 
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false. The world on its own - unaided by the describing activities of human 
beings – cannot. 
 
Whenever we appeal to ‘know something’, we are not actually talking only about the external 
world. Rather, we are trying to convince our interlocutor that whatever we have come to 
understand is in fact just what they would come to understand. But this coming to an 
understanding can never be a property of the external world but merely properties of our 
interaction with the environment and with our fellow people. In this vein, Wilfrid Sellars 
writes that when “characterizing an episode or a state as that of knowing, we are not giving 
an empirical description of that episode or state; we are placing it in the logical space of 
reasons, of justifying and being able to justify what one says.”116 We have no way of stepping 
outside our subjective condition and we should therefore be content with justification as the 
“ultimate” standard. But this does not mean that whatever we currently happen to justify, may 
not be improved upon in the future. 
 Another important aspect to this discussion is that truth by itself is meaningless. We 
care about the truth of statements that are important to us, because they are important, and not 
because they are truthful. There are an infinite number of true statements that could be made 
about the world; yet, no one bothers with them because they are seen as irrelevant and 
meaningless. Not meaningless in the sense of the Vienna circle – i.e. not in conformity with 
some standard of logic – but because the ascertaining of the truth value itself adds nothing 
which we see as important for our daily life. When I enter a room, I ordinarily do not need to 
know what construction method was used to erect it, nor am I interested in the daily caloric 
intakes of the construction workers who built it. James phrases this nicely this way: “For 
what seriousness can possibly remain in debating propositions that will never make any 
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appreciable difference to us in action? And what matters it, when all proposition are 
practically meaningless, which one of them be called true or false”.117  
 Considerations about the importance of truth therefore shift from thinking about the 
end point of inquiry to what difference such consideration make to how people live their 
lives. For economists, and social scientists, you undertake an inquiry so as to arrive at truth. 
But if there are different kinds of truth, any statement we seem justifiably to hold true can 
only the starting point of the discussion. The idea is to say that if a belief is true, how does it 
affect the way we live, both as an individual and as a community of beings?  James writes: 
"Grant an idea or belief to be true,"…."what concrete difference will its being 
true make in anyone's actual life? How will the truth be realised? What 
experiences will be different from those which would obtain if the belief were 
false? What, in short, is the truth's cash-value in experiential terms?".... The 
truth of an idea is not a stagnant property inherent in it. Truth happens to an 
idea. It becomes true, is made true by events. Its verity is in fact an event, a 
process: the process namely of its verifying itself, its veri-fication. Its validity 
is the process of its valid-ation.
118
 
 
It should be quite apparent that the notion of community is of crucial importance. The 
notion of community highlights that the production of knowledge itself is a social practice. 
Justification is not about relations between words and objects but about relations between us 
and others. Rorty explains: 
Once conversation replaces confrontation….the notion of philosophy as the 
discipline which looks for privileged representations among those constituting 
the Mirror becomes unintelligible. A thoroughgoing holism has no place for 
the notion of philosophy as "conceptual," (is "apodictic," as picking out the 
"foundations" of the rest of knowledge, as explaining which representations 
are "purely given" or "purely conceptual," as presenting a "canonical notation" 
rather than an empirical discovery, or as isolating "trans-framework heuristic 
categories." If we see knowledge as a matter of conversation and of social 
practice, rather than as an attempt to mirror nature, we will not be likely to 
envisage a metapractice which will be the critique of all possible forms of 
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social practice. So holism produces….a conception of philosophy which has 
nothing to do with the quest for certainty.
119
 
 
The aim of social inquiry can never be the evaluation of mere propositions. Instead, the 
person inquiring into social affairs is always part of a larger and longer conversation about 
how we ought to live. And this conversation takes place according to rules of conversation, 
and not according to transcendental standards of logic and truth. The error, as Deirdre 
McCloskey warns, “is to think that you are engaged in mere making of propositions, about 
which formal logic speaks, when in fact you are engaged all day, most days-in persuasive 
discourse, aimed at some effect about which rhetoric speaks.”120  
This confusion arises from the idea of unmediated knowledge, the idea that all 
knowledge is not social but individual. McCloskey makes this point in the following way: 
“Real knowing is said to be individual and solipsistic, not social. No one needs to say 
anything to you, the Cartesian says, to persuade you of the ancient proof of the irrationality of 
the square root of two. There is nothing social about your assent to it.”121 But all science is a 
social performance. It is guided and assessed by the audiences which partake in this 
performance. McCloskey writes: 
Economic scientists, then, persuade with many devices, and as speakers have an 
audience. To repeat, they do not speak into the void: the rhetorical character of 
science makes it social. The final product of science, the scientific article, is a 
performance. It is no more separated from other literary performances by 
epistemology than pastoral poetry is separated from epic by epistemology. 
Epistemology is not to the point. Literary thinking is.122 
 
The last point I want to make in this context is that the idea that substance can be 
completely separated from style seems hard to maintain. One of the main presuppositions is 
that the intrinsic worth of an argument can somehow be extracted from the way it has been 
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presented. Put slightly differently, this is another incarnation of the belief that the numbers or 
the fact speak for themselves. But as I hope to have argued, they do not. We speak with the 
facts. And if we analyze the nature of speaking and writing in an academic context, we realise 
that we have adopted a lot of conventions that have little to do with ‘the facts’. Rather, they 
have something to do with persuasion and legitimization. Rather than referring to the facts as 
the only realm of importance, academics follow certain conventions in order to assure the 
interlocutors that the position they advance should be believed. Amelie Oksenberg Rorty 
(Richard Rorty’s wife at one point) puts this point nicely when he writes:  
Conviction is often carried by a charismatic, authoritative style: its clarity and 
condensation, the rhythms of its sentences, and its explosive imagery. But often 
the form of a work assures its legitimation: a dedication indicating continuity of 
descent, a nihilobstat, the laying on of hands by footnotes acknowledging the 
advice of established authorities, the imprimatur of publication by a major 
university press. The apparatus of footnotes, appendixes, graphs, diagrams, 
formulas, used with measure and discretion, indicate a proper sobriety. Sobriety, 
attention to detail, care without obsession, the right balance of generality and 
attention, an easy rather than a relentless use of imagery and metaphor-these are 
integral to philosophical legitimation.
123
 
 
I return to this point in the next chapter but before doing so I would like to turn to one more 
major methodological claim about the nature of science made by economists, namely that 
there is a unique and uncontroversial way to test a proposition.  
 
Testability of propositions 
Suppose we have reached the point where a sympathetic advocate of the methodological 
assumptions of economics is ready to concede that the methodology as presented in a typical 
narrative of the scientific method are too simplistic. She may agree that there is indeed no 
way to access the world in general; all theorizing always reflects a larger social and cultural 
context. She may also agree that there is no unique standard which can be used for purposes 
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of evaluation. All standard of evaluation are also chosen by the community which partakes in 
the process. So, the sympathetic economists may agree with these points to say that economic 
theorizing is constitutive of a certain way of life: Our way. Economic theory reflects the 
typical standpoint taken by a person in our times and the standard of efficiency by which 
economics assesses the world is exactly the standard our society embraces. It is not a problem 
that economics fosters a certain way of life and a certain way of thinking. It is one of its main 
benefits.  
Having conceded this much, the sympathetic economist may then claim, that within 
the boundaries of our own cultural horizon, economic knowledge can indeed be said to be 
true. Even though all economic knowledge obviously reflects the limitations of our time, the 
methodology of economics has a way of unequivocally differentiating between those 
propositions which are true and those which are not, given our cultural horizon. So while 
economics cannot provide any propositions which can be said to have universal validity, they 
can nevertheless provide propositions which can be said to have universal validity within our 
own historical time. An immediate response to this may want to problematise how one goes 
about drawing the boundaries of our historical and cultural time but I do not want to focus on 
this point. Rather, I want to directly counter the point that even within our very own specific, 
historical, cultural time, there is still no unique methodology which can be chosen to 
conclusively evaluate the truth of a proposition.   
The basis for most contemporary understanding of what it means to evaluate a 
proposition is usually considered to be Popper’s theory of falsification. Popper wants to 
demarcate the scientific from the pseudo-scientific. Popper aims to circumvent Hume’s 
problem of induction which he takes to be “the question of the validity or the truth of 
universal statements which are based on experience, such as the hypotheses and theoretical 
80 
 
systems of the empirical sciences.”124 His aim is to find a criterion which can differentiate 
between the scientific and the metaphysical, or as he writes, “the problem of ﬁnding a 
criterion which would enable us to distinguish between the empirical sciences on the one 
hand, and mathematics and logic as well as ‘metaphysical’ systems on the other.”125 He 
rejects the validity of inductive knowledge because it cannot provide such a criterion. Popper 
writes that “my main reason for rejecting inductive logic is precisely that it does not provide a 
suitable distinguishing mark of the empirical, non-metaphysical, character of a theoretical 
system; or in other words, that it does not provide a suitable ‘criterion of demarcation.”126 For 
Popper, only deduction can lead to knowledge. 
Before going into further details on Popper’s theory of falsification, I would like to 
briefly highlight how the idea of a demarcation criterion in general is just another instance of 
the idea of knowledge in general. Popper himself makes this point explicit: 
This problem [of induction] was known to Hume who attempted to solve it. 
With Kant it became the central problem of the theory of knowledge. If, 
following Kant, we call the problem of induction ‘Hume’s problem’, we might 
call the problem of demarcation ‘Kant’s problem’. Of these two problems—
the source of nearly all the other problems of the theory of knowledge—the 
problem of demarcation is, I think, the more fundamental. 
 
The criticisms raised earlier about the idea of knowledge in general could also be made about 
the idea that there is a problem of demarcation in general. I do not want to repeat myself 
unnecessarily, so I will leave it at that.  
Popper’s argument is that a theory should be regarded as scientific if and only if it is 
falsifiable. It is falsifiable if it divides the class of all basic statements - all self-consistent 
singular statements of fact- into one of two non-empty categories. The first category 
comprises all those statements with which the theory is inconsistent (the ones it prohibits); 
this category is called the potential falsifiers of a theory. The second category encompasses 
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all those statements which the theory permits. Hence, a theory is scientific if “the class of its 
potential falsifiers is not empty.”127 In order to practically falsify a theory, it would appear 
that all we need to accept is a basic statement that is contradictory with the theory. But this 
condition is not sufficient. Since Popper acknowledges the occurrence of non-reproducible 
single results - something that went wrong for some unknown reason - a theory is only 
falsified if the potential falsifier that refutes the theory can be reproduced (repeated). In other 
words, we can only falsify a theory if a hypothesis can be proposed that repeatedly 
demonstrates refutation. 
Whilst logical falsifiability could be regarded as a desirable property, Popper does not 
really face the question of whether scientific practices actually incorporate this criterion into 
their daily routines. A number of subsequent scholars point out that neither does the work of 
actual natural scientists follow the idea of logical falsifiability nor could they even potentially 
hope to do so.
128
 A major problem is that the problem of induction reappears after all, this 
time in number of different guises. One of these guises is termed underdetermination. Any 
experiment always relies on more assumptions about the world than the one singled out for 
empirical testing. Since no single proposition can ever be tested in isolation, the investigator 
always has to make a choice as to what the experiment actually tested. When an experiment 
successfully refutes a theory, we do not actually know what was refuted; we only know that 
something was refuted. Pierre Duhem points to this issue as far back as 1914:  
In sum, the physicist can never subject an isolated hypothesis to experimental 
test, but only a group of hypotheses; when the experiment is in agreement with 
the his predictions, what he learns is that at least one of the hypothesis 
constituting his group is unacceptable and ought to be modified; but the 
experiment does not designate which one should be changed.
129
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Conventionally, one assumes that it was the intended hypothesis and not one of the auxiliary 
ones’ that was refuted, but this hope is not based on logical grounds. Since we cannot test a 
theory (= hypothesis) in isolation, falsifiability cannot tell us anything about a particular 
theory, only about the entire construct in which this theory is embedded (= set of hypotheses).  
 Willard Van Orman Quine subsequently took up Duhem’s criticism and expanded it 
to say that all our beliefs form an interconnected totality and we that there was no way to 
step-out of this totality in order to examine a single proposition. As Quine writes,  
The totality of our so-called knowledge or beliefs, from the most casual matters 
of geography and history to the profoundest laws of atomic physics or even of 
pure mathematics and logic, is a man-made fabric which impinges on 
experience only along the edges. Or, to change the figure, total science is like a 
field of force whose boundary conditions are experience. A conflict with 
experience at the periphery occasions readjustments in the interior of the field. 
But the total field is so underdetermined by its boundary conditions, experience, 
that there is much latitude of choice as to what statements to reevaluate in the 
light of any single contrary experience. No particular experiences are linked 
with any particular statements in the interior of the field, except indirectly 
through considerations of equilibrium affecting the field as a whole.
130
 
 
In other words, even within our own cultural horizon there is no way to evaluate 
unequivocally the truth of any single economic proposition. Economic knowledge cannot rely 
on the belief that it has access to a unique way to test economic proposition. 
 This kind of talk often leads to the fear that if there is no unique way of testing an 
economic proposition, there can be no objective knowledge. And if there is no objective 
knowledge, each argument is as good as any other. I want to emphasise that the last step does 
not follow since it relies on a confusion between different conceptions of objectivity. Helen 
Longino focuses on this point. She distinguishes objectivity in the sense of exact 
correspondence to reality from objectively in the sense of non-arbitrary. In other words, some 
theories are considered objective because they are based “upon non-arbitrary and non-
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subjective criteria for developing, accepting, and rejecting hypothesis and theories”131 even 
though these criteria are itself subject to discussion.   
 The decision as to what counts as non-arbitrary standards of justification are provided 
by the respective community. All theorizing, also science, is always a community process. 
Longino writes that the “application of scientific method, that is, of any subset of the 
collection of means of supporting theory on the basis of experimental data, requires by its 
very nature two or more individuals. Even a brief reflection on the actual conditions of 
scientific practice shows that this is so.”132 Even if it is often the case that the majority of a 
scientific theory is due to the accomplishment of a single individual, this does not mean that 
science is performed by that individual alone. Even if a single individual publishes a theory in 
a paper or lecture, this does not make that theory part of scientific canon. Rather, the theory 
needs to be accepted by other scientists. A single individual also relies on previous work and 
understandings in doing his research. In this vein, Einstein might have been the single 
individual who posited the theory of relativity, but he nevertheless relied on previous work in 
Newtonian physics; the predictions of his theory were also subsequently tested by a vast 
number of individuals. Only after a time of critical treatment from a number of people will a 
theory become part of scientific knowledge: 
What is called scientific knowledge, then, is produced by a community 
(ultimately the community of scientific practitioners) and transcends the 
contributions of any individual or even of any subcommunity within the larger 
community. Once propositions, thesis, and hypotheses are developed, what will 
become scientific knowledge is produced collectively through the clashing and 
meshing of a variety of points of view.
133
 
 
For Longino, ‘the clashing and meshing’ is equivalent to the possibility of inter-subjective 
criticism through peer review and other institutions. It is this possibility of intersubjective 
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criticism that leads objectivity in spite of the context dependence of evidential reasoning. 
Longino distinguishes between a number of types of criticism, the major categories of which 
are evidential and conceptual criticism. One form of conceptual criticism is that scientists can 
question the relevance of evidence presented in support of a hypothesis. It is through this 
mechanism that scientists are able to question background beliefs or assumptions in light of 
which states of affairs become evidence. Since the relevance of evidence cannot be assessed 
by empirical means, disputes must be resolved by conceptual discussions. These discussions 
not only highlight an individual’s background assumptions but also allow others to criticise 
and modify them:  
As long as background beliefs can be articulated and subjected to criticism from 
the scientific community, they can be defended, modified or abandoned in 
response to such criticism. As long as this kind of response is possible, the 
incorporation of hypothesis into the canon of scientific knowledge can be 
independent of any individual’s subjective preferences.134  
 
One of the problems – and this is where Longino seems too simplistic in her account – is that 
it is never possible for all background beliefs to be articulated. But even though this is one 
more argument against objectivity in the universal and transcendental sense this merely 
strengthens the view that there is no higher authority in the ways of knowledge than the 
community who are deemed to be competent interlocutors. In any case, the methodological 
belief that there is an unequivocal test for economic propositions seems hard to maintain. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I argue that the methodological underpinnings of positivism (or the scientific 
method or the hypothetico-deductive model) need to be called into question. There is no solid 
division between subject and object, between what is studied and those doing the studying. I 
review three separate presuppositions of positivism – that there exists something akin to 
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unmediated experience, that there exists a unique standard of truth by which any proposition 
can be assessed, and that there exists a way to unequivocally test a proposition – and argue 
that none of these arguments appear tenable. As a result, economics not only describes 
external reality but also helps to constitute it. So when economists go on to decry the 
uselessness of methodology, as Frank Hahn has done when he says “advise everyone to 
ignore cries of ‘economics in crisis, to avoid discussion of ‘mathematics in economics’ like 
the plague, and to give no thought at all to ‘methodology’”135, they are doing themselves and 
society a great disservice. 
 The disservice they are doing to themselves is that they misunderstand the project 
they are ultimately engaged in. Rather than discovering objective truth to be found out there 
in reality, economists are involved in fallible and always questionable political projects. The 
vision of economics as a neutral ground has a significant protective function for its 
practitioners. It insulates them for having to take responsibility for their results of their 
research and teaching. But as Jürgen Habermas has pointed out, this belief is really a case of 
false consciousness: 
The sciences have retained one characteristic of philosophy: the illusion of pure 
theory. This illusion does not determine the practice of scientific research but only 
its self-understanding. And to the extent that this self-understanding reacts back 
upon scientific practice, it even has its point. The glory of the sciences is their 
unswerving application of their methods without reflecting on knowledge-
constitutive interests. From knowing not what they do methodologically, they are 
that much surer of their discipline, that is of methodical progress within an 
unproblematic framework. False consciousness has a protective function.
136
 
  
The second disservice is that the methodology which underlies positivism gives a false 
sense of authority to the kind of claims advanced by economists. Rather than seeing these 
claims as one perspective amongst many, they are seen as the sole legitimate authority on 
economic matters. Kaul has also made this point saying that perhaps “the most important 
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consequence of writing economic theory the way it is written by the disciplinary consensus in 
economics is the possibility of pretending that ‘economic’ concerns are somehow separate 
and separable from those of a political, cultural, social, moral, ethical, and ecological nature, 
and can be addressed ‘scientifically’ within economics.”137 
Having highlighted the inadequacy of the methodology with which economics is 
practiced and taught, I will offer another way of approaching methodology in the next 
chapter. Rather than asking and thinking of propositions in terms of whether they are true, 
another methodology would be to think of the function and context of different statements: in 
which contexts they are made, with what purpose, by whom and for whom? This way of 
thinking about the purpose of statements is inspired by the idea of Wittgenstein’s language 
games. After having reviewed how the concept of language games can help in understanding 
how economic ideas are produced and transmitted, I turn to an analysis of different language 
games in the next part of this dissertation. 
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Chapter 2 
From objectivity to solidarity 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I argued that the vision of homo economicus is also upheld by a 
particular vision of methodology that sees methodology as a neutral procedure for arriving at 
the truth. This idea of methodology is seen in economics, as Kaul has already argued, “as the 
construction of formal models, which are legitimate because they are seen as attempts to 
generate knowledge of a general and universal kind which is unembodied and unembedded in 
any specific context. The appeal to the signifier ‘science’ performs the important function of 
stabilising the writing of such economic theory.”138 I review what I judge to be three central 
presuppositions of this methodology in chapter one and argue that these presuppositions 
misrepresent how knowledge and ideas are produced. In short, I try to show that the 
methodology that underlies the vision of a homo economicus is as misleading as the vision of 
homo economicus itself. 
 In this chapter, I want to sketch an outline of a methodology in the spirit of homo 
communicandis. The key to this approach is the role which language plays in the process of 
knowledge creation. Rather than seeing language as a neutral tool, I argue that language 
actively influences the way in which we see the world. A very good heuristic to use is thus 
Wittgenstein’s notion of language games or what Davidson has called vocabularies. The 
underlying idea of a language game is that concepts only derive their meaning within a 
context and that the same utterances can be evaluated differently by an interlocutor if this 
context changes. This highlights again that there is no overarching single criterion or 
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procedure by which one can evaluate the truth of a proposition but that there only exist local 
criteria which may or may not be shared amongst participants. 
In order to develop this argument, the chapter proceeds in three sections. After 
offering some further preliminary observations, the first section, entitled ‘Language and the 
world’ offers an introduction to the notion of language games and how language games can 
be used as a methodology to study the creation and transmission of knowledge and ideas. 
Language frames and primes how we see the world which means that an analysis and 
understanding of the way language works is essential if we are to understand how ideas and 
knowledge are generated and transmitted in society.  
The second section, entitled ‘Solidarity vs. Objectivity’, introduces Rorty’s heuristic 
which distinguishes two principal ways of generating meaning. The first way, what Rorty 
terms solidarity, is meant to capture the fact that humans create meaning by seeing their own 
life intrinsically as part of that of a larger community. The second way, objectivity, describes 
how another way to create meaning is to narrate one’s life in the context of some non-human 
entity. One can also think of these two ways of creating meaning as socialisation aimed at 
two different goals: Solidarity aims to socialise individuals as thinking of themselves 
intrinsically as part of a human community. A person’s loyalty is meant to be first and 
foremost directed towards other persons. Objectivity aims to socialise individuals as thinking 
of themselves as part of something larger than human. A person’s loyalty is meant to be first 
and foremost directed towards that other goal. 
The third section, ‘Solidarity in Economics’, argues that the vision of homo 
economicus, and the methodology used to advocate this vision, is an instance of the drive for 
objectivity in Rorty’s sense. Training in economics teaches students that the aim of an 
economic system is efficiency and the methodology of economics is meant to teach students 
how to construct arguments about what constitutes an efficient system. Efficiency here serves 
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as that non-human goal. The same can be said for the scientific method. The loyalty of a 
researcher is meant to be attached to following the scientific method to arrive at truth. It is 
this method that gives meaning to what a researcher does. He follows the procedure to arrive 
at truth. The image of homo communicandis, and the methodology I advocate in first section 
of this chapter, is an instance of the drive for solidarity in Rorty’s sense. My contention is 
that too much of economics is practiced in the image of objectivity and I give some 
preliminary reflections on how economics can be practiced in the name of solidarity. In the 
second part of this dissertation, I attempt to show how these reflections can actually be used 
to practice economics differently.  
The vision of solidarity highlights that scholars working on socio-economic questions 
can also be regarded as a species of practical philosophers. The attributive ‘practical’ 
emphasises the fact that theoretical knowledge has practical consequences whose 
ramifications we are subjected to in our everyday life. On one level, scholars describe these 
ramifications and how they grew out of certain theoretical constructions. At another level, 
however, the objective can also be emancipatory, allowing ourselves to work towards to a 
transformation of our self-understanding and thereby opening the door for different 
conceptualisations with different practical consequences thereby inviting renewed reflection 
and criticism. 
To me, there are two chief ways in which this emancipatory potential can be realised. 
The work of Matthew Watson encapsulates one way of accomplishing this goal.
139
 In 
reviewing the history of the formation of the contemporary conception of markets, Matthew 
Watson is able to open up our economic concepts as objects of comparison and contrast. 
Matthew Watson recognises, like Quentin Skinner, Michel Foucault, James Tully and others 
before him, that “it is easy to become bewitched into believing that the ways of thinking 
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about them [our concepts] bequeathed to us by the mainstream of our intellectual traditions 
must be the ways of thinking about them.”140 Matthew Watson’s work helps us overcome this 
bewitchment by showing that the concepts and language of our own tradition at one point 
were used in quite different ways and with different meanings. Working within the history of 
ideas can help to recapture certain meanings of our economic concepts which have become 
lost in time. This highlights the contingent nature of our current economic categories, 
showing that there is nothing inevitable about the ways in which we currently conceptualise 
them. Quentin Skinner puts the benefits of doing such work this way:  
The history of philosophy, and perhaps especially of moral, social and political 
philosophy, is there to prevent us from becoming too readily bewitched. The 
intellectual historian can help us to appreciate how far the values embodied in our 
present way of life, and our present ways of thinking about those values, reflect a 
series of choices made at different times between different possible worlds. This 
awareness can help to liberate us from the grip of any one hegemonic account of 
those values and how they should be interpreted and understood. Equipped with a 
broader sense of possibility, we can stand back from the intellectual commitments 
that we have inherited and ask ourselves in a new spirit of enquiry what we should 
think of them.
141
 
 
However, I think it is important to note that this type of historical work needs to be 
supplemented and complemented by a different approach which has not nearly as much 
attention. At the same time as we inquire into the historical roots of our contemporary 
conceptions, we need to undertake a thorough analysis of our concepts as we use them today. 
This is necessary because our inherited language and concepts are the only means available 
through which current theory and practice can be problematised. This is an area where the 
idea of language games can serve a very useful function. One of the first questions to ask is 
the extent to which our inherited concepts are adequate to question the nature of our 
commitments. Any serious attempt to transform our current economic, social, and political 
life must begin with an appraisal of whether such a transformation can be envisioned in the 
                                                          
140
 Skinner, Quentin, Liberty Before Liberalism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, p.116. 
141
 Skinner, Quentin, Liberty Before Liberalism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp.116-117. 
91 
 
inherited language and concepts. In the third part of this dissertation, I face this issue more 
directly by analysing the concept of the market and the concept of violence. 
The relation and mutually beneficial nature of these two approaches might be clarified 
through following analogy: Imagine we are wandering in an unfamiliar city and we end up 
lost. One way of finding one’s feet would be to retrace the way we have come on a map, 
following each turn we have taken and each junction we have crossed from some starting 
point to where we are now or have been recently. This retracing allows us to reconstruct how 
we ended up here rather than there but there is little emphasis on what the current position 
actually looks like. For this we would have to look up from the map to see what our 
surroundings look like in detail. We would be able to notice many details about our current 
position which would be lost in the process of retracing on a map. In order be able to read a 
map, we also need to have already learnt the rules that guide the reading of maps. This is 
another dimension to Wittgenstein’s notion of language games and I next to provide an 
introduction to this powerful tool in the next section. 
 
Language and the world 
Any understanding of how knowledge is generated requires an engagement with the relation 
between language and reality. It is often assumed that language depicts reality. Propositions 
hook onto reality in a unique way and one can evaluate any proposition by comparing it to 
reality as one finds it. This view, called the picture-theory of language, is thus concerned with 
evaluating the truth content of a proposition, whether in fact the proposition corresponds to 
reality.  Kenny summarises this view as follows: 
Any representation can be an accurate or inaccurate representation: it can give 
a true or false picture of what it represents.…In any representation there are 
two things to consider: (a) what it is a representation of ; (b) whether it 
represents what it represents accurately or inaccurately. The distinction 
between these two features of a representation corresponds to the distinction, 
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concerning a proposition, between what the proposition means and whether 
what it means is true or false – between sense and truth-value.142   
 
The picture theory of language is only convincing if the basic elements of a proposition were 
reducible to the basic elements of reality. There is, however, no straightforward way by 
which experience can be reduced into basic elements. There would need to be a standard or 
criterion according to which we could decide what exactly counts as a basic element. But a 
criterion, by definition, cannot be given by experience directly. We cannot use language as 
merely a tool that we can use to point out phenomena that exist “out there” in extra linguistic 
purity. 
The primary means by which we relate to others is also through our usage of 
language. Thus, an account that highlights our bond to our fellow beings necessarily includes 
the usage of language. In fact, language provides the sole means of justification. For, above 
all, we have a linguistic membership. And this notion of our linguistic membership was first 
brought out prominently in the notion of Wittgenstein’s language games. Wittgenstein 
introduces the practice of language as follows: 
In the practice of the use of language, one party calls out the words, the other 
acts on them. In instruction in the language the following process will occur: 
the learner names the objects; that is, he utters the word when the teacher 
points to the stone – And there will be this till simpler exercise: the pupil 
repeats the words after the teacher - -both of these being processes resembling 
language.
143
 
 
Wittgenstein calls this practice a language game in order to highlight that language is not 
simply used to describe an external reality out there, independent of the observer but that it in 
a real sense constitutes that reality. By exercising our linguistic membership within the 
communities which we are part of, we effectively take part in a way of life. Wittgenstein 
explains that “the term “language game” is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the 
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speaking of a language is part of an activity, or a form or life.’144 In order to be able to infer 
the correct meaning of a sentence requires much more than simply knowing the terms of the 
sentence. One needs to know what kind of language game is being played – the context in 
which the sentence is uttered. Wittgenstein offers a number of examples about the possible 
language games one may play:  
Giving orders, and obeying them 
Describing the appearance of an object, or giving its measurements 
Constructing an object from a description (a drawing) 
Reporting an event 
Speculating about an event 
Forming and testing a hypothesis 
Presenting the results of an experiment in tables and diagrams 
Making up a story, and reading it 
Play-acting 
Singing catches 
Guessing riddles 
Making a Joke telling it 
Solving a problem in practical arithmetic 
Translating from one language into another 
Asking thanking, cursing greeting, praying.
145
 
 
 In his painstaking analysis of different language games, Wittgenstein attempts to 
demonstrate that the very nature of how language is used makes the correspondence theory of 
truth unacceptable. He writes: 
Our clear and simple language-games are not preparatory studies for a future 
regularization of language—as it were first approximations, ignoring friction 
and air-resistance. The language-games are rather set up as objects of 
comparison which are meant to throw light on the facts of our language by 
way not only of similarities, but also of dissimilarities. For we can avoid 
ineptness or emptiness in our assertions only by presenting the model as what 
it is, as an object of comparison—as, so to speak, a measuring-rod; not as a 
preconceived idea to which reality must correspond. (The dogmatism into 
which we fall so easily in doing philosophy).
146
 
 
It is not a question of whether our language corresponds to reality. Rather it is a matter of 
how I can make myself be understood which at the same time is necessarily also a way of 
how I cannot make myself understood. One of Wittgenstein’s great accomplishments it to 
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describe the ways in which I cannot make myself understood and the correspondence theory 
is exactly one of those ways. In this way, Wittgenstein shifts the focus from correspondence 
to justification. But not only that. He also highlights that justification is an action. It is an 
action because it allows us to take certain action by the very fact of being justified to do so. 
All justification is thus inherently a claim to of legitimization: 
….How can a proposition follow from sense impressions? Well, does it follow 
from the propositions which describe the sense-impressions? No.—But don't I 
infer that a chair is there from impressions, from sense-data?—I make no 
inference —and yet I sometimes do. I see a photograph for example, and say 
"There must have been a chair over there" or again "From what I can see here 
I infer that there is a chair over there." That is an inference; but not one 
belonging to logic. An inference is a transition to an assertion; and so also to 
the behaviour that corresponds to the assertion. 'I draw the consequences' not 
only in words, but also in action. Was I justified in drawing these 
consequences? What is called a justification here?—How is the word 
"justification" used? Describe language-games. From these you will also be 
able to see the importance of being justified.
147
 
 
The search for certainty itself is just another language game. But when I say “just” I 
do not mean to belittle the search for certainty since no language game is intrinsically more 
worthwhile that any other. Rather, “just” here is meant to bring out exactly the opposite. It is 
because no language game is intrinsically superior that the quest for certainty is also 
intrinsically no more worthwhile than any other game. Practically, however, the 
preoccupation with the quest for certainty (which can never be found) takes our attention 
away from playing those games that might resolve practical problems. Thus, we should be 
concerned how language games manifest themselves in action:   
We should sometimes like to call certainty and belief tones, colourings, of 
thought; and it is true that they receive expression in the tone of voice. But do 
not think of them as 'feelings' which we have in speaking or thinking. Ask, 
not: "What goes on in us when we are certain that . . . .?"—but: How is 'the 
certainty that this is the case' manifested in human action? "While you can 
have complete certainty about someone else's state of mind, still it is always 
merely subjective, not objective, certainty."—These two words betoken a 
difference between language-games.
148
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  Sabina Lovibond highlights how the notion of language games and community are 
intrinsically connected. Because language games require our participation (for without 
participation there is no game), we should become aware that the game we play is unique. It 
is an awareness of this uniqueness which allows us to recognise and accept the other. We 
become aware of the fact that our way of life is one of many and that there is no ground from 
which we could judge this way to be intrinsically better than any other.  All we can say is that 
we play in this way and that we do not want to play in another way:  
An adherent to Wittgenstein’s view of language should equate that goal 
[accepting that there is no ultimate truth] with the establishment of a language 
game in which we could participate ingenuously, while retaining our 
awareness of it as a specific historical formation. A community in which such 
a language game was played would be one….whose members understood their 
own form of life and yet were not embarrassed by it.
149
 
  
Arguments along the lines above are often countered by unsympathetic critics with the 
argument that because there is no longer a single standard for each community, there can be 
no standards at all. But this reasoning is erroneous. The abandonment of any ultimate 
standard does not lead to the impossibility of communicative practice. Communicative 
practices always have standards, it is just that these standards are not sufficient for us to reach 
a stage of ultimate truth. William James puts it this way: 
All human thinking gets discoursified; we exchange ideas; we lend and 
borrow verifications, get then from one another by means of social 
intercourse. All truth thus gets verbally built out, stored up, and made 
available to everyone. Hence, we must talk consistently just as we must think 
consistently. For both in talk and in thought we deal with kinds. Names are 
arbitrary, but once understood, they must be kept to. We mustn’t now call 
Abel ‘Cain’ or Cain ‘Abel’. If we do, we ungear ourselves from the book of 
Genesis, and from all its connections with the universe of speech and fact 
down to the present time. We throw ourselves out of whatever truth that whole 
system may embody.
150
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But even though there clearly are standards (we do communicate), many of these standard 
forever remain hidden. Wittgenstein says that is it because all language games can only be 
expressed in language itself that we must necessarily be unconscious of most of the 
commitments we hold when playing a game. He writes that we “remain unconscious of the 
prodigious diversity of all the everyday language-games because the clothing of our language 
makes everything alike.”151 It is because of this unconsciousness of our most basic 
commitments that we need to examine some of the relationships between language and our 
commitments in more detail. 
 But before I further with this argument, I want to make three preliminary points which 
still need to be developed further. The first point is that the notion of different language 
games prominently brings out the equivalence of all language games. Put slightly differently, 
the notion of language games is inherently democratic. There is simply no master- or meta-
game whose rules can be used in order to asses all other games. There is no single vocabulary 
that has the authority to speak for all others. Each game speaks for itself, or to be slightly 
more correct, we each speak for ourselves in the context of each game. No game is 
intrinsically more worthwhile than any other. Rorty puts this point well when he writes that: 
“The world does not speak. Only we do. The world can, once we have programmed ourselves 
with a language, cause us to hold beliefs. But it cannot propose a language for us to speak. 
Only other human beings can do that…..the world does not tell us what language games to 
play.”152 
 The second point is that because we are free to choose what language games we play, 
we each have a responsibility for the games we do play. The language games we play are also 
a basis of our personal identity and we are at least partly responsible for who we become. 
Language games intrinsically connect what we say to who we are and what we do and there 
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is a real chance, as Rorty puts it, that “changing languages and other social practices may 
produce human beings of the sort that have never before existed.”153 
 The third point is that the fundamental aim of the move towards language games is 
what Rorty has called the de-divinization of the world. Language games highlight the 
optionality of all our games and practices. Since no game is intrinsically superior to any 
other, nothing needs to be regarded as sacred. He explains further: “…we try to get to the 
point where we no longer worship anything, where we treat nothing as a quasi divinity, where 
we treat everything - our language, our conscience, our community – as a product of time and 
chance. To reach this point would be, in Freud's words, to "treat chance as worthy of 
determining our fate.”154 
By highlighting the fact that truths are “verbally built out” and a form of our 
“connections with the universe of speech”, we can see that our language is part of a longer 
historical and political process. Language and politics are inherently intertwined. One may 
pretend otherwise but if there is one undeniable fact of existence it is that the ‘only way to 
communicate abstract thoughts from one mind to another is to use a natural language, or else 
to use some artificial language parasitic on a natural language because originally formulated 
in it.’155 In and of itself, this statement is not particularly interesting. What makes it 
fascinating is the fact that language is a deeply personal act which creates, constitutes, and 
performs the reality in which we find ourselves. Put slightly differently, ‘[l]anguage provides 
the means for approaching, dissecting, and negotiating a subject matter, and it provides the 
rules and commitment responsible for creating the subject matter.’156 The relationship 
between language and politics is further complicated by the fact that language influences our 
action in ways of which we are not entirely conscious. There is thus a double impact: Not 
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only does language constitute and perform social reality but it also does so in ways that select 
certain parts of our experience as worthwhile while ignoring others, thereby shaping our 
perception of the world in a way that is inherently value-bound. Attempting to become 
cognizant of those ways can foster various insights into political life. Shapiro writes:  
Because our linguistics habits tend to be shaped by a relatively passive 
language membership, we are apt to neglect the political import of our 
characteristic ways of speaking. If we ignore the rules that create what we 
speak about and how we speak about it, this passivity spills over into our 
political membership, promoting an insensitivity to much of our political 
life.
157
 
 
In this way, language and our conceptualization do matter when we think about political and 
social life. Rather than seeing language as a neutral container which could be used to express 
reality, we need to come to terms with the fact that our concepts and the language games in 
which we employ them, also shape the possibilities we can envision when being prompted 
with a problem. This is so because, as Shapiro explains, “the very identification of a problem 
(how it is named, where it is located, who is thought to be responsible for what) narrows the 
range of alternative explanations because the identification itself partakes of a guiding social 
control ideology.”158 
 These fundamental philosophical points about the nature of language can also be made 
in a somewhat different way if we consider some of the work done in experimental 
psychology over the last decades. For completeness sake, I should mention that the scholars 
undertaking this work do not attempt to directly relate their experiments to the nature of 
language and knowledge. I shall limit myself to what I see as the two most interesting aspects: 
Priming and Framing.
159
 The priming effect describes the process that words evoke memories 
and that these memories influence our reaction to words. Put differently, you are likely to act 
differently to an utterance depending on what you had previously been thinking about – the 
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previous experiences primed you to look at something one way and not another. Daniel 
Kahneman describes one experiment where it was suggested that “if you have recently seen or 
heard the word EAT, you are temporarily more likely to complete the word fragment SO_P as 
Soup rather than Soap. The opposite would happen, of course, if you had just seen 
WASH.”160 Even more surprisingly, it has been suggested that priming not only affects our 
thinking but also our doing. Kahneman describes an experiment where university students 
were asked to assemble four word sentences from set of five words. 
For one group of students, half the scrambled sentences contained words 
associated with the elderly, such as Florida, forgetful, bald, grey, or wrinkle. 
When they had completed that task, the young participants were sent out to do 
another experiment in an office down the hall. That short walk was what the 
experiment was about. The researchers unobtrusively measured the time it took 
people to get from one end of the corridor to the other. As….predicted, the young 
people who had fashioned a sentence from words with an elderly theme walked 
down the hallway significantly more slowly than the others.
161
 
 
This experiment suggests that we are not entirely conscious of ideas that influence our 
actions.  
Further studies appear to suggest that priming is particularly powerful when people are 
primed on the concept of money.
162
 In one experiment, conducted by Kathleen Vohs et. al., an 
experimenter dropped a number of pencils and the participants who had been primed on 
money choose to pick up fewer pencils.
163
 In another experiment, participants were asked to 
set up chairs to get to know another person, and those who had been primed on money, set the 
chairs further apart (118 vs. 80 centimetres).
164
 Kahneman rightly notes that “the general 
theme of these findings is that the idea of money primes individualism: a reluctance to be 
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involved with others, to depend on others, or to accept demands from others.”165 One could 
rephrase Kahneman’s and Vohs’ assessments to say that priming individuals on money 
subconsciously fosters the necessity to perform an individuality closer to homo economicus. 
The influence of priming on money makes is more difficult to act along lines of a homo 
communicandis. Priming on money emphasises the independence of an individual over his 
social connections. An implication of the research on priming is therefore that it matters how 
money is represented in academia and popular culture since the representations of money 
affect how individuals will choose to act in different circumstances. 
 The idea of framing describes a similar process but this time the focus is on the 
perception of a single idea (i.e. not how one idea will influence another). In a now famous 
experiment, Kahneman and Tversky asked respondents how they would respond given that an 
“Asian disease” was threatening to kill 600 people. There are two choices: 
If program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved. 
If program B is adopted, there is a one-third probability that 600 people will be 
saved and a two-thirds probability that no people will be saved.
166
 
 
In this set-up, a substantial majority of respondents choose program A.  
The outcomes of the programs were then presented in a different way. Respondents were 
given a choice between: 
If program A' is adopted, 400 people will die. 
If program B' is adopted, there is a one-third probability that nobody will die and 
a two-thirds probability that 600 people will die. 
 
In this set-up, a large majority of the respondents choose program B. 
 The point of these two scenarios is that they represent the same situation. The number 
of people who die and survive is equal in each scenario. Yet, people overwhelmingly give 
different answers depending on whether the situation is presented (framed) in terms of people 
who die or people who survive. 
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 Another wonderful illustration of framing comes from the anecdotes of Thomas 
Schelling. As part of one of his classes, he asked his students whether they agreed that the 
child exemption for tax purposes which is fixed at $1,000 per child should be larger for 
families with higher income. In other words, a family with an income of $120,000 and two 
children would get a larger tax exemption that a family with an income of $20,000. Almost all 
of his students rejected this idea. 
 Schelling then points out to his class that the default case of the tax law could be 
different. Rather than assuming the default of no children and then granting a tax break for 
those with children, the default code could be designed on the basis of a typical family with 
two children. So that people would pay an additional “no child surcharge”.  Schelling then 
asked his class if a childless family with an income of $120,000 should pay the same 
surcharge as a childless family with an income of $20,000.  Again, almost all of his students 
rejected this idea. 
 If you look closely, however, you realise that like in the previous example, the 
situation is exactly the same. If you dislike the first idea you ought to like the second and vice 
versa. Compare the two scenarios: 
A. Should the rich receive a larger child exemption than the poor (if both have children)? 
B. Should the rich pay as little child surcharge as the poor (if both are childless)? 
In scenario A, the students (and most of us) want the poor to receive at least equal amount of 
support for having children, then this also means that the students (and most of us) want the 
poor to pay at least an equal amount of penalty for being childless. One logically implies the 
other. Schelling eloquently puts it this way: 
We originally found it difficult to argue that the taxable-income difference ought 
to be larger for the rich family than the poor [Scenario A]; now we find that the 
taxable –income difference ought to be larger for the rich family than the poor 
[Scenario B]. Since the same income tax can be formulated with either a base 
schedule for the childless couple with an adjustment for children, or as a base 
schedule for the family with children plus an adjustment for childlessness, it 
should not make any difference which way we do it. But by simply reformulating 
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the problem of the same income tax we seem to have arrived at the opposite 
conclusion.
167
 
 
The difficulty is that it is impossible to think outside of frames. Should the tax code reward 
the rich with children or punish the poor without children? We do not like either choice, yet in 
the example one must be chosen.
168
 What this means that there is no underlying reality 
language can hook onto in a unique way. There is no point imagining the problem outside the 
frame. Kahneman summarises this nicely when he writes: 
Your moral feelings are attached to frames, to descriptions of reality rather than to 
reality itself. The message about the nature of framing is stark: framing should not 
be viewed as an intervention that masks or distorts an underlying 
preference…there is no underlying preference that is masked or distorted by the 
frame. Our preferences are about framed problems, and our moral intuitions are 
about descriptions, not about substance.
169
  
 
In order to neatly segue this discussion to the next section, I would like to bring in some of 
the famous remarks by Robert Cox. Cox was one of the first scholars in International 
Relations to argue that a simplistic view in the scientific method needed to be abandoned. He 
emphasised that we look at a subject matter from a particular position – historical, social, 
religious, economic – and this particular position ultimately limits and guides the vast 
majority of what we might imagine to be pure observational content. Thus was should ask 
who or what a purported theory is for. He writes: 
Theory is always for someone and for some purpose. All theories have a 
perspective. Perspectives derive from a position in time and space, specifically 
social and political time and space. The world is seen from a standpoint 
definable in terms of nation or social class, of dominance or subordination, of 
rising or declining power, of a sense of immobility or of present crisis, of part 
experience, and of hopes and expectations for the future. Of course, 
sophisticated theory is never just the expression of a perspective. The more 
sophisticated a theory is, the more it reflects upon and transcends is own 
perspective; but the initial perspective is always contained within a theory and 
is relevant to its explication. There is, accordingly, no such thing as theory in 
itself, divorced from a standpoint in time and space. When any theory so 
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represent itself, it is important to examine it as ideology, and to lay bare its 
concealed perspective.
170
  
 
As these remarks were frequently misinterpreted to mean that there may still be a possibility 
that some theory is not ‘ideological’, Cox unequivocally clarified this position in an interview 
thirty years after the original remarks had been written: 
What I meant is that….there is no neutral theory concerning human affairs, no 
theory of universal validity. Theory derives from practice and experience, and 
experience is related to time and place. Theory is a part of history. It addresses 
the problematic of the world of its time and place. An inquirer has to aim to 
place himself above the historical circumstances in which a theory is 
propounded. One has to ask about the aims and purposes of those who 
construct theories in specific historical situations.
171
 
 
The consequences of this view have been neatly summarised by Rorty. Rather than allowing 
somebody to hide their position in terms of some unrealizable notions “truth” or “objective 
inquiry”, we need to point out that every inquiry includes a claim about a vision of life which 
the authors wants to justify. Thus, we should focus on that vision of life, or what Rorty calls 
the self-image of our society: 
I think that putting the issue in such moral and political terms, rather than 
epistemological or metaphilosophical terms, makes clearer what is at stake. 
For now the question is not about how to define words like “truth” or 
“rationality” or “knowledge” or “philosophy”, but about what self-image our 
society should have of itself. The ritual invocation of the “need to avoid 
relativism” is most comprehensible as an expression of the need to preserve 
certain habits of contemporary European life. There are habits nurtured by the 
Enlightenment, and justified by it in terms of an appeal of Reason, conceived 
as a transcultural human ability to correspond to reality, a faculty whose 
possession and use is demonstrated by obedience to explicit criteria.
172
  
 
One very useful way of thinking about the different purposes of theory (at a high level of 
abstraction) is through Rorty’s differentiation of objectivity vs. solidarity. I turn to this 
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differentiation in the next section and examine how this heuristic can help us to think about 
how to approach the study of economics.  
 
Objectivity vs. Solidarity 
Rorty once suggested an interesting way to contemplate how human beings attempt to give 
meaning to their lives. He differentiates two principal ways of giving meaning. The first way 
highlights how an individual is always part of something larger. No human being has ever 
been born into isolation. The fact that every one of us has literally been part of another human 
being for about nine months and, that for a considerable while after we have finally become 
an independent living organism, we remain incapable of survival on our own, means that we 
always are inherently part of some community. Since this is the case, one way we can 
understand our life is within the practices of that one community, as a member who is in 
solidarity with all others members and their way of life. Rorty writes:  
There are two principal ways in which reflective human beings try, by placing 
their lives in a larger context, to give sense to those lives. The first is by telling 
the story of their contribution to a community. This community may be the 
actual historical one in which they live, or another actual one, distant in time 
and place, or a quite imaginary one, consisting perhaps of a dozen heroes and 
heroines selected from history or fiction or both…..In so far as a person is 
seeking solidarity, she does not ask about the relation between the practices of 
the chosen community and something outside that community.
173
  
 
This desire for solidarity emphasises the bond we have with the fellow members of our 
communities (whoever they may be), reminding us that we are but one of many and that this 
state of affairs puts us in a position of immediate obligation and responsibility towards our 
fellow beings. This sense of immediate obligation trumps all other considerations, including 
how our community might relate to other communities in space and time.  
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The second heuristic attempts to place an individual into relation to some universal 
non-human reality. In contrast to viewing ourselves as indebted to our fellow community, we 
view ourselves as indebted towards something that transcends our particular community, in 
fact, that transcends all communities. Rorty calls this the “desire for objectivity”. This desire 
exemplifies that many human beings do not just want to understand their life as a member of 
a single community, all members of which are eventually going to die. Rather, they want to 
understand their life as part of something larger, something eternal which makes their short 
individual life part of an everlasting cosmic chain. Rorty writes that: 
The second way is to describe themselves as standing in immediate relation to 
nonhuman reality. This relation is immediate in the sense that it does not 
derive from a relation between such reality and their tribe, or their nation, or 
their imagined band of comrades….Insofar as she seeks objectivity, she 
distances herself from the actual persons around her not by thinking of herself 
as a member of some other real or imagined group, but rather by attaching 
herself to something which can be described without reference to any 
particular human being.
174
  
 
The desire for objectivity emphasises the urge towards some point of reference outside our 
selves, to make reference to something eternal and transcendental which would provide a 
stable and constant rationale for human action. Since this idea emphasis the relation to a non-
human reality, however, it can lead to a disregard for the needs and wishes of our fellow 
beings. 
 The idea of economic and social inquiry in the name of the scientific method is very 
much an instance of the ‘desire for objectivity’. It may only be a slight exaggeration to 
suggest that a typically trained economist advances certain ideas about methodology exactly 
because this allows for the discovery of a meaningful existence in light of the universal laws 
and demand and supply and the transcendental logic of the market. It does not matter how 
this logic affects other human beings since the discovery of this universal logic marks the 
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peak of human achievement. Accordingly, the economist is not to be held responsible for 
how the logic of economics is used in actual societies. Rather, the allegiance of the economist 
is given to the idea of a universal form of inquiry.      
 As such, the economist is another instance of the general enlightenment tradition 
which seeks to satisfy the desire for objectivity by way of the concept of truth. But in 
satisfying this desire for objectivity, Western philosophy and contemporary economic theory 
has abandoned the idea of solidarity. The promise to uncover and discover the hidden logic of 
the market, to reach the holy grail of intellectual achievement, justifies any type of harm 
which we may currently cause to our fellow beings. Rorty writes: 
The tradition of Western culture which centres around the notion of the search 
for Truth, a tradition which runs from the Greek philosophers through the 
enlightenment, is the clearest example of the attempt to find a sense on one’s 
existence by turning away from solidarity to objectivity. The idea of truth as 
something to be pursued for its own sake, not because it will be good for 
oneself, or for one’s real or imaginary community, is the central theme of this 
tradition.
175
  
 
The preference of epistemology over questions of life thus makes certain kinds of inquiry 
more paramount than others. If we relate this point back to the discussion found in the first 
chapter, we can see how a particular way of conceiving social science is also linked to a 
particular way of conceiving the meaning of life.  
By construing the problem of knowledge as the problem of knowledge in general, 
rather than a multitude of local problems, each of which may be resolved individually 
without providing a single solution to them all, epistemology goes hand in hand with a certain 
kind of metaphysics. This metaphysics posits that there must be a method of justification in 
general which is applicable to all areas of knowledge. This method of justification must 
intrinsically spring from the essence of human nature and provide a link between human 
beings and the reality they inhabit. In Rorty’s words: 
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[T]o construe truth as correspondence to reality,…they must construe a 
metaphysics which has room for a special relation between beliefs and objects 
which differentiate true from false beliefs. They also must argue that there are 
procedures of justification of belief which are natural and not merely local. So 
they must construe an epistemology which has room for a kind of justification 
which is not merely social but natural, springing from human nature itself, and 
made possible by a link between part of nature and the rest of nature. On their 
view, the various procedures which are thought of as providing rational 
justification by one or another culture may or may not really be rational. For to 
be truly rational, procedures of justification must lead to truth, to 
correspondence to reality, to the intrinsic nature of things.
176
 
 
Since there is this link between human essence, our procedures of justification and all of 
reality, every question must in principle have one determinate answer. The aim of the search 
for the objective truth is to find this answer. But this necessity of the single answer extends 
from the realm of the natural to the realm of the social. Like the natural world, the problems 
of the social world also have to have one answer which the social theorist is meant to 
uncover. It is exactly this idea of a single answer which leads economists to posit that 
economists proceeds “as if” the single answer could be implemented, knowing full well that 
this may not be possible.
177
 But the existence of a single answer is simply out of the question. 
Rorty states: 
The enlightenment idea of “reason” embodies….the theory that there is a 
relation between the ahistorical essence of the human soul and moral truth, a 
relation which ensures that free and open discussion will produce “one right 
answer” to moral as well as to scientific questions. Such a theory guarantees 
that a moral belief that cannot be justified to the mass of mankind is 
“irrational”, and thus not really a product of our moral faculty at all. Rather, it 
is a “prejudice”, a belief that comes from some other part of the soul that 
“reason”. It does not share in the sanctity of conscience, for it is a product of a 
sort of pseudoscience – something whose loss in no sacrifice, but a 
purgation.
178
 
 
It may be worthwhile to emphasise here how closely Rorty’s distinction touches upon 
different developments and controversies in the history of economic thought itself. I do not 
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think it goes too far to suggest that if we venture back to an older tradition of political 
economy, as I have urged in the introduction, we can find that Adam Smith’s account of 
human agency is very much in tune with the idea of solidarity. Solidarity emphasises the 
relational aspects of human experience. The experience of one person is inherently connected 
to the experience of other people. In fact, the famous opening lines of The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments begin with this statement: “How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are 
evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render 
their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of 
seeing it.”179 Smith gives the term sympathy to the ability to feel with and for others. For 
Smith, sympathy is at the centre of all human interaction. This also holds for economic 
interaction. Given that Smith connects the ability to experience sympathy with the ability to 
communicate, it is not too far a stretch to say methodologically Smith would have sided with 
the idea of homo communicandis over homo economicus.  
However, over the subsequent course of economic history, the image of objectivity 
began to predominate. Again, I cannot provide more than fleeting commentary on some of 
the relevant points here but two particular episodes bear mentioning. The first episode 
concerns the image of the nature of games played by human being, in particular the extent to 
which these games reflect concerns of objectivity or solidarity. Where Smith’s account, 
Wittgenstein’s notion of language games, Rorty’s image of solidarity, and my notion of homo 
communicandis emphasise the social character of our experience, John von Neumann and 
Oscar Morgenstern, the founders of modern game theory, provide a very different notion of 
games. They are convinced that the social character is irrelevant to a consideration of 
economic phenomena and of the games we play. What matters for economic considerations is 
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the process of maximising. Against the view that the social nature of individuals does play a 
difference, they write: 
The chief objection against using this very simplified model of an isolated 
individual for the theory of a social exchange economy is that it does not represent 
an individual exposed to the manifold social influences. Hence, it is said to 
analyze an individual who might behave quite differently if his choices were made 
in a social world where he would be exposed to factors of imitation, advertising, 
custom, and so on. These factors certainly make a great difference, but it is to be 
questioned whether they change the formal properties of the process of 
maximizing. Indeed the latter has never been implied, and since we are concerned 
with this problem alone, we can leave the above social considerations out of 
account.
180
    
 
In Von Neumann’s and Morgenstern’s account, human experience becomes meaningful to 
the extent that we each live our life according to the maximisation principle. Put differently, 
the maximisation principle is an instance of Rorty’s objectivity. We are not meant to 
understand our experience via sympathy and solidarity towards others but to the extent to 
which each one of us maximises our satisfaction to the greatest possible extent. For Von 
Neumann and Morgenstern, there is no question about whether people ought to act so as to 
maximise their satisfaction. Rather, this is the only way in which rational individuals behave. 
In this sense, Von Neumann and Morgenstern always equate a particular human rationality 
(maximising a means end relation) with human rationality tout court. It is this rationality that 
ultimately appears as the only desirable way of acting and interacting. 
 An even more stringent version of this striving for objectivity is found in John Nash’s 
theory of games. Nash’s formulation takes Von Neumann and Morgenstern as its starting 
point but makes a crucial restriction in one dimension. Whereas Von Neumann and 
Morgenstern had allowed for limited communication between actors, Nash prohibited any 
communication from taking place at all: 
Von Neumann and Morgenstern have developed a very fruitful theory of two-
person zero-sum games in their book Theory of Games and Economic 
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Behavior…..Our Theory, in contradistinction, is based on the absence of 
coalitions in that it is assumed that each participant acts independently, without 
collaboration or communication with any of the others.
181
 
  
This formulation of Nash’s encapsulates one of the central characteristics of homo 
economicus, namely that she is not only asocial but also acommunicative. Put differently, in 
the economic history from Smith to Nash, the image of human nature has shifted from the 
vision of a person whose economic interaction occurs as part of a larger social and 
communicative experience to the image of a person who is insular and disconnected from his 
surrounding beings to the point of being incapable of communicating with them but who still 
somehow needs to optimise all his interactions with them for maximum satisfaction. It may 
be about time to reorient the image of human nature back to its communicative origin.  
 At the same time as Von Neumann and Morgenstern were working on an image of 
human nature in terms of objectivity, Milton Friedman was working on an image of social 
science methodology in terms of objectivity.
182
 Even though Friedman only ever wrote a 
single paper on methodology, most commentators would agree that it is probably the single 
most important piece on the methodology of economics written in the 20
th
 century.
183
 In this 
vein, Daniel Hausman writes about the essay that it “is by far the most influential 
methodological statement of this century. It is the only essay on methodology that a large 
number, perhaps a majority, of economists have ever read.”184 Friedman argues that the only 
relevant consideration to evaluate a theory is whether it yields successful predictions. He 
states that “the ultimate goal of a positive science is the development of a "theory" or 
"hypothesis" that yields valid and meaningful (i.e., not truistic) predictions about phenomena 
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not yet observed.”185 Put differently, the search for prediction becomes the central meaning of 
research – not to help others or to understand the world. In this sense, Friedman’s drive to 
only consider the predictive success of theory is another instance in which objectivity won 
out over solidarity. Friedman’s main oversight, and there are many oversights to choose from, 
is that he forgets that theory also constitutes reality.
186
 If theory also constitutes reality and 
socialises individuals into particular ways of acting, the question is not only whether it 
predicts correctly but in what ways it socialises individuals. In this sense, both on a 
theoretical front and a methodological front, economics urges students and researchers to 
look at the world in the image of objectivity. Thinking in terms of language games and homo 
communicandis is one way to counteract this urge.  
The first step in the reversal of the image of homo economicus is to resist the urge to 
posit a ‘knower in general’ who seeks ‘knowledge in general’. Rather, we need to examine 
particular problems of particular individuals or communities in their respective historical and 
social settings in order to reach practical solutions. It needs to be understood at the outset 
what a monumental change in intellectual outlook is required for this to occur. For not only 
does economics need to adopt a new theory of knowledge but the standards by which this 
theory can be evaluated change as well. Rather that aiming at truth, and assessing theory in 
terms of whether it is true, we can ask to what extent the theory fosters solidarity. Shifting 
our perspective this way, we allow us to consider the various points which previously 
dropped out of our consideration, especially those of difference, identity, and authority. Rorty 
explains his vision beautifully when he writes: 
In my utopia, human solidarity would be seen not as a fact to be recognised 
by clearing away "prejudice" or burrowing down to previously hidden depths 
but, rather, as a goal to be achieved. It is to be achieved not by inquiry but by 
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imagination, the imaginative ability to see strange people as fellow sufferers. 
Solidarity is not discovered by reflection but created. It is created by 
increasing our sensitivity to the particular details of the pain and humiliation 
of other, unfamiliar sorts of people. Such increased sensitivity makes it more 
difficult to marginalize people different from ourselves by thinking, "They 
do not feel it as we would," or "There must always be suffering, so why not 
let them suffer?
187
 
 
So the question clearly becomes how can solidarity be created in the teaching and practice of 
economics? 
 
Solidarity in Economics  
The best way to practice a kind of economics that supports solidarity is to intrinsically link 
the image of economics with that of the imagination. Deirdre McCloskey has done this 
repeatedly in her work. So have Kurt Heinzelmann and Martha Nussbaum. An excellent 
recent attempt to explicitly argue for the role of imagination in economics is Richard Bronk’s 
The romantic economist where he tries to argue that for a third way between narrow 
rationalism and excessive romanticism:  
The mission of the Romantic Economist is now clear – to find ‘a third way’ 
between the narrow version of rationalism still entertained by many economists 
and the wilder excesses of Romanticism. This involves developing models of the 
behaviour of economic agents that recognise the vital roles played by imagination 
and sentiment as well as reason; and, when considering the prerequisites for good 
economic analysis, it involves championing the use of analytical imagination, 
metaphorical reasoning and open-mindedness as a complement to mathematical 
rigour and logic.
188
  
 
Richard Rorty additionally links the idea of moral progress with an increase in 
imaginative power:  
More specifically, we see both the intellectual and moral progress not as a matter 
of getting closer to the True or the Good or the Right but as an increase in 
imaginative power. We see imagination as the cutting edge of cultural evolution, 
the power which – given peace and prosperity – constantly operates so as to make 
the human future richer than the human past. Imagination is the cause of both new 
scientific pictures of the physical universe and of new conceptions of possible 
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communities. It is what Newton and Christ, Freud and Marx, had in common: the 
ability to re-describe the familiar in unfamiliar terms.
189
 
 
The first step in this endeavour needs to be to replace the notion that there is a predetermined 
human nature. Human beings excel in their plasticity and it is this flexibility that makes them 
truly human. Jesse Prinz put this point very nicely when he writes: 
We must give up on approaches to social science that try to articulate how humans 
act or think by nature. Nature alone determines no pattern of behaviour. Rather, 
the investigation of our natural constitution should be directed at explaining 
human plasticity. We can call that the study of human nature, but the label is 
misleading. It carries with it the dubious idea that there is a natural way for human 
beings to be. This is not the case. By nature, we transcend nature.
190
 
 
One important ramification of this view is that there is no natural way that the economic 
system ought to be organised. The belief in a predetermined human nature leads to the belief 
that the socio-economic system needs to be organised in the way most compatible with that 
nature. The only way to avoid the vision that we ought to have a particular socio-economic 
system is to reject the notion that there is only one way of acting rationally and economically.  
 What should be emphasised in place of unchangeable modes of behaviour is that we 
are socialised into particular ways of behaving. In the same way as we need to learn what it 
means to act economically, we also need to learn what it means to care for others. Rorty puts 
this nicely when he writes that he wants to foster  
a picture of human beings as children of their time and place, without any 
significant metaphysical or biological limits on their plasticity. It means that a 
sense of moral obligation is a matter of conditioning [socialisation] rather than of 
insight. It also entails the notion of insight (in any area, physics as well as ethics) 
as a glimpse of what is there, apart from human needs and desires, cannot be made 
coherent.
191
 
 
An important consequence of this stance is that the entire basis of economics needs to 
be fundamentally adapted. Rather than positing some kind of individual utility maximisers, 
the discipline needs to begin by considering what activities and goods are utility maximising 
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and why. In the vocabulary of standard economics, what is needed is an account of taste 
formation. The kind of taste formation I have in mind here is in the broadest possible sense. It 
not only concerns whether somebody prefers chocolate to vanilla ice-cream but whether 
somebody prefers to life in a relatively equal society to a relatively unequal one. Even more, 
what is required is a recognition that the kind of economic theory that is taught can also 
contribute to this process of taste formation.  
The best way to introduce this kind of reflexivity into economic theory is to connect 
economic theory and teaching to an explicit theory of knowledge. In other words, some 
consideration needs to be given to how there is no intrinsic homo-economicus but that all 
economic principles are somehow the result of socialisation and internalisation. Part of this 
theory of knowledge includes a consideration of how people generate meaning for their life 
and how economic activity is related to an overall vision of what makes life worth living. It 
includes an appreciation of how difference can exist amongst human aims and desires and 
how the same fact can be seen from different angles and in different ways. 
I think another beneficial effect of the abandonment of a sterile type of homo-
economicus is that it human agency is properly humanised again. One of the grave 
misconceptions of microeconomics is the mechanical, automated picture of decision-making 
it presents. As if all behaviour is about calculating costs and benefits. But this idea not only 
works as a descriptive tool but also as a prescriptive advice. A number of experiments with 
undergraduate economics students appear to support this assertion experimentally. Robert 
Frank concludes from these experiments that “economics training [does not] transform 
people into serial killers but that it makes them marginally less likely to cooperate in social 
dilemmas.”192 
                                                          
192
 Frank, Robert et. al., “Do Economists make bad citizens”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10(1), 1996, p. 
187. 
115 
 
The overall result of many billion million instances of marginally less cooperation is 
that it impoverishes the human experience over the long-term. There is something 
aesthetically beautiful about people cooperating and about a society which is cooperative. 
This kind of society does not come about naturally but the necessary values and appreciation 
needs to be instilled. This does not mean that another type of society is somehow more 
natural. There is no state of nature in the sense that humans just approach nature as it is. 
Nature needs to be made comprehensible and in imposing a particular perspective on nature, 
we shape its appearance.  
So what kind of values ought to be fostered in socialisation? I think it is as simple, or as 
difficult, as fostering an imaginative capacity. Part of what is involved in this fostering of the 
imagination is the development of empathy and sympathy. This is another instance where we 
can return to the spirit of Adam Smith. For Smith, the imagination is the very basis for why 
we have sympathy and empathy. He writes: 
As we have no immediate experience of what other men feel, we can form no idea 
of the manner in which they are affected….it is by the imagination only that we 
can form any conception of what are his sensations. Neither can that faculty help 
us to this any other way, than by representing to us what would be our own, if we 
were in his case. It is the impressions of our own senses only, not those of his, 
which our imaginations copy. By the imagination, we place ourselves in his 
situation, we conceive ourselves enduring all the same torments, we enter as it 
were into his body, and become in some measure the same person with him, and 
thence form some idea of his sensations, and even feel something which, though 
weaker in degree, is not altogether unlike them.
193
  
 
Richard Sennett has nicely elaborated further on this role of sympathy and empathy for 
cooperation.  He writes: 
Both sympathy and empathy convey recognition, and both forge a bond, but the 
one is an embrace, the other an encounter. Sympathy overcomes differences 
through imaginative acts of identification; empathy attends to another person on 
his or her own terms…both of these recognitions are necessary at different time 
and in different ways to practice cooperation.
194
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One of the most obvious ways in which to foster imaginative thinking in economics is to 
connect the subject matter with writings in fiction. I explore this idea in more detail in the 
next part of this dissertation. Luckily, such an attempt does not have to start from scratch. A 
number of works in different disciplines, especially literary criticism, have already 
considered some of the relevant issues. I want to draw upon their insights and fashion a way 
of thinking about how different kinds of texts produce economic knowledge and how this 
may be appropriated for a different kind of teaching in economics. As a first taste of what is 
to come, I would like to conclude this section with a longish quote from Heinzelman’s The 
economics of the imagination, the spirit of which will guide the next part of the dissertation:   
To put it another way, this book is not merely (or even primarily) a series of 
essays about political economy or about its “effects” on literature. Nor is it a 
general, theoretical excurses on the nature of metaphor. It is, rather, an 
intersystematic analysis of the language and logic which poetic and economic 
“systems” share. More specifically, by determining how economic theory 
imaginatively – fictively – structures economic discourse, we may explore how 
the art of political economy incorporates those structures; how this art is then 
expressed, formulated, and reassesses in literature; how it is also transfigured 
there.
195
 In my discussion of Marxian economics….it is not my intention to prove 
that Marx was “wrong” – or that we was “right” – but only to disentangle and 
unfold some of the plangent and problematic upon which his theories are 
grounded. This work will find its final coherence, I think, if and when it has 
convinced the reader that such metaphors still inform our daily speech, our social 
fictions, and the literature we read – that they have, in fact, been translated by 
literature into challenging and largely unanalysed forms of thought which we 
literary and economic analysts alike, often unwittingly approximate, ignore, or 
repossess in our own thinking.
196
  
 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I make the case that the study of language and concepts can be a useful 
methodological foundation for studying economics. I draw heavily on the work of 
Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations to show how language always socialises 
individuals into particular ways of thinking. I next draw on Rorty’s differentiation between 
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objectivity and solidarity to suggest that the current practice of economics too strongly 
socialises in the direction of objectivity. In the last section, I argue that the practice 
economics should more strongly be directed towards solidarity. I suggest that one way of 
accomplishing this aim to make use of works of fiction in the teaching of economics. In order 
develop this claim, the second part of this dissertation argues that works of fiction also 
contribute to the creation of economic knowledge and ideas. I also compare the ways in 
which economic textbook generate economic knowledge to the ways in which works of 
fiction generate such ideas.  
One important implication of the discussion of this chapter, and of the notion of 
language games in general, is that there can never be only one way of doing economics. 
Different problems require different approaches and there can be no universal criterion to 
adjudicate which problem is to be ranked as paramount. Rather, we can ask what difference it 
makes to study economics one way rather than another. The aim of such inquiry, however, is 
not settle the question once and for all, but to engage in a dialogue through which we 
recognise that “it is the open-ended dialogue that brings insight through the activity of 
reciprocal elucidation itself.”197 
In the next part of this thesis, I am going to try to open up new avenues for dialogue by 
applying a methodology appropriate for the image of homo communicandis to the practice of 
economics. I do so by highlighting how different texts produce knowledge and meaning and 
how they manage to do so. I turn to what at first sight appear to be very different kinds of 
texts. First, I will turn to economics textbooks in chapter three. I will also analyse two 
contemporary novels in chapter five. Wedged in between those two explorations, chapter four 
provides a further explanation of how both textbooks and novels can be studied along similar 
lines.  
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Having argued that knowledge is not a matter of getting closer to reality per se, the second 
part of this dissertation is going to examine some of the ways in which economic knowledge 
is produced and transmitted in contemporary Anglo-Saxon societies. I want to argue that 
knowledge is constructed as part of different overlapping socialisation processes and that we 
can turn to a variety of materials to gain some understanding in what ways individuals are 
being socialised. I also want to highlight that because economic knowledge and ideas are a 
matter of socialisation, and not an accurate understanding of reality, there are choices 
involved in how to socialise individuals into particular ideas. This means that there is a 
certain amount of responsibility involved in how economic knowledge is created through 
socialisation channels. The decision to socialise particular groups of individuals one way, 
rather than another, can be of grave consequences for a society overall.  
 This means that questions need to be asked about the ways the current teaching of 
economics socialises individuals and with what specific results. Some results indicate that the 
effects are similar to being primed on money. Becoming socialised into academic economics 
appears to make people less cooperative and greedier. Robert Frank et. al. test this hypothesis 
in a number of different ways. They asked US college students to play games of prisoner’s 
dilemma and found that economics students were less cooperative than non-economics 
students.
198
 It might be the case that it is only the more selfish students that choose to become 
economics majors in the first place. In order to account for this possibility they also observed 
how the trend for non-cooperation changed over the course of a college education. They 
found that for non-economics majors, upperclassmen (juniors and seniors in the American 
college system) become more cooperative, whereas economics majors stayed as 
uncooperative as they had been as underclassmen. They conclude by saying that 
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Naturally, we are in no position to say whether the trend for noneconomists 
reflects something about the content of noneconomics courses. But the fact that 
this trend is not present for economists is at least consistent with the hypothesis 
that training in economics plays some causal role in the lower observed 
cooperation rates of economists.
199
 
   
Similar results were obtained by Long Wang et. al. They compared how economics majors 
and education majors play the dictator game and found that economics students kept a larger 
amount compared to education students ($7.76/$10 vs $6.5/$10).
200
 They also found that the 
attitude towards greed itself changed. Economics majors both reported more positive feelings 
about greed in their own actions and more positive moral feelings about greed in general. A 
further interesting dimension of the Frank et. al. study is that the result also seems to hold for 
the economics professors. They sent out questionnaires about personal charitable giving to 
1245 college professors in the United States and they found that despite “their generally 
higher incomes, economists were also among the least generous in terms of their median gifts 
to large charities like viewer-supported television and the United Way.”201 These 
experimental results give some further credence to my suggestion that economics too heavily 
fosters objectivity over solidarity in Rorty’s sense.  
 Framing the issues this way allows me to ask if it may be necessary to adapt the way 
in which economic ideas are currently being socialised. The argument begins in chapter three, 
where I argue that economics textbooks are an important vehicle to justify and legitimate 
particular ways of framing and understanding economic and social processes as the only 
correct way to understand them. I then want to demonstrate that economics textbooks are 
only one of very many ways in which economic ideas are socialised and that it may be of 
benefit to at least complement economics textbooks with a greater variety of material to teach 
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economics in institutions of higher education. A number of different ways are imaginable. In 
fact, I have been involved in a number of initiatives which urge to implement curriculum 
reform in economics. By far the most high-profile of these reform movements, the INET 
CORE movement,
202
 is hampered by the fact that they are unwilling to engage with any of 
the methodological issues which economics inherently faces. Because of the unwillingness to 
engage with issues of methodology, the INET CORE movement reproduces many of the 
problematic assumptions of standard economic theory. Given my own emphasis on 
methodology, I therefore pursue a much more radical position. The argument I pursue in this 
dissertation is that economic ideas and knowledge are also transmitted through works of 
fiction and that this channel may be preferable to textbooks. The criterion for this preference 
is that works of fiction allow for a less deterministic and more varied way of socialisation.
203
 
In order to make this argument, I review some seminal works in literary criticism and 
cultural history in chapter four to argue that works of fiction can have a dual function. On the 
one hand, they can reflect particular ways of looking at the world which are shared with the 
readership. Through the actions and attitudes of the main protagonists, novels are able to 
reflect particular cultures. On the other hand, novels are also able to get readers to reflect on 
the desirability of particular social and economic arrangements. If these points are well 
presented, it may get readers to change their opinion on particular issues. Put this way, novels 
can also be a source of resistance and social transformation. As such, they are an ideal 
mechanism to teach economic knowledge and ideas. 
In chapter five, I use two contemporary American novels to demonstrate how novels 
partake in the reproduction of particular ideas. I also highlight that they can call these ideas 
into question. The examples I have chosen for this purpose are Jonathan Franzen’s Freedom 
and David Foster Wallace’s (DFW) The Pale King. Both works are exemplary in the extent to 
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which they have taken up the constitution of economic knowledge and its consequences for 
individuals and society at large as their central theme. But I have also chosen these novels as 
examples because it was these books above all others which first allowed me to realise what 
powerful tools works of fiction can be in the reproduction and transmission of economic 
ideas. Both novels share an interest in the issue of responsibility in contemporary societies. In 
different ways, they both call into question the idea of the self-reliant, independent, consumer 
agent at the heart of economics, politics, and large parts of contemporary culture. Franzen’s 
Freedom heavily focuses on the interrelation between how individuals construct meaning as 
part of their respective identity. DFW’s The Pale King, by contrast, deals with issues relating 
to what it means to work for and with large modern bureaucracies. DFW asks the reader to 
contemplate the nature of work – to consider if work is only a means to an income or if our 
work also partially makes us who we are as a person. DFW asks the reader to consider the 
possibility that working for a large modern bureaucracy makes us into a kind of person who 
fails to realise their full human potential.  
In the previous paragraph, I made reference to the idea that these novels and 
textbooks are exemplary. As I will show, economics textbooks and novels can be said to be 
exemplars and exemplary in a whole number of different dimensions. For starters, economics 
textbooks are exemplary for containing what is considered accepted theory in economics. 
Thomas Kuhn himself remarked this about the nature of textbooks, saying that “textbooks 
expound the body of accepted theory, illustrate many or all of its successful applications, and 
compare these applications with exemplary observations and experiments.”204 In teaching 
what is considered accepted theory, economics makes use of particular exemplars or tropes in 
order to teach this particular way of viewing the world. Novels can be said to be exemplary in 
the way in which plotlines and protagonists reflect situations and traits which its readers are 
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very familiar with and can relate to. In fact, in the case of overfamiliarity with a plotline or 
protagonist, one would call it a cliché. An important dimension is that the plotline and 
protagonists also give rise to a way of viewing the world. Put differently, stories can also 
contain a moral vision. The epithet ‘And the moral of the story is’ captures this idea 
wonderfully.   
I come back to this issue at various points during the third chapter but for now I 
would like to highlight how examples, or exemplars as Kuhn called them, are crucial to how 
knowledge is socialised and constructed. Kuhn used the term exemplar to point out that 
students learn how one does physics on the basis of particular illustrations which highlight 
what counts as what in a given situation. As Kuhn writes: “…I speak of acquiring from 
exemplars the ability to recognise a given situation as like some and unlike others that one 
has seen before…”205 What this means, as Matthew Watson has nicely remarked, is that 
exemplars “primarily….educate people into viewing the world in a particular way.”206 Kuhn 
highlights how the kind of exemplars that are learnt structure our understanding in ways that 
cannot be recovered by some neutral language. He writes:  
Because the words about which difficulties cluster have been learned in part from 
direct application to exemplars, the participants in a communication breakdown 
cannot say, “I use the word ‘element’ (or ‘mixture,’ or ‘planet,’ or ‘unconstrained 
motion’) in ways determined by the following criteria. They cannot, that is, resort 
to a neutral language which both use in the same way and which is adequate to the 
statement of both their theories or even of both those theories’ empirical 
consequences. Part of the difference is prior to the application of the languages in 
which it is nevertheless reflected.
207
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Kuhn thus highlights how exemplars are of crucial importance to teach a way of looking at 
the world. I demonstrate a number of instances in the third chapter where economics 
textbooks rely on the notion of exemplars to substantiate their claims. 
 
A Methodological Interlude 
But before proceeding with the discussion, I would like to provide an important 
methodological consideration. When I claim that textbooks are vehicles of socialisation (and 
communication), the question arises what evidential basis can I appeal to in order to support 
this claim? In other words, how can I provide a general explanation about the relationship 
between economics textbooks touts court and their socialising effects? This is a tricky 
question and one that is difficult to resolve since it clearly is not possible to claim that if 
student x comes into contact with book y, in context z, a will happen.  
This problem is well known to most scholars working in communication studies. Joseph 
Klapper, writing in 1960, provides a wonderful framing of exactly this problem: 
Teachers, preachers, parents, and legislators have asked us [scholars in 
communication studies] a thousand times over these past fifteen years whether 
violence in the media causes delinquency, whether the escapist nature of much of 
the fare does not blind people to reality, and just what the media can do to the 
political persuasions of their audiences. To these questions we [scholars in 
communication studies] have not only failed to provide definite answers, but we 
have done something worse: we have provided evidence in partial support of 
every hue of every view.
208
  
 
Bernard Berelson, writing in 1948, opts for a slightly tongue-in-cheek way of putting this 
issue. He states that the most one is able to say is that “some kinds of issues, brought to the 
attention of some kinds of people, have some kinds of effects.”209 
 In order to understand the socialising effects of textbooks, we need to move away 
from the hope that this relationship can be expressed in some kind of deterministic fashion. In 
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Communication Studies, the hope to be able to accomplish such a feat is known as 
hypodermic needle theory or magic bullet theory “whereby messages are automatically 
injected into the minds of recipients, whether in their living room, at the cinema or in a 
lecture theatre.”210 A hypodermic explanation cannot be achieved. It will neither be possible 
to make any deterministic claim for a single individual nor will it be possible to make any 
deterministic claim about a collective or group. 
An unsympathetic reader might counter that if no deterministic relationships can be 
established even in principle, this issue is simply not worth studying. This view forgets that 
lack of determinism is not the same as lack of importance. Just because something does not 
deterministically lead to certain outcomes does not mean it is irrelevant. It just means that the 
phenomenon is not causally determined. This is just another way of repeating the original 
claim that to understand socialisation, we need to move away from a deterministically causal 
explanatory framework. 
 I would therefore like to offer two different conceptualisations of the kind of 
explanations I have in mind when I talk about the effects of socialisation. One way of 
conceptualising the relationship is under the rubric of influences. Joseph Klapper provides 
another wonderful way of phrasing this issue, arguing that we need “a shift away from the 
tendency to regard mass communication [textbooks are one instance of mass communication] 
as a necessary and sufficient cause of audience effects, toward a view of the media as 
influences, working amid other influences, in total situations.”211  
Another way of framing the kind of explanatory framework I have in mind is to 
appropriate the Bourdieusian term ‘field’. Although Bourdieu’s writing leaves a lot of be 
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desired in terms of clarity, I think we can follow the general gist of his concept of field.
212
  
Bourdieu himself characterises a field  
as a system of specifically linguistic relations of power based on the unequal 
distribution of linguistic capital (or, to put it another way, of the chances of 
assimilating the objectified linguistic resources), the structure of the space of 
expressive styles reproduces in its own terms the structure of the differences 
which objectively separate conditions of existence…. It is one of the generic 
properties of fields that the struggle for specific stakes masks the objective 
collusion concerning the principles underlying the game. More precisely, the 
struggle tends constantly to produce and reproduce the game and its stakes by 
reproducing, primarily in those who are directly involved, but not in them alone, 
the practical commitment to the value of the game and its stakes which defines the 
recognition of legitimacy.”213 
 
Bourdieu manages to bring out a number of important considerations with his 
conceptualisation of the field. Like the term ‘influences’, the concept of field involves a 
recognition of the fluidity and interrelation of the processes under consideration. What makes 
the concept of the field better suited for my purposes, however, is that Bourdieu never tires of 
emphasising the fact that fields are intrinsically reflective and constitutive of particular power 
relations and that in participating in a certain field, the underlying values of this field are 
reproduced. Viktoria Kalmus provides one of the best ways of paraphrasing the Bourdieusian 
notion of field as: 
structured social spaces with dominant and dominated social agents and unequal 
power relations, which are constantly struggled over. These fields are discursively 
interrelated. The field of school, for instance, is discursively related to the fields 
of the political system, the media, family, and peer-groups (and those fields are 
interrelated with each other) when, e.g. a TV debate on a policy of interethnic 
integration and its viewing by the pupils’ parents and siblings are discussed in a 
(multicultural) classroom after the pupils have read the chapter on ethnic 
minorities in their civics textbook.
214
 
 
Another important dimension to this conceptualisation of the field is that social context 
matters for knowledge production and processes of socialisation.
215
 This comes back to the 
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arguments raised in chapter one and two that all reality is socially constructed. Berger and 
Luckmann put this point nicely when they write that “what is 'real' to a Tibetan monk may 
not be 'real' to an American businessman. The 'knowledge' of the criminal differs from the 
'knowledge' of the criminologist. It follows that specific agglomerations of 'reality' and 
'knowledge' pertain to specific social contexts.”216  
 This issue is pertinent for economic ideas because economic ideas are constructed in 
many overlapping fields. My aim in this part of the dissertation is to start to examine two 
different fields of knowledge production – economics textbooks and contemporary novels. 
Economics textbooks are particularly interesting in this regard because they operate in very 
different social contexts and these contexts can have significant consequences for how ideas 
presented within these textbooks are taken up. On the one hand, textbooks function as a 
socialisation vehicle for economics students.
217
 In this context, the influence of economic 
textbooks is inherently tied up with the social context of the classroom – a teacher, grades to 
be achieved, a job after graduation, peer pressure and so on. My interest in economics 
textbooks is not limited to the text per se. Rather, I am interested in how economics textbooks 
as they function within the total social setting. On the other hand, textbooks also function as a 
sort of reference point for journalists and policy makers. As in the case of the classroom 
environment, economics textbooks partake in power relations, giving authority to legitimise 
certain type of claims. The constitution differs markedly between a classroom and a 
journalistic setting, however. In the next chapter, my aim is to examine some of the ways in 
which the field of the economics textbooks constitutes itself. In other words, how does it 
manage to function as a field and what are some of the particular consequences of this field? I 
highlight that economics textbooks tend to legitimise their authority position with an appeal 
                                                          
216
 Berger, Peter and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of 
Knowledge, London: Penguin, 1991 (1966), p.15. 
217
 For an excellent overview, see Kalmus, Victoria, “What do pupils and textbooks do with each other?: 
Methodological problems of research on socialisation through educational media”, Journal of Curriculum 
Studies, 36(4), 2004,  pp. 469–485. 
128 
 
to science as an accurate description of reality. In other words, the very vision of science that 
makes it impossible to understand how knowledge and ideas are constructed is used as a 
justification for why economics textbooks construct knowledge.       
A comparison of economics textbooks with contemporary novels can be insightful for 
a number of reasons. The first is that is allows for a better appreciation of the relationship 
between reader and author, and how ideas are produced and transmitted. In some ways, the 
issues at stake are another permutation of the question of how meaning is produced in 
general. Traditionally, as Stanley Fish has remarked about this own development, the 
problem was framed as a question where meaning is located: in the text or in the reader.
218
 
On the one hand, there is the position that texts have a single unique meaning to be 
discovered by the reader.
219
 In many ways, this is one of the standard assumptions of all 
works motivated by the spirit of positivism but, perhaps more interestingly, it is also a 
position which underlies a significant portion of the work of the Frankfurt School. Herbert 
Marcuse, in his One-Dimensional Man, for example, makes repeated allusions as to the ease 
with which modern readers of mass communication are duped into taking the position wanted 
by those who hold power. At one point he writes that “our mass media have little difficulty in 
selling particular interests as those of all sensible men.”220 The type of automatic response to 
particular media, as often envisioned by the Frankfurt School, necessitates that the meaning 
of texts is clear and the same for every reader. Otherwise those in power cannot communicate 
their message so effectively. I am in full agreement with Willem Schinkel who argues that 
“the media do not, as various members of the Frankfurt School held, directly determine what 
we think.”221 On the other hand, there is the position that texts have no predetermined 
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meaning. Meaning is produced only in the reader. Jonathan Culler summarises this type of 
position by arguing that “interpretation is not a matter of recovering some meaning which lies 
behind the work and serves as a centre governing its structure; it is rather an attempt to 
participate in and observe the play of possible meanings to which the text gives access.”222 
 Thinking about how textbooks and novels might produce knowledge highlights some 
shortcomings of framing the issue as a duality. A student taking an undergraduate economics 
class certainly has to recover the meaning of the economics textbook if she aims to pass the 
class. The argument that her reading of the textbook differs from the instructor will not be 
seen as acceptable. The same student reading a contemporary novel for pleasure does not 
have the same need to conform. So the question is not so much whether the text or the reader 
produces meaning but how different texts function in different social contexts. A more useful 
framing of my purposes might therefore be Umberto Eco’s counterintuitive distinction of 
texts as open and closed text. In Eco’s terminology, some novels can work as closed texts 
meaning that they are open to any possible imagination. Textbooks, however, are open texts 
because they only work with a particular kind of reading: 
Those texts that obsessively aim at arousing a precise response on the part of more 
or less precise empirical readers (be they children, soap-opera addicts, doctors, 
law-abiding citizens, swingers, Presbyterians, farmers, middle-class women, 
scuba divers, effete snobs, or any other imaginable sociopsychological category) 
are in fact open to any possible aberrant decoding. A text so immoderately 'open' 
to every possible interpretation will be called a closed one….. This cannot happen 
with those I call 'open' texts: You cannot use the text as you want but only as the 
texts wants you to use it. An open text, however open it may be, cannot afford 
whatever interpretation.
223
 
 
 The point I want to highlight with this distinction is that texts are best thought of as being 
located simultaneously on different continuums. In one dimension, text A will be more open 
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than text B. In another dimension, it will be the other way around. And each of these 
dimensions will reflect and constitute different social contexts.  
As a last point, I would like to emphasise the autobiographical angle for this section. 
Again, my own person is tied up with the discussion in multiple and overlapping ways. 
However economic knowledge and economic ideas are produced, I need to admit my full 
complicity within these processes. In fact, I am doubly complicit. I am complicit because I 
read these textbooks and participated in the field as an economics student. Today, I am 
participating in the field as somebody who teaches economic ideas. In some ways, it is this 
complicity which attracted me to this research in the first place. But the complicity also goes 
some way towards explaining the books that I have chosen to examine as exemplars of these 
particular fields (textbooks and novels). As an undergraduate economics student, I began my 
studies with Mankiw’s Principles. So this book also contributed to my own intellectual 
development in a myriad of ways. Luckily, however, Mankiw’s is also widely regarded as the 
most popular economics textbooks and therefore a prime candidate for a deeper analysis. 
Frank and Bernanke’s textbook provides a further nice example since they are much more 
explicit about the pedagogical practices that underlie a textbook. The same also holds true for 
the two novels that are the subject of discussion in chapter five. Both Franzen’s Freedom and 
David Foster Wallace’s The Pale King were in some ways influential in allowing me to 
realise that economic ideas are transmitted in different ways and that this also means that 
economics could be taught differently at university.  As they are both best-selling books in 
the United States, they seemed the right place to start a serious exploration of how fiction 
contributes in the transmission of economic ideas and knowledge in contemporary societies.    
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Chapter 3: 
How and what economics undergraduate textbooks 
socialise 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I want to explore how economics textbooks create economic ideas and 
economic knowledge. I raise a number of different issues but the main point is that the 
teaching of economics too heavily relies on fostering an idea of objectivity, to the detriment 
of solidarity. One of the ways in which this is accomplished is to rely on the view of the 
scientific method that has been found wanting in the first chapter. In order to develop this 
argument, the discussion proceeds in four sections. In the first section, I ground the 
discussion through a literature review of sorts. I highlight why economic ideas matter and 
how previous scholarship has attempted to link the production of particular ideas with 
economics textbooks. In the second section, I undertake a rhetorical analysis of one of the 
most widely used economics textbooks - Gregory Mankiw’s Principles. In the third section, I 
extend the discussion of Mankiw’s Principles to Robert Frank’s and Ben Bernanke’s 
Principles. In the final section, I use the specific example of a student protest again Gregory 
Mankiw’s economics course at Harvard College to concretise some of the issues I had raised 
in the earlier sections.  
In the first section, I argue that previous attempts to link the production of economic 
ideas to textbooks have been very sporadic, lacking an overall comprehensive approach. 
Given the theoretical grounding provided in part one of this dissertation, I hope I can 
synthesise various points raised by previous scholarship into a more comprehensive 
framework of how economics textbooks produce economic ideas: through socialisation. In 
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the second section, I want to demonstrate how Mankiw uses a particular vision of what 
constitutes knowledge and science to lend legitimacy to his approach. The vision of 
knowledge which Mankiw appeals to is exactly the vision of knowledge as accurate 
representation of reality that I rejected in part one of this dissertation. Put differently, Mankiw 
appeals to a vision of knowledge as authority which, once properly considered, should lend 
no legitimacy and authority to his position. This shows once more why it is important rethink 
the theory of knowledge which underlies economics. In the third section, I compare the 
position about scientific knowledge found in Mankiw with the pedagogical advice found in 
Frank and Bernanke’s textbook. I highlight that when it comes to pedagogical advice, Frank 
and Bernanke are very well aware that economics is not only concerned with accurate 
description of reality but that it helps to constitute it in some ways. But they still use the 
legitimating claim of scientific knowledge to justify their argument. In other words, there is a 
telling kind of incongruity between the pedagogical standpoint and the methodological 
standpoint found in economics textbooks. In the fourth section of this chapter, I use the 
example of the Harvard Economics walk-out organised by students to highlight how this 
view of knowledge obscured some of the commitments in Mankiw’s teaching of economics. 
Mankiw and the defenders of his position take the student complaint as a complaint about the 
realm of objectivity when the students’ complaint is in fact about the realm of solidarity. 
 
Why economic ideas matter! 
It may be worthwhile to begin this discussion with the question of why the issue of 
economics textbooks should be considered important. My point is as simple as wide-ranging. 
Economics textbooks matter because economic ideas matter. This point has been frequently 
made. Keynes concludes his General Theory by writing that 
The ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and 
when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed 
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the world is ruled by little else. Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite 
exempt from any intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of some defunct 
economist. Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air, are distilling their 
frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few years back.
224
 
 
This point has been taken up by a number of different scholars in different ways in 
recent years. George DeMartino focuses on the influence which economists as a profession 
have on policy-making. He writes: “The economic profession today has an enormous impact 
on the life chances of people across the globe: one that is far greater than that of most other 
professions……Economic interventions of the sort undertaken by economists entail a 
responsibility that is, in a word, awesome.”225 Tiago Mata and Steven Medema, by contrast, 
highlight the role which economists play as public intellectuals. They argue that “histories 
that connect the public utterances and interventions of economists are possible. They are 
fundamental to unlock a deeper understanding of the place of economic knowledge in our 
culture.”226 Craufurd Goodwin has highlighted a complex blurred distinction between 
economists as scientists and economists as practitioners saying that “many scholar-
economists have come to fear the effect practitioner-economists may have on the very system 
that is their subject of study and therefore have not come to grips with their existence.”227 
Marion Fourcade in many ways summarises these issues and adds some further 
dimensions when she highlights the evolution of the economics profession over time:  
Since the end of the nineteenth century, economists have developed increasingly 
distinctive discourses, credentials, and professional ambitions. In most countries 
the discipline of economics has become a legitimate, and a highly technical, field 
of scientific study and practice. It has secured a position within the higher 
educational system and has expanded its authority within a wide range of social 
institutions, including governments, corporations, and international organizations. 
As economic technologies and policy recipes have become inescapable features of 
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the expert tool kits of modern social institutions, economic vocabulary and images 
saturate our culture.
228
 
 
I am in complete agreement with much that has been written about the importance of 
economic ideas but I think too little appreciation has been given to the role of economics 
textbooks and economics undergraduate teaching. Economists are clearly important because 
they serve in policy arenas and as public intellectuals. But a very important dimension to their 
influence is that they are also tasked with educating the population at large about what the 
economy is and how it works. And many of the most important textbook authors were highly 
aware of this relevance. Paul Samuelson, whose Principles was the most popular economics 
textbooks until the 1970s, reportedly once remarked that “I don't care who writes a nation's 
laws – or crafts its advanced treaties – if I can write its economics textbooks.”229 
The role and importance of economics textbooks have generally received very 
piecemeal attention. One tendency has been to link the issue of how textbooks teach the 
subject through the prism of particular issues. In this vein, Robert Cherry, writing in 1985, 
highlights the treatment of minimum wage discussions in 28 different economics textbook to 
find that “whatever the motivation for these textbook presentations, they are damaging to 
black youth and other constituents of the low-wage labor market.”230 Susan Feiner and 
Barbara Morgan, writing in 1987, argue that “economics stands out as one of the few subjects 
represented in the college curriculum in which the relevant professional organization has 
neither adopted a position on the importance of race and gender balance nor initiated or 
funded "balancing" projects.”231 Robert Lepenies, by contrast, focuses on trade theory 
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arguing that “all textbooks put forward trade policy recommendations in nearly identical 
manner” and that they therefore “tend to matter as vehicles, wittingly or unwittingly, of a 
political philosophy of a special kind.”232 
Another tendency has been to highlight some of the methodological shortcomings of 
how economics textbooks present economic knowledge. Michael Watts reviews different 
conceptions of ideology and how they relate to the teaching of economics.
233
 Will Carrington 
Heath briefly reviews fact/value distinctions in textbooks.
234
 Silja Graupe, by contrast, argues 
that “the economics curriculum, under the surface of awareness, shapes an image of man, 
which splits society into mere cogs in the machine of the economy on the one side and the 
omnipotent social engineers on the other. The latter are portrayed as if they could steer this 
machine from the outside according to their own precepts.”235 
A third tendency is to highlight the nature of economics textbooks as a transmission 
mechanism. Massimo M. Augello and Marco E.L. Guidi attempt to highlight how “textbooks 
and manuals contributed to the creation of market economic agents, with an economic 
representation of the social world and with economic tools to apply to their professional, 
social, and political activities.”236 Neva Goodwin highlights the importance of economic 
textbooks by stating that “every year about 5 million people in the U.S. graduate from college 
having taken at least one economics course. These courses, and the textbooks that shape 
them, in turn contribute to a shared understanding of how things work in the world – and to a 
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general consensus on whose voices will be heard on economic subjects.”237 Peter-Wim 
Zandorf further highlights the importance of economics textbooks outside the classroom. He 
writes: “While one need not have any illusions about how much students actually retain from 
their introductory course, textbook accounts are also what journalists, commentators, policy 
advisors, economists, and noneconomists alike tend to draw on when having to explain 
economics in public.”238 I think one of the reasons why economics textbooks are so important 
in this regard is that they are they are usually the only output by professional economists that 
can be read in prose, rather than mathematics.  
In many ways, what I am trying to accomplish in this chapter is to synthesise these 
various perspectives into a more comprehensive framework for understanding the role of 
economics textbooks. Starting with the background that knowledge is a matter of 
socialisation allows for a recognition of the various ways in which textbooks socialise and 
construct knowledge. Economics textbooks matter because they socialise the student and 
reader into a particular language and way of thinking. It is for this reason that economics 
textbooks are a much more powerful tool for the transmission of economic ideas at large than 
academic journals. Most readers of an academic journal in economics will already have learnt 
the ways of speaking and thinking like an economist. This is not the case with an 
undergraduate textbook where one of the explicit aims is to teach what it means to think and 
speak like an economist. Keith Tribe has pointed out that this learning of language is crucial 
for the way economic processes are envisioned. He writes that  
we need to pay attention to the use of words, and discount claims that it is enough to 
define them—that we ‘know’ what capital, interest, wages, growth, and so on are, that 
all we need to do is refer to their definition in modern economics. When using 
                                                          
237
 Goodwin, Neva, “The human element in the new economics: a 60-year refresh for economic thinking and 
teaching”, Real-world economics review, 68, 2014, p. 99. 
238
 Zuidhof, Peter-Wim, “Thinking Like an Economist: The Neoliberal Politics of the Economics Textbook”, 
Review of Social Economy, 72(2), 2014, p. 159. 
137 
 
economic language, we would do well to pay attention to which language we are 
speaking.
239
 
 
Arjo Klamer has already attempted to provide a reading, informed by what he terms a 
rhetorical perspective, of Samuelson’s Principles, arguing that “the rhetorical perspective 
provides a mode of inquiry. It may eventually affect the way economists view the world - I 
have argued it should - but for now it guides explorations of what it is economists do.”240 In 
the following chapter, I attempt to add to this way of approaching economics textbooks. 
 Textbooks are also an interesting case because they embody a particular permutation 
of the image of homo communicandis. Unlike the image of homo economicus, who appears to 
know how to behave rationally from birth, the image of homo communicandis highlights that 
behaviours need to be learnt and socialised. Textbooks also embody a particular relationship 
between student and teacher but what makes this particular embodiment of homo 
communicandis different from the image I have been using is that the flow of communication 
is merely one way. The teacher communicates to the student rather than with the student. In 
order to function as a textbook, this also partly needs to be the case for it is only by laying a 
claim on a superior type of position that particular claims are likely accepted by the student as 
binding. Put differently, only because a teacher can claim to know how the world works, and 
the student does not, can the teacher then teach the correct way of looking at the world to the 
student. This is one important way of how ideas are socialised. But as far as concerns the 
image of homo communicandis, it is a poor example since that image is meant to emphasise 
the two-way relationship in communication. This is not to say there is a type meaningful 
communicative relationship that is free all power relations. All meaningful communicative 
relationships are shaped by such power relationships. But the teacher-student case in the case 
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of higher education is a particularly one-sided case and I would just to emphasise this point at 
the outset.
241
 
 
Mankiw’s Principles 
If we begin our analysis to see how the study of economics is introduced and justified in 
textbooks, the first thing one encounters is how the tone of the book assumes a particular 
relationship between reader and author. Unlike some of the points raised earlier in the 
interlude, where an argument was reviewed that an author’s intentions are ‘neither desirable 
nor available’ when approaching a written work, I think the author’s intentions here are made 
abundantly clear. The author, as professor and economist, is presented as being in a position 
of having some sort of knowledge which the reader, as student, lacks. The aim of the author 
is to educate the reader, to tell him how things work in the world. This might appear to be an 
obvious point. And it is. The point of a textbook is for somebody to learn the material 
presented within that textbook. But by the very nature of this role, the textbook embodies an 
important power relationship. The student is put in a position where the professor with her 
superior knowledge is going to judge the student on how well she is able to reproduce this 
knowledge. The teacher is in a position to tell the student what she ought to do – what and 
how she ought to study.  
Put this way, the economist has some responsibility for what she is asking the student 
to learn. Being in a position of power and tasked with the evaluation of how well a student 
manages to reproduce this knowledge, the economist is also responsible for the content of 
said knowledge. To use a bit of a crude example, if there was a certain subject in every 
university in the country that taught that women were inferior to men, and students were 
asked to reproduce this answer in various exams, would this subject not have some influence 
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– responsibility – on the arguments that are reproduced in popular discussions as to why 
women are inferior to men? In this way, textbook authors play a strong legitimating role. In 
presenting something as knowledge about how the world works, they naturalise certain 
understandings. My point here is not to criticise this fact (it is impossible to avoid) but to 
point out that this legitimation does take place and that it is an important point to keep in 
mind. Put differently, economics textbooks are one important mechanism by which the image 
of homo economicus is produced and transmitted and the discipline of economics is 
responsible for transmitting this image of human agency.                                                           
This point can be put another way. If one pores over a number of textbooks, one is 
very much reminded of the old relationship between master and apprentice craftsmen in a 
medieval guild.
242
 Just like the master teaches the apprentice to learn the tools of the trade, 
the economics professor teaches the tools of economics to the student. The implicit 
assumption is that the craft of building a chair or printing textiles is of the same kind as 
thinking about an economic problem. David Begg et. al. even make explicit use of this 
metaphor but in a more contemporary context: “The formal study of economics is exciting 
because it allows a better understanding of the problem we face. Everyone knows a smoky 
engine is a bad sign, but sometimes only a trained mechanic can give the right advice.”243 But 
clearly, if the master teaches the apprentice to build chairs that always break, does the master 
not bear some responsibility for the failures of the apprentice? And by learning to build chairs 
in the way the master has taught him, is the apprentice not justified in building chairs this 
way as opposed to another?  
Framing the issue in these terms allows for a recognition that economists are 
responsible for the ideas they produce and ask students to learn. One question is clearly how 
                                                          
242
 Quentin Skinner was maybe one of the first employ this metaphor when he was discussing the student-
teacher relationship in history books. See Skinner, Quentin, Visions of politics Volume I: Regarding Method, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 9. 
243
 Begg, David et. al., Economics, Maidenhead: McGraw-Hill Higher Education, 2005, p. 1. 
140 
 
economists approach this issue of responsibility. The central argument I advance is that 
economics as it is taught not only ignores this problem of power and responsibility, but 
actively tries to reject that it exists in the first place. The way this is accomplished is to posit 
that economic theory is in the business of uncovering fundamental laws of human nature – 
finding out the truth. Economists thus assume the existence of an unmediated experience of 
the world. By unmediated, I mean that no matter who were are, when or where we were born, 
there is a single perspective that correctly captures the way the world really works. There not 
only exists something like a knower in general who has access to experience in general but 
also a unique universal standard by which this experience can be assessed.
244
  
Most economics textbooks use the introductory section as a guide for why one should 
study economics in the first place. Knowing economics will not help the student to fix a car 
engine. So, what use is the economic knowledge which the professor is promising to impart 
on the student? Mankiw makes some far-reaching claims about the variety of ways in which 
knowledge of economics is going to enrich the student’s life:  
The first reason to study economics is that it will help you understand the 
world in which you live. There are many questions about the economy that 
might spark your curiosity. Why are apartments so hard to find in New York 
City? Why do airlines charge less for a round-trip ticket if the traveller stays 
over a Saturday night? Why is Johnny Depp paid so much to star in movies? 
Why are living standards so meagre in many African countries? Why do 
some countries have high rates of inflation while others have stable prices? 
Why are jobs easy to find in some years and hard to find in others? These are 
just a few of the questions that a course in economics will help you 
answer.
245
 
 
If there was something that could explain everything from why Jonny Depp is paid so much 
to why African countries are so poor, this is good stuff. But Mankiw promises more. Not only 
does studying economics allow one to understand the world but it also puts one in a position 
to benefit from this understanding. There is an implicit distinction drawn between the 
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amateurs and those who really know economics and it is only the latter who become an 
“astute participant in the economy”. It is the astute who have the best chance of becoming 
rich: 
The second reason to study economics is that it will make you a more astute 
participant in the economy. As you go about your life, you make many 
economic decisions. While you are a student, you decide how many years to 
stay in school. ….Someday you may find yourself running a small business 
or a large corporation, and you will decide what prices to charge for your 
products. The insights developed in the coming chapters will give you a new 
perspective on how best to make these decisions. Studying economics will 
not by itself make you rich, but it will give you some tools that may help in 
that endeavor.
246
 
 
So we might conclude from this introduction that the study of economics is basically 
the study of business, the ways in which one can make money. But Mankiw quickly dispels 
this idea as much too narrow. Economics is not primarily concerned with how to make 
money but rather with how people interact. “There is no mystery to what an economy is. 
Whether we are talking about the economy of Los Angeles, the United States, or the whole 
world, an economy is just a group of people dealing with one another as they go about their 
lives.”247 
So knowledge of economics somehow teaches us how to become rich and how we 
should deal with other people. An insolent student might object that if this is the case, 
economics is no longer a craft like fixing an engine at all. It is one thing to learn about how a 
certain inanimate object has to be manipulated in order to obtain the desired results but it is 
quite a different matter how I choose to interact with my fellow beings. This criticism could 
be countered by saying that economics does in fact not teach you how to become rich AND 
how to interact but it teaches you how to interact so as to become rich. This certainly is true 
enough but it does not solve the problem of authority, the question of what kind of person I 
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ought to be. Surely, being rich is great, but what if the only way to be rich is also to be lonely 
and miserable? Mankiw would try to assuage such concerns by highlighting the fact that 
every person faces decisions and economics will just help with the process of making 
decisions: 
A household faces many decisions. It must decide which members of the 
household do which tasks and what each member gets in return: Who cooks 
dinner? Who does the laundry? Who gets the extra desert at dinner? Who gets to 
choose what TV show to watch? In short, the household must allocate its scarce 
resources among its various members, taking into account each member’s 
abilities, efforts, and desires.
248
 
 
But this seems perplexing. Why would every family in the world have the same rationale for 
choosing who cooks dinner? Surely, there can be no all-encompassing rationale which 
establishes regularity in dinner and laundry making? 
 Mankiw answers this point with an appeal to the notion of scarcity. One is obviously 
free to make decisions however one likes. But the fact of the matter is that resources are 
scarce so if we want the best outcome for everybody, we better learn how to make the best 
decision. As Mankiw explains:  
The management of society’s resources is important because resources are 
scarce. Scarcity means that society has limited resources and therefore cannot 
produce all the goods and services people wish to have. Just as each member 
of a household cannot get everything he or she wants, each individual in a 
society cannot attain the highest standard of living to which he or she might 
aspire.
249
 
 
The student is asked to accept that the economist has caught onto a fundamental, universal 
fact of life. In just the same way as it is self-evident that one day we are all going to die, it is 
clear that resources are scarce. Economists are telling students about how the world works. 
The economist is speaking the truth and the student can either accept this and learn what the 
economist has to teach or choose to remain ignorant. Frank and Bernanke, authors of another 
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widely used textbook which I explore in the next section, put this nicely when they write that 
“scarcity is a fundamental fact of life.”250 It is up to the student to recognise this fact. If they 
fail to do so, it is the student’s fault and not due to the fact that the notion of scarcity may be 
questionable. After all, some of the most important things in life do not seem to be scarce at 
all. Parents love their children unconditionally and so does a partner during adulthood,
251
 and 
for most people there is ample air to breathe and water to drink. What is implied to the 
student is that there is a correct way of looking at the world, namely the way the economist is 
telling them to look and if one looks that way, one sees that resources are scarce. 
 Even though Frank and Bernanke judge the idea that scarcity is a fundamental fact of 
life to be self-evident, the idea itself is actually a fairly recent development in the history of 
economic thought. In fact, the first time this definition was put forth explicitly was in Lionel 
Robbins’s An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science, first published in 
1932.
252
 But, as Roger Backhouse and Steven Medema have pointed out, this definition was 
not widely accepted for another three decades after the publication of the essay. In other 
words, “though Robbins’s definition is often presented as self-evidently correct, as a 
depiction of the economic problem faced by either individuals or societies, both the definition 
and the developments that it has been used to support were keenly contested.”253  
Backhouse and Medema highlight in particular that the Robbins definition was first 
accepted in economics textbooks and only subsequently found its way into academic 
journals. In other words, the direction of knowledge transmission ran opposite from what one 
would commonly expect. As Backhouse and Medema comment, “if one thinks of knowledge 
being created in the journals and then finding its way into textbooks, this pattern is 
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strange.”254 What appears to have happened is that the textbooks which trained the next 
generation had presented the scarcity definition of economics as the definition, and the 
younger generation became socialised into thinking of the discipline in those terms. As a 
result, it was the textbooks that created the idea and the knowledge of what the discipline of 
economics was ultimately concerned with, not the journals. This highlights that important 
socialisation processes happen during the early years of one’s college education, not 
necessarily during graduate school. This is yet another reason to consider the way knowledge 
is presented by an economics textbook like Mankiw’s as highly important. 
 The fact that there are potentially a number of legitimate ways to define the discipline 
of economics raises again the question of authority. By what authority is the economist 
telling the student to look at the world one way? What we find at this juncture is the attempt 
to side-step the question of authority by appealing that there are intrinsically certain ways 
with which one looks at the world. The difficulty is not that the economic way of looking at 
the world is special but simply that this way of looking at the world is not as familiar as other 
ways. Mankiw explains that “the purpose of this book is to help you learn the economist’s 
way of thinking. Just as you cannot become a mathematician, psychologist, or lawyer 
overnight, learning to think like an economist will take some time”255 
 In order to learn to think like an economist, Mankiw notes that one must learn how to 
speak like one:  
Every field of study has its own language and its own way of thinking. 
Mathematicians talk about axioms, integrals, and vector spaces. 
Psychologists talk about ego, id, and cognitive dissonance…. economics 
is no different. Supply, demand, elasticity, comparative advantage, 
consumer surplus, deadweight loss—these terms are part of the 
economist’s language. In the coming chapters, you will encounter many 
new terms and some familiar words that economists use in specialized 
ways. At first, this new language may seem needlessly arcane. But as 
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you will see, its value lies in its ability to provide you with a new and 
useful way of thinking about the world in which you live.
256
 
 
What appears to be strange is that on the one hand there are supposed facts of existence 
which any person can recognise. Yet, one needs to learn the language of economics in order 
to recognise them. So how can they be facts which one can experience straightforwardly? 
 In order to surmount this difficulty, Mankiw displaces this question with an appeal to 
a certain notion of objectivity and science. Students surely have no problem with accepting 
the idea that physics teaches us how the physical world works, so they should have no 
problem with the idea that economics teaches us how the economic world works. 
Economists try to address their subject matter with a scientist’s objectivity. They 
approach the study of the economy in much the same way as a physicist 
approaches the study of matter and a biologist approaches the study of life: they 
devise theories, collect data, and then analyse these data in an attempt to verify or 
refute their theories. …The essence of science…is the scientific method – the 
dispassionate development and testing of theories about how the world works. 
This method of inquiry is as applicable to studying a nation’s economy as it is to 
studying the earth’s gravity or a species’ evolution.’257 
 
If one looks at this statement carefully, it amounts to nothing more than saying that there are 
certain facts of life to be discovered and the economist is trying to uncover them. Somebody 
like Mankiw is of course aware that he is using a rhetorical strategy but he nevertheless 
believes in the essential applicability of his argument, its truth. And the truth is that the 
methodology economics employs – which Mankiw claims is the same methodology as other 
sciences – means that the economist is able to reach judgments that are “free of bias and 
ideology”.  
Economists like to strike the pose of a scientist. I know, because I often do it 
myself. When I teach undergraduates, I very consciously describe the field of 
economics as a science, so no student would start the course thinking he was 
embarking on some squishy academic endeavor. Our colleagues in the physics 
department across campus may find it amusing that we view them as close cousins, 
but we are quick to remind anyone who will listen that economists formulate 
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theories with mathematical precision, collect huge data sets on individual and 
aggregate behavior, and exploit the most sophisticated statistical techniques to 
reach empirical judgments that are free of bias and ideology (or so we like to 
think).
258
 
 
Mankiw essentially employ a simple deductive argument: 
The natural sciences produce results free of bias and ideology. 
Economics uses the same methodology as the natural sciences. 
Economics is value free. 
 
What he fails to do, of course, is to provide an argument for his belief that the natural 
sciences provide results free of bias and ideology and that why, by merely employing a 
certain methodology, one is bound to arrive at the correct results. In fact, it should be 
repeated here that the natural sciences, especially mathematics and physics, have long 
abandoned this idea of methodology.
259
 I should also note that part of the unlearning I needed 
to do in order to write this dissertation was to let go of these kinds of methodological 
pronouncements I had learnt during my undergraduate days.  
 So how does one arrive at results free of bias? As Mankiw explains above, the 
essential feature is that one “devise theories, collect data, and then analyse these data in an 
attempt to verify or refute….theories”. Even if this was persuasive (which it is not) there is 
clearly the problem of where one is to get the data and how one is to test it. A scientist has 
her laboratory, but the economist does not. So where is the data to come from? Mankiw’s 
answer is that it comes from history: 
To find a substitute for laboratory experiments, economists pay close attention to 
the natural experiments offered by history….Throughout this book, therefore, we 
consider many historical episodes. These episodes are valuable to study because 
they give us insight into the economy of the past and, more important, because they 
allow us to illustrate and evaluate economic theories of the present.
260
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Mankiw has now arrived at the basis for his argument. It is that history entails episodes by 
which we can ‘test’ economic knowledge. What Mankiw obviously fails to specify is what 
historical data is supposed to be used for what economic theory. And this is a true 
conundrum. There are supposedly some undeniable facts of existence but the only place we 
can find those facts is in the past. But the past clearly does not tell us which facts to select. 
History simply has no facts to offer. It is a matter of deciding which parts of the past we want 
to select.  
 And here we return to the issue of identity and experience. Anybody’s view of the 
past depends on their position in the present. Our experience of the present is also a product 
of the history of our community. The end of slavery in the Unites States following the Civil 
War looks very different depending if you are the young daughter of a former slave or the 
young son of a plantation owner. In each case, the life you have known is about to radically 
change, but in different ways. It is this belief that underlies everything Mankiw writes. There 
is a single overarching perspective that is right, some procedure and standard which we can 
decide whether the young plantation owner or the young slave is right. That there is one truth 
that can be found. The facts are to be found in the experience of history and once these facts 
are known, they must be assented to.     
 It is this belief in the single right answer that guides all of economic theory. Mankiw 
admits that it may not always be feasible to follow the right answer (the truth) but this does 
not discredit the fact that this single right answer exists. Mankiw puts this very nicely when 
he writes:  
Throughout this text, whenever we discuss economic policy, we often focus on 
one question: What is the best policy for the government to pursue? We act as if 
policy were set by a benevolent king. Once the king figures out the right policy, 
he has no trouble putting his ideas into action.
261
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What Mankiw forgets is that the best policy for one person may not be the best policy for the 
next person. One needs to recognise that the basis of living together in a community with 
other people is mutual exchange and communication and that most societies no longer accept 
the idea that somebody ought to be in the position of a king. But if we open the door to 
democracy, the idea that there is a right policy is simply tough to grasp. In order to open up 
space for discussion on social issues, it is paramount that we abandon the idea that there is 
anything like ‘one right answer’. In fact, it may very well be the case that the belief in one 
right answer is what has led to such extreme poverty in contemporary discussions of the role 
financial markets play. The first step for a more reflexive discussion needs to be a realisation 
that one right answer cannot exist on most issues.  
 
Frank and Bernanke and Pedagogy 
In this section, I compare the methodological position found in Mankiw’s book with the 
pedagogical advice given in another economics textbook. For this purpose, I turn to Robert 
Frank’s and Ben Bernanke’s Principles of Economics. The reason is similar to the choice of 
Mankiw. Where Mankiw is very vocal about methodology, Frank and Bernanke are very 
vocal about pedagogy. However, I also must admit that I had never been assigned Frank and 
Bernanke as a textbook as a student so my relationship to the book is intrinsically different 
from Mankiw. However, unless my memory entirely deceives me, I did come across the book 
on a number of occasions during my undergraduate studies because it is just one of those 
textbooks which any university library tends to carry.  I hope to show that the pedagogical 
advice runs directly counter to the methodological standpoint. In giving their pedagogical 
advice, they are also quite vocal about the commitments that economics actually makes. 
Economic thinking encapsulates a way of life: a way of life that cherishes considerations of 
efficiency above all other concerns.  
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Frank and Bernanke begin their textbook with the statement that “the philosophy of 
this text rests on two pillars: the development and repeated application of a set of core 
economic principles, without the usual clutter.”262 I say more about the nature of these 
principles in a bit but for now I focus on the idea of “repeated application”. Frank and 
Bernanke go on to explain that “the best way to teach introductory economics – or virtually 
any subject, for that matter – is to expose students to repeated applications of a short list of 
the core ideas of the discipline.”263 In presenting economics this way, Frank and Bernanke 
very much invoke the notion of the Kuhnian exemplar discussed earlier. It is indeed very 
sound pedagogical advice for many areas of teaching. But it does not hold for all ideas. 
Consider a few notions which most people hold to be self-evident, such as Euclid’s 
principles:  
Things that are equal to the same thing are also equal to one another.  
If equals are added to equals, then the wholes are equal. 
If equals are subtracted from equals, then the remainders are equal. 
Things that coincide with one another equal one another.  
The whole is greater than the part.  
 
 It might appear pedantic to insist that the study of economics is not equal to 
understanding any of these propositions but there is a very important point here. Whatever 
status the study of economics has, it is not self-evident. Even Euclid’s propositions need to be 
taught and so economic knowledge certainly needs to be taught. But if it needs to be taught, 
there are choices to be made in what is taught. And if there is a choice to be made, then 
whatever this choice is, it reflects some bias, some ideology. So how could the study of 
economics ever be value-free if there are value judgments made in the way it is taught?  
 There are also other aspects of interest to the importance of repetition. One is that in 
some instances, repetition serves to facilitate a confidence in doing a certain activity or 
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process. In this sense, repetition is key to technical mastery. Taking a derivative would be a 
good example of this. For most people, when they first learn how to take a derivative, it is a 
slow process and prone to error. But as one practices this mathematical operation more 
frequently, one gets better and faster. It is exactly this benefit of repetition which Adam 
Smith pointed out in the context of the division of labour. Yet, the effects of repetition of this 
kind are fairly narrow. They are contained to a single operation and have quite limited effects 
on any other operation. Just because one is good at taking a derivative does not make one any 
better at dividing matrices, for example.  
 It becomes quite apparent that Frank and Bernanke are not interested in the effects of 
repetition as technical mastery per se. Rather, they are interested in the effects repetition can 
have on the overall person. They write that “[t]he introductory course will be taught most 
effectively if it begins with a well-articulated list of some sort, and then doggedly hammers 
away at it…..It may be hackneyed to say but it is nonetheless true that economics is a way of 
thinking, not a fixed body of facts to be memorized.”264 What they are really saying by 
referring to economics as “a way of thinking” is that the study of economics is not exhausted 
by the solution of some technical problems. The study of economics entails an entire way of 
approaching the world, or as Wittgenstein says, a form of life. A good way of comparing this 
might be to say that the study of art may help you to develop a certain way of thinking about 
the world aesthetically. 
 It is sometimes said that physics is also a way of thinking or approaching the world. 
Yet, I am arguing that the economic way of thinking reaches into many more spheres of life 
than that of physics. Hence why it makes sense to use the term homo economicus. Thinking 
like a physicist is contained to the problems of physics. Once a physicist leaves the realm of 
study and research for his everyday life, most physicists leave their subject matter. In 
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economics, this is not the case. Frank and Bernanke also clarify that it is one of the chief aims 
of their textbook to get students also to think like an economist outside the classroom 
environment. They hope that students apply the perspective taught in their textbook in every 
area of their daily life. Frank and Bernanke call this economic naturalism. In the vocabulary I 
have been using, what Frank and Bernanke call economic naturalism is the very same image 
of human agency as that of homo economicus. Frank and Bernanke explicitly and consciously 
want to socialise their students into becoming this type of person:  
In our efforts to train students to think like economists, we aim not just for them to 
be able to apply core economic principles, but also to have an inclination to do so. 
The most effective strategy we have discovered for achieving this goal is to 
encourage students to become economic naturalists….Studying economics can 
enable students to see the everyday details of ordinary existence in a bright new 
light. Throughout the text, Economic Naturalist examples show students the 
relevance of economics to their world.
265
 
  
 Since ‘studying economics can enable students to see ordinary existence in a new 
light’, it immediately follows that there is more than one way to look at ordinary existence. 
Frank and Bernanke, even according to their own logic, are saying that the economic point of 
view is more important, or better, than any other point of view that could be adopted. This 
makes the study of economics unlike any other of the natural sciences. No physicist, chemist, 
or biologist would ever claim that their teaching is intrinsically more important for all 
problems than that of any other discipline. Rather, they are content to shed light on certain 
aspects of the problem under investigation. But in economics, there tends to be a claim 
towards a total domination of all viewpoints, what Ben Fine has called economics 
imperialism.
266
  
 Yet, this total domination of all points of view is exactly what Frank and Bernanke 
have in mind. They suggest that the economic way of thinking needs to be internalised so 
much so that students are no longer aware they are using this logic. It is not a question of 
                                                          
265
 Frank, Robert and Ben Bernanke, Principles of Economics, Maidenhead: McGraw-Hill Education, 2001, p.x. 
266
 Fine, Ben and Dimitris Milonakis, From Economics Imperialism to Freakonomics: The Shifting Boundaries 
between Economics and other Social Sciences, London: Routledge, 2009. 
152 
 
consciously applying a given framework to a specific problem but of applying the economic 
logic habitually in every area of live. They state quite explicitly that “Merely understanding a 
concept…..is different from knowing it. Even the brightest students never fully internalise a 
concept unless they use it repeatedly.”267 In internalising the logic proposed by Frank and 
Bernanke, they want to make the economic point of view they are trying to advance self-
evident and thus to be beyond the realm of critical scrutiny.  “Once students realise they can 
pose and answer such questions on their own, they’re hooked. A lifetime trajectory begins in 
which their mastery of economic principles not only doesn’t decay with year after the 
completion of the course, but actually soars higher.”268 
 Now I can finally ask what exactly it is that Frank and Bernanke want students to 
internalise? And here we come to their central concern, that of economic efficiency: 
Although we believe pedagogy is extremely important, ours is not solely a book 
about pedagogy, ours is not only a book about pedagogy. Indeed, the decision 
about what to teach is as important to us as the decision how to teach it…..we 
believe the most central concern of economics is efficiency. Throughout the book, 
it underlies our ongoing argument in support of economic efficiency as an 
important social goal. Rather than speaking of tradeoffs between efficiency and 
other goals, we stress that maximizing economic surplus aids the achievement of 
all goals, both public and private.
269
 
 
If we return to Mankiw’s idea that “We [the authors of the textbook] act as if policy were set 
by a benevolent king”, we begin to realise that the authors have effectively turned themselves 
into that benevolent king. But rather than ruling by force, they rule through their ideas. On 
the one hand, they make claims about the value-freedom of the nature of economic thought. 
And thus there can be no grounds for disagreeing with their logic, for it derives from its 
premises. Yet, on the other hand, there is a claim that efficiency is the most important goal. 
But by making efficiency the central consideration, economic analysis is no longer value-
free. Efficiency is a value. By pretending as if this were not the case, economists essentially 
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attempt to move the notion of efficiency beyond the control of democratic institutions. For 
once enough people have internalised the logic of efficiency, it will indeed become the 
central concern of society. But it is a vision of society I do not share and therefore this 
dissertation is also an attempt to argue for a different vision of society.
270
 In the last section 
of this chapter, I turn to a particularly poignant episode which highlights how students have 
tried to highlight and resist the way of thinking pushed upon them by economics textbooks 
and economics teaching. I also review two of the responses with which the student resistance 
has been met to highlight how a belief in a methodology that guarantees truth obscured an 
understanding of the actual nature of the student complaint. 
 
An Illustrative Example: The Harvard Intro Econ Walk-out 
On the 7
th
 November 2011, a small portion of the students of Harvard’s Introductory 
Economics course decided to leave their class in protest. They justified their action in a one- 
page letter published in the Harvard Crimson. I want to use this event as an opportunity to 
concretise some of the issues I have touched upon in the last two sections. But as interesting 
as the walk-out itself has been the response which the walk-out received. As I am unable to 
discuss the variety of reactions in the popular media, I focus on two exemplary cases: 
Gregory Mankiw’s own response and that of Amity Shlaes. Mankiw’s response in many 
ways represents the standard response that would be given by a neoclassical economist. It 
engages with the core claims even though it subsequently rebukes them. Amity Shlaes, on the 
other hand, represents an influential fraction of American public intellectuals who preach an 
even more narrow-minded vision of economics than Mankiw. Unlike Mankiw, who at least 
tries to make an argument for this point of view, Shlaes basically preaches: it’s her way or the 
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highway. I want to include such a position in this dissertation because I want to demonstrate 
that my call for a rejection of a notion of universal truth does not mean I think every position 
is equally valid. There are still important considerations by which arguments become 
persuasive, like consistency, humility, clarity, providing particular instances which seem to 
support the general assertion, etc. Abandoning the idea of truth does not entail an 
abandonment of all standards of debate. In fact, it makes such standards even more important.  
When the students staged their walk-out, they justified their actions in an open letter as 
follows:  
Today, we are walking out of your class, Economics 10, in order to express our 
discontent with the bias inherent in this introductory economics course. We are 
deeply concerned about the way that this bias affects students, the University, and 
our greater society….[The] course…. espouses a specific—and limited—view of 
economics that we believe perpetuates problematic and inefficient systems of 
economic inequality in our society today. A legitimate academic study of economics 
must include a critical discussion of both the benefits and flaws of different 
economic simplifying models…. the biased nature of Economics 10 contributes to 
and symbolizes the increasing economic inequality in America.
271
 
 
This single complaint actually encapsulates a number of different dimensions. First, there is 
the overall theme that the economics course espouses a specific and limited view of what 
economics is. The students refuse to accept that efficiency is the sole consideration for all of 
economics. But they go further and argue that not only is efficiency not the prime goal of 
economics but the notion of efficiency as it is actually conceptualised is misleading. The 
students used the notion of bias to make reference to the “legitimate academic study of 
economics” which brings up questions of authority, community, and power. They thus share 
my concern with about the authority with which economic knowledge is presented and that 
they do not recognise this authority. In their actions, they basically urge other members of 
society not to accept this authority either. They also talk about “increasing economic 
inequality” which brings up practical concerns with how Americans as a community live 
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their daily lives. This is another point where the central notion of efficiency is being 
questioned. The students simply do not care whether the current state of affairs is efficient 
according to some standard. They care that every member of society enjoys certain benefits, 
no matter whether this arrangement is deemed to be efficient. The needs of the community 
are primary, not considerations of efficiency.  
Gregory Mankiw responded a month after the walk-out in the New York Times.
272
 In 
his response, he is quite conscious of the fact his presentation of economics does have 
important effects on the way students think about the world. He writes that “I have written a 
textbook that has introduced millions of students to the mainstream economics of today. If 
my profession is slanted toward any particular world view, I am as guilty as anyone for 
perpetuating the problem”. Mankiw eventually does take the position that “like most 
economists, I don’t view the study of economics as laden with ideology”, but he 
acknowledges a number of issues: First, he notes: “That is not to say that economists 
understand everything” and that “Widening economic inequality is a real and troubling 
phenomenon, albeit one without an obvious explanation or easy solution”. Second, he notes 
that even though the “inchoate feeling that standard economic theory is inherently slanted 
toward a conservative world view” has in fact a long tradition, he goes on to note that the 
current complaints “seemed to me to be a grab bag of anti-establishment platitudes without 
much hard-headed analysis or clear policy prescriptions.” 
To a large extent, this feeling is indeed understandable. It is one thing to voice 
discontent about the existing state of affairs but quite another to realise the full complexity 
which an alternative arrangement needs to take into account. So I sympathise with Mankiw’s 
urge on the importance of practical action. But what he does not seem to realise is that 
practical action is itself related to the view we take of the world. If you do not allow people to 
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voice an alternative as legitimate, it is very hard to develop alternative routes for practical 
action. And given that fundamentally Mankiw does not see the “study of economics as laden 
with ideology”, he cannot recognise that efficiency is just one goal which societies may strive 
for. 
A further response to the students’ complaint was written by Amity Shlaes, a week 
after the walk-out.
273
 In contrast to Mankiw’s mild-mannered presentation, Shlaes epitomises 
a very different type of response. To begin, she misconstrues what the students are actually 
complaining about. In her mind, one of “their specific criticisms [is] that economics as taught 
in this class, formally called Economics 10, failed to prevent the financial crisis”. Given this 
imagined primary concern, her answer is that “[t]here are two theories that could have 
predicted the financial crisis of 2008, and that have much to say about inequality. Neither of 
them would be considered progressive.” In her mind, the two theories that explain financial 
crises are Austrian economics and Public Choice theory. 
 If Shlaes had actually engaged with the core of the student concern that economic 
theory is, as Mankiw nicely paraphrases, “inherently slanted toward a conservative world 
view”, she would realise that her apparent dismissal of the student complaint is actually a 
confirmation. For if it is the case that there are only two theories which explain the financial 
crisis but neither of which is progressive that just goes to show that there is indeed a slant 
towards a certain ‘ideology’, even according to her own terminology. Why is there no theory 
of progressive politics that explains the financial crisis, as outlined by Shlaes? Even though I 
do not want to engage with this argument further here, I would like to note that even by the 
terms of her own statement, she is mistaken. There are a number of other theories that can 
explain the financial crisis, take Minskyian theory, Post-Keynesian or standard Marxian 
theory as examples. As Steve Keen has pointed about his own Minskyian model that the 
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“transition from the Great Moderation to the ‘Great Recession’ was inexplicable from a 
neoclassical point of view, but could be inferred from my Minsky model.”274 The point is that 
she either does not know about these theories or does not care to engage with them. Either 
way would be a support of the criticism in the official student complaint. 
 Two other points are worth making. On the question of Mankiw’s relation to 
Keynesian theory, Shlaes notes that “Mankiw hasn’t thrown Keynes out the window, like a 
Frisbee into Harvard Yard. He has merely updated him and presented him in the best light.” 
But one would have to ask who decides the standard according to which this ‘bestness’ is to 
be judged. For surely, according to some standard an interpretation of Keynes would be the 
best, whilst according to some other standards it would be the worst. So who gets to pick the 
standard? The problem is that Shlaes already knows what she wants Keynes to have said and 
this would be the true standard of judgement. 
 But Shlaes goes on to make two stronger claims. The first is that the introductory 
economics course is much more intellectually diverse than other courses. As she states: 
“Look closely at the Harvard protest and you find a problem opposite to the one alleged. Ec 
10, though still Keynes-flavoured, does feature intellectual variety relative to the rest of 
Harvard’s curriculum.” Sadly, she offers not a single example in support of this assertion. 
Even more, what is the definition of intellectual variety? How does one compare the 
intellectual content of economics with that of art history? The second claim is that she seems 
to suffer from the common misunderstanding that what she thinks of as free markets is 
somehow less ideological than other theoretical approaches. She states that “the course’s 
message of free markets and trade, and less-regulated prices, rings at odds with the ideology 
on offer in many Harvard courses labelled “history,” “sociology” or “government.”” Shlaes 
never specifies what exactly she means by this statement but one can assume that she thinks 
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of her free market position as neutral whilst what she regards as intervention into the 
supposed workings of the market as unnatural and undesirable. Shlaes appears to exhibit a 
typical case of what Terry Eagleton has said in general about ideology, namely that “nobody 
would claim that their own thinking was ideological, just as nobody would habitually refer to 
themselves as Fatso. Ideology, like halitosis, is in this sense what the other person has.”275 
With the help of greater self-reflection, however, and bearing in mind the image of homo 
communicandis, we may to avoid the worst cases of halitosis. It will never be possible to be 
aware of all the ways in which one’s perspective is shaped but this is also not necessary. It 
suffices that one recognises that one’s perspective on nearly all issues of relevance is simply 
not neutral but shaped by biological, cultural, and idiosyncratic factors. This recognition 
could then be the basis for a humility for the respect for other perspectives. It is this humility 
that is particularly lacking in Shlaes’ defence.  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I examined two widely used economics textbooks to demonstrate what 
narrative, arguments, and rhetorical devices are used in order to construct economic 
knowledge and economic ideas. I argued that economics textbooks, especially Mankiw’s 
Principles, rely on arguments about what constitutes the methodology of economics in order 
to justify the argument that efficiency is the most important economic and social criterion for 
any society. I also highlighted how the methodological claims stand in stark contrast to the 
pedagogical claims made by economics textbooks. I used Frank and Bernanke’s Principles as 
a particular example to further elaborate this claim. I concluded the chapter by showing how 
the methodological position advocated by economics textbooks makes it impossible to 
understand the basis and justification of why students would like to see a more pluralistic and 
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diverse teaching in economics. In the next chapter, I demonstrate how a more pluralistic way 
of teaching economic knowledge could be accomplished. The aim is to lay the theoretical 
foundation to argue that economic ideas can also be taught through works of fiction. In order 
to do this, I turn to some seminal work in literary criticism and cultural history that has 
highlighted how literary texts both reflect and produce particular cultures.
276
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Chapter 4: 
How novels foster solidarity 
Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to connect Rorty’s heuristic of solidarity vs. objectivity developed 
in the second chapter with the discussion of how economics textbooks produce knowledge 
found in the third chapter. I already suggested at one point in the third chapter that economics 
textbook can be understood as an attempt to generate meaning by positing a world of 
objectivity in Rorty’s sense. In this chapter, I want to highlight how language can also be 
used to create bonds and empathy. In order to do this, I want to think of as language as 
reflecting and producing particular cultures. One can thus think of economics textbooks as 
producing a culture of objectivity and novels as producing a culture of solidarity.  
 In order to develop this argument, the chapter proceeds in four parts. First, I revisit 
some of the points raised in the second chapter about the notion of language games and how 
language games can be used to understand culture simultaneously as being reflected in the 
kind of language games that are being played and as being produced by those very same 
games. In particular, I want to think about the nature of language games along the lines of 
Rorty’s objectivity vs solidarity. The second section then develops this argument further by 
showing that novels are one site which indicates the kinds of language games a particular 
community likes to play – they reflect a particular culture and can thus be used to understand 
the concerns, issues, and questions a particular culture grapples with. The third section 
enlarges this point by arguing that the relationship between novels and culture is more 
complex than suggested in the second section. Novels not only reflect culture but also 
actively produce and transform it. I end the third section by suggesting that novels are a better 
way to foster solidarity than economics textbooks. In the fourth section, I give a brief outline 
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of why this is the case: Novels are intrinsically more open than economics textbooks. It is this 
openness that ultimately is a prerequisite for solidarity.  
 
Language as culture 
The idea that language is a cultural tool and artefact is by no means uncontroversial.
277
 A 
large number of scholars still think of language mostly in terms of a tool to describe reality. A 
more nuanced version of this view is the theory of universal grammar developed by Noam 
Chomsky which has been adapted in numerous different guises, most notably Stephen 
Pinker’s The Language Instinct. Their differences aside, all scholarship sympathetic to 
universal grammar shares the conviction that all languages share at least some of the same 
properties which are innate to every normal human being. As a result, language does not have 
to be taught. Every human is naturally equipped with the syntactical structures to speak any 
language and universal grammar will reveal what exactly these structures are. Universal 
grammar effectively posits that all language use can be understood through a few universal 
grammatical rules. For those following universal grammar, the meaning of a sentence is a 
straightforward extension of its grammatical structure. 
 Wittgenstein, in his Philosophical Investigations, provides a very different account of 
language. For Wittgenstein, all language rules are local. There are no universal rules that tell 
us what an expression means. Rather, we have to strenuously learn the meaning of different 
utterances. The derivation of the meaning of an utterance is the result of a complex interplay 
between experience, grammatical structure, word choice, and context. Wittgenstein employed 
the term language games to demonstrate and capture how an utterance itself does not carry 
the rules by which it can be understood. Rather, we already need to have learnt the rules of an 
utterance in order for us to be able to correctly grasp its meaning. Wittgenstein uses the 
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wonderful example of an arrow or signpost. Even though we all take an arrow to be guiding 
us in the direction of its head rather than its nook, the arrow itself does not tell us that this is 
how we ought to apply the rule. We have to have mastered the rule before we can understand 
what the arrow is trying to tell us. Wittgenstein phrases this issue wonderfully by writing: 
“To understand a sentence means to understand a language. To understand a language means 
to be master of a technique.”278   
  Because understanding a language requires mastery of a certain technique, language is 
best regarded as an instrument. And we have to learn how this instrument is to be used. 
Wittgenstein asks his readers to “think of the tools in a tool-box: there is a hammer, pliers, a 
saw, a screw-driver, a rule, a glue pot, glue, nails, and screws – The functions of words are as 
diverse as the functions of these objects. (And in both cases there are similarities).”279 As 
instruments could be used in many different ways, the exact ways in which we do use them 
shows our belonging to a group with whom we share this usage. This is one of the reasons 
why Wittgenstein calls speaking language a form of life. Another way of saying this would 
be to say that language is a cultural tool, as Daniel Everett does.  
 One of the ways we can therefore think about the nature of our culture is to think 
about what expressions are used and learnt. The question becomes “how did we learn the 
meaning of this word (“good” for instance). From what sort of examples? In what language 
games?”280  Because every word can be used in a variety of language games, each word can 
be regarded as belonging to a family of resemblances:  
We see a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: 
sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail. I can think of no 
better expression to characterise these similarities than “family resemblances”; for 
the various resemblances between members of a family: build, features, colour of 
eyes, gait, temperament, etc., etc. overlap and criss-cross in the same way. – And I 
shall say: ‘games’ form a family.281      
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This vision of language was also espoused by one of Wittgenstein’s contemporaries, 
J.L Austin. Austin also provides a great contribution to an understanding of the cultural 
nature of our language. Where Wittgenstein uses the term language game, Austin uses the 
term speech act.
282
 Austin argues that some speech acts are performative utterances. A 
performative utterance brings about something just by the mere fact that is has been uttered. 
Austin’s wonderful example is a priest uttering ‘I pronounce you Man and wife’. What is 
interesting about such utterances is that certain conditions must be fulfilled for to these 
utterances to function. Even though Austin never used the term himself, these conditions are 
generally known as felicity conditions today. In other words, if a friend at some bar 
pronounces two people as man and wife, the felicity conditions have not been met, and 
utterance does not carry any weight. The utterance itself, however, does not tell us anything 
about whether these conditions are in fact fulfilled, or even, what they are. Not only do we 
need to learn what these conditions are but they can differ fundamentally between different 
cultures.    
Felicity conditions play an important role in the production of economic knowledge 
and economics as a discipline. It needs to be remembered that the question of who counts as 
an economists in many ways is decided by the collective self-understanding of the 
community of economists. And this self-understanding is reflected in the kind of work that is 
deemed admissible in research journals and doctoral dissertations. If I briefly allow the 
autobiographical angle to break through to the surface of the narrative again, it might be 
worth noting that this dissertation is also characterised by not being the kind of work that is 
admissible in an economics department. As it stands, I would not be awarded a doctoral 
degree in economics at any of the top tier school in Anglo-Saxon countries for the kind of 
work I am writing here. Despite the fact that I explore how economics knowledge and ideas 
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are produced, this dissertation does not meet the felicity conditions of being considered a 
doctoral dissertation in economics. Again, one would not be able to infer this from the nature 
of the text alone – one needs to know what those conditions are in the first place. 
The felicity conditions that are imposed on research in turn have grave consequences 
for the way economics is taught at university. It may make sense to think of a doctoral 
dissertation as a membership card to a private club. Once one has received the card, one is in 
principle a member. One may not be considered a full member at the outset but one is, as the 
saying goes, at least part of the club. By virtue of having been granted this club membership 
(which is frequently the prerequisite of teaching in an economics department), one fulfils the 
felicity conditions in order to create performative utterances within a classroom environment. 
By virtue of being appointed as a lecturer or professor in a university context, one’s 
utterances about what counts as economics take on a performative character: Economics is, 
whatever it is, because one has said so. There may be disagreements amongst colleagues 
about the exact nature of economics but this becomes secondary in the classroom. A lecturer 
or professor is invested with the authority to enforce his vision of the subject on the 
students.
283
 Given that most people’s vision of the subject also influences the kind of work 
which they personally research, the style of one’s research is often reflected in the kind of 
teaching one does.  
It is obviously true that there are limits on the kind of utterance that can be made 
performative in a classroom environment. Just saying ‘the world is flat’ will not make the 
world flat. Nor would it even convince most students that the world is flat. In other words, 
there is a certain background knowledge and understanding of the world which the economist 
as teacher needs to tap into in order to make his utterances truly performative. In the third 
section of this chapter, I suggest that novels can be understood as one vehicle which helps to 
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contribute to this background understanding (as could movies, social media, newspapers, 
etc.).  
One important aspect to the performance of an economist as teacher, or all 
performance for that matter, is sociality. In participating in acts of communication, we 
become part of social interactions. In fact, language can only enact its performative character 
if the community bond amongst different speakers of that language is recognised. If the 
community does not take the words “I now pronounce you man and wife” to be in any way 
binding, the pronouncement will lose the meaning which we would currently attach to it (as 
somebody who is part of a community where this pronouncement under the right felicity 
conditions is indeed transformative of the social context of the two people in question). In 
other words, we can see how the idea of homo communicandis is inherently tied to a social 
conception of human nature. But it also implies that language is somehow part of the 
processes by which our culture is created. Claire Kramsch puts this issue nicely when she 
states: “Language is the principal means whereby we conduct our social lives. When it is 
used in the context of communication, it is bound up with culture in multiple and complex 
ways.”284 Daniel Everett provides a useful way of thinking about what constitutes culture vs 
language:  
Language is how we talk. Culture is how we live. Language includes grammar, 
stories, sounds, meanings, and signs. Culture is the set of values shared by a group 
and the relationship between these values, along with all the knowledge shared by 
a community of people, transmitted according to their tradition.
285
 
 
One important aspect to this interrelation between language and culture is the very creation 
and consolidation of social bonds. Everett tries to emphases this dual role of language:  
all human languages are tools. Tools to solve the twin problems of 
communication and social cohesion. Tools shaped by the distinctive pressures of 
their cultural niches – pressures that include cultural values and history and which 
in many cases account….for the similarities and differences between languages.286  
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Everett is following a number of other scholars to try to emphasise the role and contribution 
of langue to human evolution.
287
 Everett and others are interested in how “it is that the values 
we hold as members of a human societies shape the ways in which we communicate….Our 
cultures, linguistic forms, and minds evolve together from birth to death and even beyond the 
lifespan of any individual – each language is a history of symbiosis of grammar, mind, and 
culture.”288 I share the concerns of Everett and other evolutionary scholars but I am also 
interested in the reverse story, namely how the ways we communicate shapes our cultural 
values. Hence my interest in economics textbooks and other artefacts that produce economic 
ideas.  
 This realisation is the starting point of the excellent work of many cultural historians. 
Stuart Hall provides one the best examples of how language can be used to understand 
culture. In The Hippies – An American Moment, Hall relates the language and slogans of the 
Hippie movement in the US to their overall cultural project. He writes:  
I try to view the Hippie Style as a project for a certain section of American youth 
(rather than a symptom). I stress that this is both a description, and an 
interpretation, because, as will be apparent, I am trying to manifest what are, by 
definition, the latent meanings of a way of life: a way of life which rejects and 
despises, precisely, the language and act of interpretation.
289
  
 
Hall uses Hippie slogans as an example of how “most subcultures dramatise the gap between 
their own world and the world of ‘others’ in language – the most expressive mediation or 
objectivation of all.”290 This is because, and I think Hall is right in making this claim, the 
chosen language reflects a particular vision of what make life worthwhile. Hall writes:  
The symbols, expressive values, beliefs, and attitudes, projects and aspirations of 
groupings like the Hippies constitute, taken together, a significant, meaningful 
way of being in the world for them. It is by learning to read the meanings of these 
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‘signs’ that we come to understand the global vision of the world, the 
weltanschauung, the project which organises and makes coherent the many 
disparate strands.
291
  
 
Other cultural historians have taken up the idea that language can be traced in order to 
understand historical developments. Alan Munslow’s Discourse and Culture is a great 
example in this regard. Munslow uses the work of Hayden White as a starting point. White 
argues that “each of the epochs in Western cultural history, then, appears to be locked within 
a specific mode of discourse, which at once provides its access to “reality” and delimits the 
horizon of what can possibly appear as real.”292 Given this background, Munslow argues that 
“the explanations for American cultural formation in the late nineteenth-century are to be 
derived not only from the examination of the evidence of factory life and urban living 
conditions, but also from the analysis of discourse of dominant and subordinated groups 
represented in the voices of class, race and gender.”293 In order to accomplish this task, 
Munslow “examines five language terrains or discourses which were integral to the creation 
of American culture in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.”294 He identifies 
these as “the language of capital accumulation and enterprise, the producer tradition that was 
largely destroyed by economic change, the nationalist discourse of written history, the 
language of social reconstruction and the constitution of gender, and finally the language of 
race.”295  Munslow tries to understand the nature of each of these discourses by focusing on 
the work of a single representative individual – Andrew Carnegie, Terence V, Powderly, 
Frederick Jackson Turner, Jane Addams, Booker T Washington, and W.E.B du Bois. In this 
way, he aims to “assess [each discourse] through the role of a key intellectual chosen for his 
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or her significance in the process of cultural representation and ideological formation.”296 In 
some ways, the methodology of the next chapter follows Munslow’s ethos since I try to 
assess the linguistic terrain of economic ideas through an assessment of representational 
novels.  
 Judi Atkins et. al. have attempted to carry the spirit of such work to an analysis of 
British society. Rather than using the terms discourse or language, Atkins et all. prefer the 
term rhetoric. They think that  
rhetoric is more than just surface language, an ornament to underlying ideas. 
Rhetoric is, arguably an analytical framework for academic inquiry, a broad-
ranging methodology for interpreting social symbols, centring on ethos, logos, 
and pathos as a conceptual that reveals much about the strategic use of language 
by individuals and that also bring to light key themes in public life.
297
  
 
They want to use rhetoric as an analytical framework in order to “consider the ways in which 
rhetoric constructs the social order. That is, how does rhetoric contribute to the texture of 
British politics and society?”298 They analyse different instances of political speech to show 
how rhetoric is inherently involved in each instance. They show how  
through rhetoric, individuals – whether the prime minister, public commentators, 
journalists, or ordinary Britons – cope with change and stake their own claims 
about it is to be British, about who should be praised and who vilified, about what 
makes British culture and about what we should do politically to adapt to social 
change. The very idea of Britishness is negotiated through rhetoric, although 
never with a single voice.
299
 
 
 Examples such as those provided by Atkins et. al. demonstrate the deep and intrinsic 
interrelationship between language, culture and identity. But there is another important 
dimension to this consideration, namely that culture is simultaneously both liberating and 
constraining for an individual. Claire Kramsch highlights this issue nicely when she states: 
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Social conventions, norms, and social appropriateness are the product of 
communities of language users. As the Dickinson poem, poets and readers, florists 
and lovers, horticulturists, rose press manufacturers, perfume makers and users, 
create meanings through their words and actions. Culture both liberates people 
from oblivions, anonymity, and the randomness of nature, and constrains them by 
imposing on them a structure and principles of selection. This double effect of 
culture on the individual – both liberating and constraining – plays itself on the 
social, historical, and metaphorical planes.
300
 
 
This double effect is of particular importance in the context of economic ideas and 
knowledge. Contemporary economic ideas are intrinsically tinged with a particular vision of 
how freedom is constituted. In the next chapter, I examine how one contemporary novel has 
taken up this issue as its central theme in order to ask the reader to reflect on just what it 
means to be free in contemporary America.    
 However, at the same time as language helps to constitute cultures and identities, it is 
also a marker of difference. Language can be studied to understand cultural difference and 
what such differences consists in. Karen Risager highlights 
how cultural differences express themselves and are created via various forms of 
linguistic practice and discourse, how culturally different conceptual systems and 
world views are contained in the semantic and pragmatic system of various 
languages, and how language development and socialisation contribute to the 
development of cultural identities and cultural models around the world.
301
   
 
Because language expresses difference, language and discourse can also be regarded as “sites 
of cultural contest.”302 For Shi-Xu, the very terms by which cultural practices are described 
already inherently reflect certain cultural preconceptions. There is no neutral ground from 
which to analyse any cultural practice. Shi-Xu also highlights that the vast majority of 
commentary on cultural practices has been written by scholars educated in the Western 
tradition. He emphasises the “lived but ignored fact that international scholarship on 
discourse, and for that matter language and communication, has been mainly a West-
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dominated enterprise and, consequently, culturally univocal and monological in nature, rather 
than pluralistic and reflexive.”303 He posits that most discussions of cultural practices and 
cultural values reflect particular conceptions of culture that are indigenous to the West only. 
As a result, he thinks of scholarship as reflecting and reproducing a particular type of 
monoculture which poorly represents the diversity of human knowledge and experience: 
This unhappy state of the international discourse scholarship has broader 
consequences for the development of human knowledge, and ultimately, on the 
survival of human cultures. For, when such a culturally unbalanced 
communication system, as manifested in the powerful cultural symbolic practices 
of (text)books, journals, conferences, research projects, classroom teaching and so 
on, keep producing and reproducing culturally singular and perhaps circular ways 
of understanding, pre-emptying the cultural diversity of knowledge (seeking) and 
invalidating the relevance of dialogue and critique between culturally different 
traditions, thereby genuine intellectual growth becomes difficult, if not 
impossible.
304
 
 
I think that Shi-Xu makes a very important and pertinent point that is worth keeping in mind 
as a reader of this dissertation. For whatever my assessment and critique of economic ideas 
and knowledge amounts to, it is still the assessment and critique of a Western, Western-
educated, privileged, white male. I can reflect on my particular experience and subjectivity at 
a particular point in time but my perspective will always be tinged by my subjectivity. Shi-
Xu’s criticism is also of importance for me as the writer of this dissertation for it highlights 
the inherent incompleteness and bias of everything I think and write. With that in mind, I can 
now review of the novel has been conceptualised as reflecting a particular culture.  
 
The novel as a reflection of culture 
Modern academic scholars interested in understanding whether and how a particular culture 
could be understood to be reflected in works of fiction, or literature in general, appears to 
have arisen more of less simultaneously in a number of very different writings. This first 
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wave of scholarship took place in the late 1930s and early 40s but it took from the late 50s 
until to the early 70s for these writings to be publicly available. The best examples of this 
scholarship are: Georg Lukacs’ The Historical Novel, written in 1936-37 but only available in 
English in 1962; Ian Watt’s The Rise of the Novel, begun in 1937 but only published in 1957; 
and Michel Bakhtin’s The Epic and the Novel, written in 1941, but only available in English 
from the mid 1970s.
305
 
Their differences notwithstanding, the early scholars seem to be in agreement that 
following the industrial revolution in England and the French revolution in France, Europe 
underwent significant social and economic transformations. One of the ways in which these 
transformations could be understood was to turn to works of fiction, especially novels. A 
couple of preliminary points are noteworthy: First, it counts as certain that none of these 
scholars had been in correspondence with one another so that the simultaneous emergence of 
this scholarship is already a striking factum in and of itself. Second, it is also striking that 
even though these works all agree that novels can be used to understand social and economic 
transformations, there is perhaps a surprising amount of disagreement as to what these 
transformations amount to. As a consequence, I would like to briefly review some of the 
main points of each contribution.  
In his The Historical Novel, Lukacs wants to contribute to both Marxist aesthetics and 
a materialistic treatment of literary history showing that the advent of the modern 
industrialisation and its consequent social transformations gave in fact rise to a new form of 
novel.
306
 Lukacs differentiates historical novels of the 17
th
 and 18
th
 century from those of the 
19
th
 century, in that the historical dimension of the former did not extend beyond “their 
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purely external choice of theme and costume.”307 It was only in the later that the characters 
started to understand themselves as figures at a particular time and place. Lukacs writes: 
“What was lacking in the so-called historical novel before Sir Walter Scott is precisely the 
specifically historical, that is, derivation of the individuality of characters from the historical 
peculiarity of their age.”308  
Of crucial importance for Lukacs is the fact that 19
th
 century novels started to reflect 
the unmistakable truth of a Hegelian understanding of history and a Marxian understanding 
of capitalist exploitation:  
Progress is no longer seen as an essentially unhistorical struggle between 
humanist reason and feudal-absolutist unreason….The most important thing here 
is the increasing historical awareness of the decisive role played in human 
progress by the struggle of classes in history. The new spirit of historical 
writing….concentrates precisely on this question: on showing historically how 
modern bourgeoisie society arose out of the class struggles between nobility and 
bourgeoisie, out of the class struggles which raged throughout the entire ‘idyllic 
Middle Ages’ and whose last decisive state as the great French revolution.309  
 
For Lukacs, it is clear that the transformation in the concerns of certain novels reflects the 
changing understanding and concerns of society as a whole – most importantly how to bring 
about the overthrow of capitalist regimes world-wide. This assessment might strike the 
contemporary western reader as a delicate mixture between naiveté and outlandishness. Yet, I 
think such a reaction dangerously underestimates the realness of such feelings in substantial 
parts of the Western world at the time of his writing. And it is exactly through a consideration 
of popular novels which enjoyed widespread appeal, rather than narrow academic writing, 
that the realness of these concerns can be uncovered retrospectively (as well as seen 
contemporaneously).  
 Ian Watt, by contrast, argues that novels of the 18
th
 and 19
th
 century reveal quite 
different social concerns. Watt shares Lukacs assessment that novels written during this 
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period for the first time considered individuals in their historical specificity. In this vein, Watt 
writes about Defoe that “his fiction is the first which presents us with a picture both of the 
individual life in its larger perspective as a historical process, and in its closer view which 
shows the process being acted out against the background of the most ephemeral thoughts 
and actions.”310 However, the historical specificity which Watt alludes to is decidedly not that 
of a Marxist revolution. Very much on the contrary, Watt believes to be witnessing the rise of 
modern individualism.  He writes: 
The novel's serious concern with the daily lives of ordinary people seems to 
depend upon two important general conditions: the society must value every 
individual highly enough to consider him the proper subject of its serious 
literature; and there must be enough variety of belief and action among 
ordinary people for a detailed account of them to be of interest to other 
ordinary people, the readers of novels. It is probable that neither of these 
conditions for the existence of the novel obtained very widely until fairly 
recently, because they both depend on the rise of a society characterised by that 
vast complex of interdependent factors denoted by the term 'individualism'.
311
 
 
Like Lukacs, Watt believes that the rise in this new way of looking at the world is 
directly linked to changes in the economic and social reality in England. However, Watt’s 
assessment of what this social reality amounts to is again starkly at odds with Lukacs. Where 
Lukacs emphasises how novels highlight the destructive and exploitative character of modern 
capitalism, Watt highlights how novels highlight how much the standard of living and 
personal freedoms enjoyed by the average Englishperson had increased under the new 
economic order:   
Capitalism brought a great increase of economic specialisation; and this, 
combined with a less rigid and homogeneous social structure, and a less absolutist 
and more democratic political system, enormously increased the individual's 
freedom of choice. For those fully exposed to the new economic order, the 
effective entity on which social arrangements were now based was no longer the 
family, nor the church, nor the guild, nor the township, nor any other collective 
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unit, but the individual: he alone was primarily responsible for determining his 
own economic, social, political and religious roles.
312
 
 
We see here how novels written at the same time can highlight very different social realities. 
Even more, Lukacs and Watt are concerned mostly with works from different countries: 
While Lukacs is mostly concerned with French and German novels, Watt is exclusively 
focused on English novels. Whether or not these geographical differences entirely explain the 
different social realities attributed to the novel, however, is doubtful.  Part of the difference 
might simply consist in the fact that Lukacs and Watt looked at the world in different ways. 
However, the very nature of the novel may help to decrease such differences.  
 This is exactly the argument put forth by Michael Bakhtin in The novel and the Epic. 
For Bakhtin, the nature of the novel reflects the fact that for the first time in Europe there 
appears to be intercultural exchange at the popular level. Whilst Europe has certainly 
witnessed inter-cultural exchange at the level of the Monastery and Sovereign as well as 
commerce, such internationality did not extend beyond the very elite of society. With the 
novel argues Bakhtin, we can see the how this started to change in Europe: 
[The] characteristics of the novel are all organically interrelated and have all 
been powerfully affected by a very specific rupture in the history of European 
civilization: its emergence from a socially isolated and culturally deaf semi 
patriarchal society, and its entrance into international and interlingual contacts 
and relationships. A multitude of different languages, cultures and times became 
available to Europe, and this became a decisive factor in its life and thought.
313
 
 
Like Lukacs and Watt, Bakhtin argues that this transformation resulted in a genuinely 
new cultural perspective. However, where Lukacs and Watt focused on the material changes 
which accompanied the life of the average person, Bakhtin focuses on the intellectual 
changes that are occurring, in particular the rise of polyglossia (speaking/understanding many 
languages).  
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The new cultural and creative consciousness lives in an actively polyglot world. 
The world becomes polyglot, once and for all and irreversibly. The period of 
national languages, coexisting but closed and deaf to each other, comes to an end. 
Languages throw light on each other: one language can, after all, see itself only in 
the light of another language. The naive and stubborn coexistence of "languages" 
within a given national language also comes to an end-that is, there is no more 
peaceful co-existence between territorial dialects, social and professional dialects 
and jargons, literary language, generic languages within literary language, epochs 
in language and so forth.
314
 
 
Even though both Lukacs and Watt realised that novels could also aid in the production of 
certain cultures, their focus remained on showing how novels reflected certain cultural trends. 
Bakhtin, by contrast, was much more heavily interested in showing that the novel could help 
to produce new cultures in which the relationship between the word and the world is radically 
different from before: 
In this actively polyglot world, completely new relationships are established 
between language and its object (that is, the real world)-and this is fraught with 
enormous consequences for all the already completed genres that had been formed 
during eras of closed and deaf monoglossia. In contrast to other major genres, the 
novel emerged and matured precisely when intense activization of external and 
internal polyglossia was at the peak of its activity; this is its native element. The 
novel could therefore assume leadership in the process of developing and 
renewing literature in its linguistic and stylistic dimension.
315
 
 
The idea that novels also help to produce culture, first developed by Bakhtin, has since found 
enormous reception. This point is of tremendous importance for my argument and I shall thus 
review some major contributions in more detail in the next section.   
 
The Novel as producing culture 
Bakhtin first hints that novels, and literature in general, produce knowledge was subsequently 
developed by a vast variety of scholarship.
316
 The knowledge produced is not only knowledge 
of literature. Rather, what is produced is knowledge about people, society, history and more. 
In short, novels produce knowledge about one’s own culture and, to the extent that this 
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knowledge is internalised by readers, they effectively produce culture. This idea very much 
runs counter to certain epistemologies which see the only possible creation of knowledge 
within the domain of scientific activity – roughly the results of experiments in controlled 
conditions that are subject to repetition. However, the realm of knowledge extends much 
further: It extends to ideas of how one behaves at a dinner party, whether to trust strangers in 
the street, and whether poor people deserve their fate. It is because novels contribute to this 
vast range of knowledge that they also help in the production of a given culture.   
  One of the most brilliant works which elaborates these themes is Jean Francois 
Lyotard’s The Postmodern Condition where he argues that the reason why both scientific 
activity and novels help in the production of culture is that they are both forms of narration. 
Narration, for Lyotard, is the basis of all knowledge. He writes: “Narration is the 
quintessential form of customary knowledge, in more ways than one.”317 This sentiment is 
also very much echoed by Alistair McIntyre in After Virtue: “Narrative history of a certain 
kind turns out to be the basic and essential genre for the characterization of human 
actions.”318 
 One of the key reasons for the power of narratives is that they contribute to identity 
formation. The constant telling of narratives teaches us and reminds us of who we are. 
Charles Taylor’s Sources of the Self probably provides the best discussion of this point: 
in order to make minimal sense of our lives, in order to have an identity, we need 
an orientation to the good which means some sense of qualitative discrimination, 
of the incomparably higher… this sense of the good has to be woven into my 
understanding of my life as an unfolding story. But this is to state another basic 
condition of making sense of ourselves, that we grasp our lives in a narrative…. In 
order to have a sense of who we are, we have to have a notion of how we have 
become, and of where we are going…319 
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This is one of the reasons why historical facts can be of secondary importance to the self-
image and identify of a group – what matters is how these historical events are taken up in 
contemporaneous narration. Lyotard writes that 
a collectivity that takes narrative as its key form of competence has no need to 
remember its past. It finds the raw material for its social bond not only in the 
meaning of the narratives it recounts, but also in the act of reciting them. The 
narratives' reference may seem to belong to the past, but in reality it is always 
contemporaneous with the act of recitation.
320
  
 
The very nature of narratives that we can find in a society contain all the knowledge this 
society not only about itself but also about its environment.  
 A wonderful elaboration of this point is made by Benedict Anderson in Imagined 
Communities. Anderson argues that we are best served to understand the modern nation state 
as an imagined community. For Anderson, the nation is imagined “because the members of 
even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even 
hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion.”321 But this 
imaginary status of the nation in no way undermines the reality of the nation state or masks 
some other true community. Imagination and the narratives that it produces are the basis of 
for the birth and continued existence of the nation state.  
 Interestingly, Anderson very much follows Bakhtin in the idea that the rise of 
polyglossia was one of the prerequisites for the modern nation. The narratives that sustain 
modern understandings of the nation first and foremost required legitimisation against 
previously dominant cultural systems, the religious community and dynastic realm. For, as 
Anderson reminds us, “both of these, in their heydays, were taken-for-granted frames of 
reference, very much as nationality is today.”322 Nationalism, like the religious community 
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and dynastic realm, makes claims as to the ontological reality of the world. And these claims 
are inherently linked to the languages used by the cultural system: “In effect, ontological 
reality is apprehensible only through a single, privileged system of re-presentation: the truth 
language of Church Latin, Qur'anic Arabic, or Examination Chinese.”323 It is only when these 
single privileged truth-languages had lost their power over the imagination that new 
narratives could emerge. And this is where literature plays a transformative role for it was 
particularly the “novel and the newspaper….[that] provided the technical means for re-
presenting the kind of imagined community that is the nation.”324 Lyotard and Anderson both 
highlight that narratives are and provide modes of legitimation. Lyotard writes: 
Narratives, as we have seen, determine criteria of competence and/or illustrate 
how they are to be applied. They thus define what has the right to be said and 
done in the culture in question, and since they are themselves a part of that 
culture, they are legitimated by the simple fact that they do what they do.
325
  
 
 If we accept that fiction, and novels in particular, provide a kind of knowledge, the 
next question to ask is what kind of knowledge they provide. Richard Rorty provides some 
very interesting thoughts on this matter. The principal strength of the novel, for Rorty, is that 
it fosters human solidarity. It does so because novels foster “the imaginative ability to see 
strange people as fellow-sufferers.”326 Rorty elaborates on this wonderfully: 
Fiction…gives us the details about kinds of suffering being endured by people to 
whom we had previously not attended… gives us the details about what sort of 
cruelty we ourselves are capable of, and thereby lets us redescribe ourselves. That 
is why the novel, the movie and the TV program have, gradually but steadily, 
replaced the sermon and the moral treatise as the principal vehicles of moral 
change and process.
327
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Like Anderson, Rorty emphasises that novels help to produce a culture with a different 
ontology and epistemology. In his Essays on Heidegger, he elaborates: 
A society which took its moral vocabulary from novels rather than from 
ontotheological or ontico-moral treatises would not ask itself questions about 
human nature, the point of human existence, or the meaning of human life. Rather 
it would ask itself what we can do so as to get along with each other, how we can 
arrange things so as to be comfortable with one another, how institutions can be 
changed so that everyone’s right to be understood has a better chance of being 
gratified.
328
 
 
This idea is further developed by Martha Nussbaum in Poetic Justice where she argues that 
the very value of literature is that it is at odds with some of core demands of homo 
economicus. Nussbaum emphasises the increasing tendency to subject all aspects of life to 
calculating rationality. For Nussbaum, however, there are aspects of life that are irreducible 
in their nature. Nussbaum believes that engaging with novels can help readers to be reminded 
of this irreducibility, thereby fostering a more complex vision of life as emphasised by the 
notion of homo communicandis: 
Economics has an even greater hold over the political and intellectual life of my 
society that it did over the society known to Dickens’s characters, or to the 
narrative voice in his novel. I notice that the type of cost-benefit analysis favoured 
by economics has become so familiar in public policy that it is taken for granted; 
at the same time, public servants are less and less likely to be readers of literature, 
where they would discover a more complex vision of human life.
329
  
 
Nussbaum thus emphasises that novels can also serve subversive purposes. They show 
how a different vision of life than that advanced by advocates of homo economicus is not 
only possible, but how it might also be desirable. She writes: 
Literature expresses, in its structures and ways of speaking, a sense of life that is 
incompatible with the vision of the world embodies in the text of political 
economy; and engagement with it forms the imagination and the desires in a 
manner that subverts that science’s form of rationality.330  
 
I think this point is of crucial importance if we are to appreciate what fiction does, and can 
do, in contemporary culture. In the next section, I briefly demonstrate that one reason why 
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novels are able to subvert the rationality encapsulated in homo economicus is also due to their 
openness. By being open to potentially radically different interpretations, they highlight that 
there can be multiple perspectives on the same issue. This stands in direct contract to the 
vision of homo economicus where every issue is to be captured by a single right perspective. I 
briefly demonstrate this openness by highlighting how the novel American Psycho has been 
subject to radically different interpretations. 
 
Openness as Solidarity 
American Psycho is exemplary to the extent to which it has been subject to radically different 
interpretations. In this section, I review four radically different interpretations of the book. 
For this purpose, I review the responses of Tara Baxter, Naomi Mandel, James Annesley, and 
Georgina Colby. I would like to give the reader a sense of the degree of openness with which 
a novel can be read. It is this openness which makes novels such powerful tools to teach 
about the nuances of economic and social life.  
Tara Baxter, a feminist activist, judges American Psycho to perpetuate, what she feels 
to be, constant violence against woman in American culture. For her, Bret Easton Ellis is an 
integral player in the patriarchy that upholds and fosters narratives of male dominance and 
objectification against woman. She writes: “American psychos like Bret Easton Ellis (and all 
men like him) are an integral part of that patriarchy; and they need to be deal with in a swift 
and appropriate manner.”331 For Baxter, fighting against narratives like those contained in 
Ellis’ works is an integral part of being a feminist activist. As she writes: 
As long as woman are being raped, tortured, and murdered at the rate that we are, 
it is imperative that we seriously consider all the strategies to decorticate male 
dominance. One strategy, is refusing to accept violent, exploitative male fantasy, 
wherever it may be expressed – whether in fiction, art, pornography, in the public 
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sphere, or in our home. Otherwise we collaborate in our own victimisation by 
remaining silent during this war that men are waging against us.
332
 
 
James Annesley’s Blank Fictions shares the assessment of Ellis as a perpetuator of American 
culture but he differs in emphasis. Rather than exclusively focusing on the role of violence 
against woman, Annesley notes how American Psycho perpetuates the very ethos of 
commercialisation and objectification that the books seemingly satirises. For Annesley, 
American Psycho can “be read as a text that participates in the process of commercialisation 
and objectification that were the forces is set out to satirise.”333 
An almost diametrically opposed reading of the text is provided by Naomi Mandel who 
argues that American Psycho is in fact highly subversive and critical. Rather than upholding 
the very narratives which Baxter finds so despicable, Mandel believes American Psycho to 
subvert these. She writes:  
If American Psycho demands a different approach to violence’s critique, it may 
be because the novel posits violence as critique, as adjudicating agent and not 
just the object of discussion. Born in violence, formed by text, reforming the real 
by de-forming it, American Psycho’s critique of violence offers violence as 
critique, confronting sadism with masochism, discourse with practice, literal 
with literary, word with violent world.
334
 
 
A fourth type of position is offered by Georgina Colby. Colby argues that Ellis’s work, 
particularly American Psycho, should be read as neither endorsing certain narratives or as 
subverting them. Rather, the entire point of Ellis’s writing to refrain from taking a position. 
She writes: “I suggest that Ellis refrains from adopting a moral or ethical stance in his 
novels.”335 She elaborates that her “book seeks to argue against any branding of the author, 
since to brand Ellis is to enact precisely the reductions found in the relation of productions 
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that he is critiquing.”336 She moreover highlights that “Ellis plays with truth and fiction in 
interviews. He is constantly contradicting himself, wearing masks, playing with the media 
through playing with truth…” Colby goes on to argue, correctly I think, that American 
Psycho invites such different readings because it fundamentally operates on different levels at 
the same time. On one level, the stylised depiction of violence and consumerism honestly 
mirrors some of the worst excesses of American culture in these areas. At another level, 
however, such an honest portrayal also makes such practices appear questionable even 
though they are never explicitly condemned by the author, narrator, or characters. Colby 
writes: 
This book [Underwriting the contemporary] suggests that reading Ellis’s work as 
at once destabilising the culture in which he operated by writing below it, while 
taking responsibility for the modes of objective violence inherent in the very 
which in which we live, opens up new avenues of perceiving and understanding 
our contemporary world and the function of the writer within it. 
337
 
 
 I think Colby’s observations are very astute and I would like use the examples of 
Jonathan Franzen’s Freedom and DFW’s The Pale King to explore ‘such new avenues of 
perceiving and understanding out contemporary world.’ But I also want the reader to keep 
this point in mind because the next section represent one possible reading of the novels. 
Many other readings may be available but I think my reading is very helpful and insightful 
for my purposes. 
 
Conclusion 
I make two separate but related arguments in this chapter. My first point is that works of 
fiction also participate in the production and transmission of ideas. My second point is that 
novels may be a better way to transmit economic ideas to foster a vision of solidarity than 
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current economics textbooks. Current economics textbooks contribute to the production of a 
culture of objectivity and the image of homo economicus is one aspect to this culture. In order 
to make this argument, I revisit the notion of language games first introduced in the second 
chapter of this dissertation to show that language games also produce and reflect our cultures. 
I then argue that novels simultaneously reflect and produce particular culture. I end the 
chapter by highlighting how one of the reasons why novels can contribute to the realm of 
solidarity is that they are intrinsically open to different interpretations. In the next chapter, I 
turn to two particular examples of contemporary novels, Jonathan Franzen’s Freedom and 
DFW’s The Pale King, to show just how they contribute to the vision of homo 
communicandis which fosters the Rortian realm of solidarity rather than the objective image 
of homo economicus.  
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Chapter 5: 
Socialisation through novels 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I explore Jonathan Franzen’s Freedom and David Foster Wallace’s (DFW) 
The Pale King as two examples of how novels participate in the reproduction, transmission, 
and transformation of economic ideas. My aim in this chapter is three-fold. First, and to a 
reader with a background in literary criticism this might seem obvious, I want to foster the 
recognition that works of fiction indeed participate in (re)production of economic knowledge 
and ideas. If a reader with a background in economics or political economy comes away 
having gained this understanding, I would judge this chapter already as a success. The second 
aim is to undertake a deeper textual exploration of how particular economic ideas are taken 
up by these works. I think both books are great examples of how certain economic themes are 
picked up in popular writings. The success of both books suggests that the themes to which 
these books speak find resonance with a widespread readership. The third aim is to highlight 
that even though these books reflect concerns which are shared by many readers, they still 
allow for a variety of different interpretations. Novels can therefore be regarded as much less 
prescriptive in advocating or rejecting particular economic ideas than economics textbooks. 
Because of this characteristic, novels can be regarded as much more attune to the image of 
homo communicandis. Rather than positing some objective reality in which the only way to 
live is to maximise preferences like homo economicus, novels highlight the diversity of the 
human experience. They also showcase how the human experience becomes meaningful 
because we are part of a larger social and cultural whole. In this way, novels directly 
contribute to a Rortian sense of solidarity. They put us in touch with other people, their 
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feelings, desires, fears and worries. Novels can invite to us see how we can generate meaning 
for our own life by considering the lives of others, even if these lives are fictional.  
 The chapter proceeds in two sections. In the first section, I examine Jonathan 
Franzen’s Freedom. I highlight how Franzen explores two themes that are at the heart of 
economics. The first theme concerns what responsibility one holds towards others (and to 
oneself). One prescription of economic theory is to say that each person is to be seen as 
entirely sovereign in every aspect of their life. In other words, each person is expected to 
assume responsibility for every choice they make in their life; as a consequence, it can then 
be assumed that every situation in which a person finds herself is a result of the choices she 
has willingly and knowingly made. In many ways, such a line of thinking can be incredibly 
seductive and powerful for it always provides a rationale for the fact that the existing state of 
affairs is not only natural but also perfectly justified. The question, however, which 
effectively is assumed away from the outset, is whether we are, in fact, entirely in charge of 
our own destiny in every way. After all, we do not choose our parents, our place of birth, our 
native language, our socio-economic class, our sex, our natural talents, and innumerable other 
characteristics. Galen Strawson in fact argues that we are not responsible for anything. 
Strawson summarises this basic argument as follows: 
1. When you act, you do what you do - in the situation in which you find 
yourself - because of the way you are. 
2. If you do what you do because of the way you are, then in order to be 
ultimately responsible for what you do you must be responsible for the way you are. 
3. But you cannot be ultimately responsible for the way you are. 
4. So you cannot be ultimately responsible for what you do.338 
Franzen’s Freedom can be read as an attempt to come to terms with what is means to act 
morally towards oneself and towards other people. As a result, Franzen’s book is also a 
meditation on the question of identity in modern society.  
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 The question of identity is taken up as a second theme in Freedom. Presumably, there 
is a good reason for why Franzen choose this as the title of his book. Most of Franzen’s 
readers will have grown accustomed to the idea of freedom as a lack of constraint. In fact, 
this is a core aspect to freedom in economic theory. In standard decision-making theory, an 
individual consumes at the point of tangency between her indifference curve and her budget 
constraint. Move the constraint outwards, and one has more freedom of choice, thus more 
freedom. If only one did not have a budget constraint to grapple with, one could be infinitely 
free. I would go so far as to suggest that this is idea is at the very heart of current American 
culture. People either consciously embrace it, unconsciously embrace it, or consciously reject 
it but it is an issue that speaks to the vast majority of readers. Franzen uses different 
characters to explore just what a lack of constraint might mean and do to an individual. 
Again, Franzen relies heavily on the question of identity to deal with this issue. 
 The second section of this chapter focuses on The Pale King. As in the case of 
Freedom, I want to explore two issues in greater depth. First, The Pale King in many ways 
mirrors the discussion of this dissertation about how truth, knowledge, and meaning are 
generated. Second, DFW relates this issue of truth and knowledge generation to the nature of 
work in the contemporary United States. This is the second issue I want to focus on. There 
are two important dimensions to the issue. The first is that DFW tries to problematise the 
consequences of living with and working in seemingly ever bigger, more powerful and 
impersonal bureaucracies. In this way, DFW echoes a sentiment that Hannah Arendt voiced 
nearly fifty years ago: 
in a fully developed bureaucracy there is nobody left with whom one can argue, to 
whom one can present grievances, on whom the pressures of power can be 
exerted. Bureaucracy is the form of government in which everybody is deprived 
of political freedom, of the power to act; for the rule by Nobody is not no-rule, 
and where all are equally powerless we have a tyranny without a tyrant.
339
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On the one hand, large bureaucracies are ever-present in our life. Just take the 
McDonalds Corporation, as an example. McDonalds has over 1.8 million employees, over 
35,000 outlets, and operates in around 120 countries. Chances are, wherever you are, 
especially in the developed world, a McDonalds is near you. Yet, almost all these outlets and 
people are not accountable for how the McDonalds Corporation operates. Just try asking your 
local McDonalds to purchase ingredients from a local farmers market. Even if the workers in 
your local outlet would like to do so, they literally could not. The near omnipresence of large 
bureaucracies like McDonalds stands in stark contrast to the fact that decision-making is 
highly centralised and far removed from the centre of operations. This is obviously not an 
entirely new reality but I think what characterises contemporary American culture is that the 
disjuncture between the omnipresence of the façades of large bureaucracies and the ever-
absent decision centres are felt particularly acutely. It is probably not an exaggeration to say 
that that there is not a single American adult alive today who cannot tell a story of some 
Kafkaesque trial through the machinations of some bureaucracies’ call centre – explaining an 
issue to operator after operator, merely to be passed along to yet another person. These 
bureaucracies have a lot of influence in shaping the nature of public and political discourse. 
What should be considered as the truth in light of the financial might these corporations put 
to work on advancing their agendas?   
DFW uses The Pale King to ask the reader to reflect on some very interesting 
questions about the nature of work. For example, there is a question whether the nature of 
work becomes intrinsically different if one works for a large bureaucracy rather than a small 
family company. There is also a question of whether to successfully function in a large 
bureaucracy somehow poses different challenges for an individual than working in a small 
organisation. These questions are almost entirely ignored in standard economics. But the fact 
that they are not recognised as important can also be taken to mean that they make no 
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difference to the lives of individuals. DFW explorations throughout his book highlight that 
large bureaucracies may indeed pose very different problems for individuals and that the 
nature of work may be greatly affected by this organisational form. 
As part of asking what it might mean to work for such large bureaucracies, DFW also 
explores what it means to work in general. Why do we work? And what makes work 
rewarding? Again, this is an issue at the heart of economics and most of the readership of 
DWF needs to come to term with this question for their own life. Standard economics tries to 
tell students that the question of work is a question about the relationship between work and 
leisure. Leisure is what people want, work is what they have to do in order to afford leisure. 
As Mankiw notes: “Probably no trade-off is more obvious or more important in a person’s 
life than the trade-off between work and leisure. The more hours you spend working, the 
fewer hours you have to watch TV, enjoy dinner with friends, or pursue your favourite 
hobby.”340 So the basic question about work for an economist is what you need to be paid in 
order to give up your leisure time. Standard economics makes allowance for the fact that 
some jobs are easier than others. And since easier jobs are more similar to leisure, easier jobs 
are preferable. As Mankiw writes: 
When a worker is deciding whether to take a job, the wage is only one of many 
job attributes that the worker takes into account. Some jobs are easy, fun, and 
safe, while others are hard, dull, and dangerous. The better the job as gauged by 
these nonmonetary characteristics, the more people there are who are willing to do 
the job at any given wage. In other words, the supply of labor for easy, fun, and 
safe jobs is greater than the supply of labor for hard, dull, and dangerous jobs. As 
a result, “good” jobs will tend to have lower equilibrium wages than “bad” 
jobs.
341
 
 
What gets lost in this way of seeing work is that it entirely neglects the idea that 
people derive meaning through their work. The question is what makes a job “good” and this 
will be a function of the historical and cultural background of the person. One of Mankiw’s 
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examples makes it wonderfully clear that the idea that work is a source of meaning for 
people’s life is entirely lost: 
For example, imagine you are looking for a summer job in a local beach 
community. Two kinds of jobs are available. You can take a job as a beach-badge 
checker, or you can take a job as a garbage collector. The beach-badge checkers 
take leisurely strolls along the beach during the day and check to make sure the 
tourists have bought the required beach permits. The garbage collectors wake up 
before dawn to drive dirty, noisy trucks around town to pick up garbage. Which 
job would you want? Most people would prefer the beach job if the wages were 
the same. To induce people to become garbage collectors, the town has to offer 
higher wages to garbage collectors than to beach-badge checkers.
342
  
 
Because the way in which work can be source of meaning for the lives of individual gets lost 
in the way the nature work is presented in economics, all that matters about a job is how 
much it pays, given how difficult it is to do (and get hired). So all an individual has to decide 
is between means and ends, given initial endowments. Individuals have different talents and 
they should choose to make the best use of these talents in order to maximise their risk 
adjusted earnings. So the decision to go to university will somehow be a reflection of the cost 
of attending college (both in terms of tuitions fees, time lost and forgone earnings) and the 
increase in earnings a university degree enables over your lifetime, discounted back at some 
risk weighed factor. As a result, many people do indeed tend to consider the nature of work 
as irrelevant except for the wage it pays. But given how much of our time is spent working, 
this may be a reason for the perceived meaninglessness which many people reportedly 
experience in their life.  
 
Jonathan Franzen’s Freedom 
In many ways, Franzen’s Freedom continues a tradition that deals with the nature of 
individualisation in society. As such, his work echoes Watt’s analysis in The Rise of the 
Novel. However, it seems that there has been a fundamental shift in emphasis in how 
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individualism is understood. The novels which Watts analyses attempt to highlight the 
emancipatory aspects of individualism. Individuals were able to free themselves from the 
commitments of tradition, church, and feudality. Individualism contributed to feeling of 
increasing personal freedom for many parts of the population and this enthusiasm is captured 
in some of the characters of Defoe and Fielding. The characters of Franzen’s work, by 
contrast, find themselves in a markedly different situation. They find themselves in a world 
where all commitments are optional. But rather than experiencing this state as absolute 
freedom, they experience it as deeply troubling. Franzen clarified in an interview that this 
problematic forms the basis of the title of the novel. He says: “I wanted to write a book that 
would free me in some way. And I will say this about the abstract concept of 'freedom'; it's 
possible you are freer if you accept what you are and just get on with being the person you 
are, than if you maintain this kind of uncommitted I'm free-to-be-this, free-to-be-that, faux 
freedom.”343 
 In many ways, each of the characters and the central plots lines can be understood as a 
meditation on different ways of understanding freedom and responsibility towards self and 
other. Franzen also makes it quite explicit to the reader how his book can be understood as an 
attempt to deal with these questions vis-à-vis the view that is fostered by economic theory. 
One of the central ways in which the book picks up on this issue is Patty’s life story. Patty 
was born into an affluent family in Westchester County in New York State. Her mother was a 
state assembly woman, her father a lawyer. As a teenager and young adolescent, Patty was an 
outstanding basketball player, first for her high school and then for the University of 
Minnesota. Writing about her senior year of high school, the narrator notes that “Patty 
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became a real player, not just a talent. She all but resided in the field house”.344 After high 
school, the reader is told that: 
Patty went out to Minnesota in July for special jock-summer camp followed by 
special, early, jocks only freshmen orientation, and then she lived in a jock dorm, 
made exclusively jock friends, ate exclusively at jock tables, cluster danced at 
parties with her jock-teammates, and was careful to never sign up for a class 
without plenty of other jocks to sit with and (time permitting) to study with.
345
 
 
Her life consisted of basketball; nothing else. Effectively, then, Patty had no personal 
freedom in her life. Her entire personality was subsumed under the commitment of being a 
great high school and college athlete. It is obviously true that Patty could have made the 
decision to no longer be an athlete but on one level this misses the point: Once Patty decided 
to be an athlete, many other personal questions were effectively answered.  
This situation changes abruptly when Patty injures her knee so badly that she is forced 
to retire from playing. At first, Patty attempts to fill the void left by basketball through a 
romantic engagement with Walter, or, as the narrator put it: He [Walter] may not have been 
exactly what she wanted in a man, but he was unsurpassable in providing the rabid fandom 
which, at the time, she needed even more than romance.”346 Over time, and after having 
gotten married and given birth to two children, however, the void left by sports became 
increasingly filled by alcohol: “She didn’t think she was an alcoholic. She wasn’t an 
alcoholic. She was just turning out to be like her dad, who sometimes escaped his family by 
drinking too much….But once one or two glasses turned into six or eight, everything 
changed…It wasn’t alcoholism, it was self-defence.”347  
 As the reader learns more about Patty’s life, he is faced with a difficult conundrum. 
One the one hand, Patty seems to have been most fulfilled during her time as a basketball 
player. On the other hand, she appears to have been so busy as not to really be able to live 
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fully. Neither the narrator nor Patty’s character resolve this conundrum for the reader. 
Instead, we are left wondering about how we should personally approach our life. Maybe less 
choice and more commitments makes life easier. Or maybe, they cause one to miss all that is 
important. Either way, it is something which each of us needs to decide. 
The example of what is gained and given up by assuming commitment is also a 
central theme in the character of Walter, Patty’s husband and father of their son Joey. Unlike 
Patty, Walter comes from a very simple background. His parents operate a motel in rural 
Minnesota. When Walter was a teenager, he dreamt of becoming an actor or filmmaker but 
because of the dire financial situation of his family, he decided he needed a more reliable 
education in order to help with the running of the motel. During and after college, Walter 
then wanted to become a political activist but once again decided to take the economically 
safe route and so he settled for a job at a blue-chip corporation: 
Poor Walter. First he’d set aside his acting and film making dreams out of a sense 
of financial obligation to his parents, and then no sooner had his dad set him free 
by dying than he teamed up with Patty and set aside his planet-saving aspirations 
and went to work for 3M, so that Patty could have her excellent old house and 
stay home with the babies.”348 
 
Interestingly, however, all these commitments do not make Walter miserable. In fact, they 
seem to have him kept grounded. After his marriage has failed and after he quits his corporate 
job to pursue a job in nature activism, Walter’s life becomes increasingly turbulent. This 
development culminates in a speech on stage that decries the hypocrisy of his chief donor 
(LBI) and some of the people he had convinced to resettle (against substantial compensation) 
in order for a new nature habitat to be build (as well as new mining activity). I will reproduce 
a quote at some length because it wonderfully highlights how Franzen interweaves the 
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question of personal responsibility with the real world consequences of our collective 
decisions (which economic theory often ignores):
349
  
Welcome to the middle class. That’s what I wanted to say. Although quickly, 
before I go any further, I also wanted to say to Mr. Mathias [representative of the 
village which will be resettled] here in the front row: I know you don’t like me. 
And I don’t like you. But, you know, back when you were refusing to have 
anything to do with us, I respected you. I didn’t like it, but I had respect for your 
position. For your independence. You see, because I actually came from a place a 
little but like Forster Hollow myself, before I joined the middle class. And now  
you’re middle class, too, and I want to welcome you all, because it’s a wonderful 
thing, our American middle class. It’s the mainstay of economies all around the 
globe….You, too, can help denude every last scrap of native habitat in Asia, 
Africa, and South America! You, too, can buy six-foot-wide plasma TV screens 
that consume unbelievable amounts of energy, even when they’re not turned on. 
But that’s ok because that’s why we threw you out of your homes in the first 
place, so we could strip-mine your ancestral hills and feed the coal-fired 
generators that are the number one cause of global warming and other excellent 
things like acid rain. It’s a perfect world, isn’t it. It’s a perfect system, because as 
long as you’ve got your six-foot-wide plasma TV, and the electricity to run it, you 
don’t have to think about any of the ugly consequences. You can watch Survivor: 
Indonesia until there is no more Indonesia.
350
  
 
A number of issues come out in this single paragraph. First, Franzen highlights the price of 
living the American dream for all those who happen not to be fortunate enough to be living it. 
In standard economics, growth and rising incomes are always considered a good thing. The 
existence of externalities like pollution is accepted but always considered as an afterthought 
to be solved later. Franzen posits that a considerable portion of the economic growth which 
the US has witnesses over the last decades was mainly due to its ability to outsource all 
externalities to other countries around the world. To a significant extent, the promise of the 
American dream is built upon the nightmare for many other people.  
 Franzen also playfully satirises the promises of economic theory. Standard economic 
theory presents the market system as if it was perfect: perfect information, perfect 
competition, and perfectly smooth running. Walter takes up these themes of perfection but 
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shows that the seemingly perfect system has far from perfect consequences. In fact, the only 
thing that makes the system perfect is that it tranquilises the beneficiaries of the system into a 
completely misplaced sense of entitlement. When Walter points out this misplaced sense of 
entitlement to the people concerned, he is booed of stage and loses his job. 
The character of Joey is another powerful exploration of the extent to which an 
individual could ever act along the lines of homo economicus. In fact, Joey appears to be the 
model of the purely self-reliant, individualistic, and self-focused person as imagined in 
economic theory. Joey, even as a child, sees himself already as a fully responsible consumer. 
Other people, including his parents, have no right to question his consumption choices, such 
as when he chooses to go to bed. As Patty explains: 
He is being such a little shit,” she told the other mothers during the long winter of 
the Bedtime Wars, when Joey was asserting his right to stay awake as late as Patty 
and Walter did….“He’s questioning the basis of our authority. We make him turn 
the lights out, but his position is that he shouldn’t have to go to sleep until we turn 
our own lights out, because he’s exactly the same as us.351 
 
But, as most rebellious youngsters know, parental authority does prevail for a little 
while. It is revealing, however, how Joey rationalises his acceptance of parental demands. It 
is not out of some sense of love, duty, gratitude, or morality. What matters is that parents 
extend their purchasing power to him. For Joey, only money provides a legitimate basis for 
authority. Since children do not have sufficient money to provide housing, food, and 
entertainment for themselves, they have to accept parental oversight as punishment for being 
inadequate in this regard. As the narrator explains: “According to Patty, the lesson that Joey 
had learned from his incessant arguments with Walter was that children were compelled to 
obey parents because parents had the money.”352 The lesson, for Joey, is clear. Provide for 
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yourself and you are freed from parental demands. With the help of his girlfriend’s family, 
Joey attains his independence at the age of sixteen.
353
  
Another distinguishing feature of Joey’s character is that he personifies the coldly 
calculating individual who knows what they want. He is purely ends oriented and will do 
whatever it takes to accomplish his goals. He never loses his composure; never cries. The 
narrator sometimes refers to “Joey, in his precocious self-mastery.”354 This self-mastery finds 
it preliminary pinnacle when he informs his father that he will move in with his girlfriend. 
Carol, his girlfriend’s mother, emphasise Joey’s composure in this situation as responsible 
and contrast it with the sheer wild emotionality of Joey’s father, Walter.   
“Joey was so calm, so calm,” Carol said. “I swear to God, you couldn’t melt butter 
in his mouth…And Joey was totally responsible like always…He says he’s not 
asking permission, he’s just informing them about what he’s going to do, and 
there’s nothing to discuss…And that’s when Walter loses it. Just loses it. He’s got 
tears running down his face he’s so upset. YOU ARE SIXTEEN YEARS OLD 
AND YOU ARE NOT GOING ANYWHERE UNTIL YOU FINISH HIGH 
SCHOOL.
355
 
 
An important component of this self-mastery is that Joey is fully convinced of his 
superiority. This conviction informs everything that he does and also gives him the 
confidence to act as he does. Joey has no doubts about what to do because whatever he ends 
up doing, is was the right thing to do in those circumstances. Again, in making Joey 
understand the world in this manner, Franzen brilliantly mirrors some of the tendencies of 
economic theory to not only ascribe perfect information and perfect foresight but knowledge 
that one as perfect information and foresight to individuals.   
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But as most economists know, sometimes there occur exogenous shocks which shatter 
the idea of perfect information and foresight. Franzen uses the idea of such a shock to shatter 
Joey’s perfectly smooth world. The exogenous shock which Franzen employs is 9/11. It is a 
turning point for life as Joey knows it and it can well be read to imply that it is also a turning 
point for an America guided by the same ideology that had seemingly made Joey such a 
superman. The fact that the narrator informs the reader that Joey preferred attending his 
intermediate economics lecture, rather than watch the events that made the world he knew 
disappear, is a wonderfully subtle point of irony on Franzen’s part:  
Growing up in St. Paul, Joey Berglund had received numberless assurances that 
his life was destined to be a lucky one. The way star halfbacks talk about a great 
open-field run, the sense of cutting and weaving at full speed through a defense 
that moved in slow motion, the entire field of play as all-visible and 
instantaneously graspable as a video game at Rookie level, was the way every 
facet of his life had felt for his first eighteen years. The world had given unto him, 
and he was fine with taking. He arrived as a first-year student in Charlottesville 
with the ideal clothes and haircut and found that the school had paired him with a 
perfect roommate from NoVa (as the locals called the Virginia suburbs of D.C.). 
For two and a half weeks, college looked like it would be an extension of the 
world as he had always known it, only better. He was so convinced of this—took 
it so much for granted—that on the morning of September 11 he actually left his 
roommate, Jonathan, to monitor the burning World Trade Center and Pentagon 
while he hurried off to his Econ 201 lecture. Not until he reached the big 
auditorium and found it all but empty did he understand that a really serious glitch 
had occurred.
356
 
 
Joey starts to realise that even when things work out well for him, there are people who 
endure real suffering as a result of his success. Through a number of connections of his 
roommate Jonathan, who hails from a wealth Southern family, Joey becomes responsible for 
procuring parts for large multinational (LBI) which supports the military invasion of Iraq. In 
return for finding spare parts for a particular truck, Joe stands to make a quick profit of 
$600,000.
357
 But upon tracking down these parts in Paraguay, he realises they are of very 
poor quality and will probably result in the deaths of American soldiers in Iraq which 
                                                          
356
 Franzen, Jonathan, Freedom, London: Fourth Estate, 2010, p.247. 
357
 Franzen, Jonathan, Freedom, London: Fourth Estate, 2010, p.409. 
197 
 
prompts his “thinking what a very inconvenient time this was to be developing a 
conscience.”358 
In this way, the character of Joy can be read as a direct rejection of the image of homo 
economicus. Franzen highlights that the question of preferences cannot be neatly separated 
from larger questions of identity and morality. It may be worth recalling how a standard 
economics textbook envisions the nature of preferences: 
Economists tend to view preferences as given. Taking them as given, they 
calculate what actions will best serve those preferences. This approach to the 
study of behaviour is widely used both other social scientists and by game 
theorists, military strategists, philosophers, and others. In its standard form, it 
assumes purely self-interested preferences for present and future consumption of 
good of various sorts, leisure pursuits, and so on. Concerns about fairness, guilt, 
honor, sympathy, and the like typically play no role.
359
  
 
Franzen clearly demonstrates that ultimately, even for a person as close to the image of homo 
economicus as Joey, issues like fairness and guilt do eventually matter. Most people are not 
completely immune against the suffering of others, particularly if it is caused by them. In 
other words, most people do have sympathy and empathy. Adam Smith pointed out long ago 
that even the most hardened criminal is not entirely without sympathy. Smith writes: 
That we often derive sorrow from the sorrow of others, is a matter of fact too 
obvious to require any instances to prove it; for this sentiment, like all the other 
original passions of human nature, is by no means confined to the virtuous and 
humane, though they perhaps may feel it with the most exquisite sensibility. The 
greatest ruffian, the most hardened violator of the laws of society, is not altogether 
without it.
360
 
 
Franzen directly counters the vision that it is desirable, or indeed possible, to live entirely 
without a consideration of others. In fact, it is only after Joey redeems himself by considering 
how his actions affect others, that the character becomes somewhat likeable in the eyes of the 
reader. It is interesting to see that Joey appears to redeem himself by the very act of 
communication with his father. In the vocabulary I have been using, Franzen can be said to 
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make a very strong appeal to the notion of homo communicandis. By opening himself up to 
his father, by showing his vulnerability, Joey moves from an embodiment of the idea of homo 
economicus to that of an embodiment of homo communicandis.  
Franzen also uses Joey’s conundrum for another exploration of one of the central 
questions of economics: What is value? In discussing the quality of the truck parts with 
Connie, the reader is treated to the following conversation: 
“It sounds like you did fantastic,” Connie said. “I mean, twenty thousand dollars, 
that’s a great price, right?” 
“Except that it’s about nineteen thousand more than the stuff is worth.” 
“No, baby, it’s worth what Kenny will pay you.” 
“And you don’t think I should be, like, morally worried about this? About selling 
total crap to the government?” 
She went silent while she considered this. “I guess,” she said finally, “if it makes 
you too unhappy, you maybe shouldn’t do it. I only want you to do things that 
make you happy.” 
“I’m not going to lose your money,” he said. “That’s the one thing I know.”…… 
Out on the tarmac, under an unsettled gray Floridian sky, proven weapons 
of mass destruction were taxiing hither and thither. Joey wished there were some 
different world he could belong to, some simpler world in which a good life could 
be had at nobody else’s expense.361 
 
At first, Joey is worried that the government might reject the parts due to their low quality. 
Once he learns that they have been accepted and that he will receive his $600,000 profit for 
something that will literally kill American soldiers, his purely ends-oriented persona finally 
breaks. “And then, one night, on CNN, he saw the news of an ambush outside Fallujah in 
which several American trucks had broken down, leaving their contract drivers to be 
butchered by insurgents….he become so anxious that he had to drink himself to sleep.”362  
 The character of a Joey (like Patty and Walter) is a reminder of the fragility of most 
human psyches. Unlike homo economicus, we are not just automata. Joey is a reminder that 
even somebody endowed with enormous intellectual talent, single-mindedness, and the 
ability and willingness to work incredibly hard, can find himself in a situation where he 
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requires the emotional help of another.
363
  But because we are likely to be in need of another, 
this indebtedness should always guide our actions from the outset. And because of this, 
personal financial gains are not the only relevant metric when making any decision. There are 
other concerns that can and should influence our behaviour – be it the lives of other humans, 
the environment, or other species.  
 
Having examined three characters on their own accord, I next examine how Franzen 
combines different characters into plotlines which further heighten the awareness of how 
economic thinking influences everyday life. One of the most powerful excerpts in this regard 
occurs in the chapter entitled ‘Free markets foster competition.’ In explicitly framing the 
chapter in terms of economic theory, Franzen invites the reader to think of the different 
character constellations as markets. There are a myriad of three-way constellations to be 
found in this chapter but the most important ones are the constellation of Walter-Patty-
Richard, Richard (or Blake)-Joey-Walter, and, Patty-Joey-Walter.
364
 Franzen invites the 
reader to think of these constellations as a competition for love, affection, recognition, safety 
etc.  
The Richard-Joey-Walter constellation is a good example of how Franzen gets the 
reader to question the standard competition model. Clearly there is competition in a sense but 
this competition involves the issue of somebody’s identity. In the image of competition in 
economics, one actor never cares about the character of another. All one cares about is 
outcomes. Means, as long as they are legal, are irrelevant. What matter is to successfully 
attain the ends. But with people, the means of how things are done are just as important, 
sometimes even more important, than whether they are accomplished. Franzen illustrates that 
the decision of who we want another person to be is also at the same time a reflection of who 
                                                          
363
 In Joey’s case, it is actually his father who he had despised as weak who helps him out with this situation. 
364
 Other constellations include Patty-Walter-Eliza, Patty-Elisa-Richard, Patty-Joey-Connie. 
200 
 
we want to be. In other words, the identity of others has important consequences for our own 
identity:  
And here is an actual serious personal failing of Walter’s: he couldn’t accept that 
Joey wasn’t like him. If Joey had been shy, and diffident with girls, if Joey had 
enjoyed playing the role of child, if Joey had wanted a dad who could teach him 
things, if Joey had been helplessly honest, if Joey had sided with underdogs, if 
Joey had loved nature, if Joey had been indifferent to money, he and Water would 
have gotten along famously. But Joey, from infancy onwards, was a person more 
in the mould of Richard Katz – effortlessly cool, ruggedly confident, totally 
focussed on getting what he wanted, impervious to moralizing, unafraid of girls – 
and Walter carried all his frustration and disappointment with his son to 
Patty….”365 
 
This issue also plays a role in Joey’s relationship with Patty but along quite different 
lines. Patty has an intense need to be liked and respected by Joey. The fact that Joey exhibits 
many of the same characteristics that she found attractive in Richard as a young woman 
probably complicates the story further. Like Water, she has a vision of who she wants Joey to 
be and one aspect of this vision is that he does not settle for the relatively plain 
neighbourhood girl, Connie:  
If she’d been honest with herself, what she really wanted was for Joey to be 
delighted by her. She didn’t see how he could possibly be loyal and devoted to the 
neighbour girl. She thought that Connie Monaghan, sneaky little competitor that 
she was, had managed to get some kind of filthy little momentary hold on him. 
She was disastrously slow to grasp the seriousness of the Monaghan menace, and 
in months when she was underestimating Joey’s feelings for the girl – when she 
thought that she could simply freeze Connie out and make light-hearted fun of her 
trashy mom and her mom’s boneheaded boyfriend, and that Joey would soon 
enough be laughing at them, too – she managed to undo fifteen years of efforts to 
be a good mom. She fucked up royally, Patty did, and then proceeded to become 
quite unhinged.
366
 
 
Because Patty thinks so highly of Joey, she believe he deserves, and ought to aim for, a girl 
which was truly special on some way – from a rich family, gorgeous, or just very talented in 
some way. And later in life, Joey meets this kind of girl. As in the example of Walter’s 
relationship with Joey, Franzen invites the reader to question whether relationships should be 
                                                          
365
 Franzen, Jonathan, Freedom, London: Fourth Estate, 2010, p.158. 
366
 Franzen, Jonathan, Freedom, London: Fourth Estate, 2010, p.159. 
201 
 
assessed in terms of pure ends and the extent to which it makes sense to rate a partner by any 
kind of objective criteria, like wealth, looks, connections, fame, etc. In this way, Franzen 
invites the reader to contemplate what makes a relationship meaningful and it becomes pretty 
clear throughout the book that whatever this may be, it is not some criteria that could be 
maximised subject to a constraint, as is envisioned in the standard account of decision-
making.  
Patty’s difficulty with Joey also complicates Patty’s relationship with Walter. It is 
another one of countless instances in which the constitution of one relationship has grave 
ramifications for the constitution of another relationship. The economic parlance for this 
phenomenon would be contagion but because contagion is intrinsic to every close 
relationship, it makes no sense to pretend as if some relationship could operate according to a 
non-contagion principle. Because Joey fails to become the son both Patty and Walter wish 
for, he undermines the viability of the relationship between Patty and Walter.  
She has terrible fights with Walter in which he blamed her for making Joey 
ungovernable and she was unable to defend herself properly, because she wasn’t 
allowed to speak the sick conviction in her heart, which was that Walter has 
ruined her friendship with her son. By sleeping in the same bed with her, by being 
her husband, by claiming her for the grownup side, Walter had made Joey believe 
that Patty was in the enemy camp. She hated Walter for this, and resented the 
marriage, and Joey moved out of the house and in with the Monaghans and made 
everybody pay in bitter tears for their mistakes.
367
      
 
Rather than individuals being atomistic and self-sufficient, here we find individuals 
who heavily rely on others for their mental stability. Once this stability is removed, an 
individual can quickly fall apart. In the case of Patty this takes the form of becoming an 
alcoholic. In highlighting the relational aspects between different individual characters, 
Franzen in a way also picks up on the issue of solidarity. Each character understands herself 
via the other characters not via some external truth.  
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One of the most poignant scenes in the Walter-Patty-Richard constellation is when 
Patty leaves a road trip she had been on with Richard to visit Walter at his parents’ house in 
Hibbing. Walter had been enraged that Patty had gone on this road trip with Richard in the 
first place. Franzen writes that “Walter stared at her furiously. “Then why did you go with 
him? Why was he in Chicago with you? Why the fuck? I don’t understand!”368 During this 
conversation Walter repeatedly tries to explain to Patty that his anger is only partially 
directed at her “This is not about you”, he said. Do you get that? I love every bit of you. 
Every inch. From the minute I saw you. Do you get that?”369  
Walter is trying to tell Patty, and Patty appears to partially understand, that the question 
of who gets to be with her is also a question about the relationship between Walter and 
Richard. And in trying to get Walter to explain this point to Patty, Franzen is also explaining 
the inappropriateness of seeing human relationships in the standard competition model to the 
reader. For clearly in an actual competition, the ends are the only thing that matters. If Patty 
truly was a product to be bought, say at auction, then it would only be about her. But as 
Walter says repeatedly, it is not about Patty. Rather, the nature of her relationship with 
Richard also constitutes an important aspect of the relationship between Walter and Richard. 
And the relationship between Walter and Richard is an important aspect to how Walter sees 
himself – to his identity. Walter does not want Patty to be the cause why his relationship with 
Richard falls apart but he also fears that Richard through Patty might endanger who he wants 
to be himself. These kinds of interrelations between the actors strongly highlights the degree 
of difference between the normal image of competition and that which should be invoked in 
order to understand the complexity and nuance of human relationships. 
Through these constellations, Franzen tries to show that without these constellations, 
the protagonists would not be who they are. People become who they are because they 
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participate in various constellations, in each of which they are a partial but necessary part.
370
 
Seeing individuals in this way is very different from the competition model advocated by 
economics where each individual firmly constitutes herself. Again, the issue here mirrors the 
discussion of homo economicus vs homo communicandis. Franzen, in what I think is one of 
the best metaphors on this issue ever written, compares the work of individuals to the minutes 
in an individual’s workday:  
There’s a hazardous sadness to the first sounds of someone else’s work in the 
morning; it’s as if stillness experiences pain in being broken. The first minute of 
the workday reminds you of all other minutes that a day consists of, and it’s never 
a good thing to think of minutes as individuals. Only after other minutes have 
joined the naked, lonely first minute does that day become more safely integrated 
in its dayness.
371
 
 
The day is made up of minutes just as society is made up of individuals. But just as the day is 
made of the integration of different minutes, the character of society not made up of simply 
adding individuals: They have to become integrated into the whole in order for society to 
truly manifest itself. It is this vision of individuality that is the basis of homo communicandis 
and solidarity. 
 
David Foster Wallace’s The Pale King 
DFW’s The Pale King is another outstanding example how works of fiction reflect, produce, 
and question economic ideas. DFW shares Franzen’s concern about the nature of economic 
subjectivity – what is means to be a responsible economic agent in the United States at the 
beginning of the 21
st
 century. However, whereas Freedom heavily emphasises how 
individuals produce meaning and identity through their relationships and how this relates to 
world-wide economic and social processes, The Pale King focuses much more on the nature 
of work and where this works takes place. In fact, it is probably one of the best explorations 
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of what it means to work as part of a large, impersonal, modern bureaucratic structure, 
demonstrating that work is not just as about earning income. The way in which work is seen 
solely as a means to achieve an income in economic theory overlooks crucial aspects of what 
it means to work. Work is much more deeply intertwined with our psyche. Not only do we 
construct meaning through it but work can also be a source of great psychological anxiety 
and stress. In some ways, The Pale King asks the reader to contemplate the possibility that 
the demands made by modern bureaucratic structures place a very high burden on the psyche 
of the individual.
372
 One particular burden is that the whole process by which truth and 
meaning is generated becomes interlinked with these bureaucratic structures.  
One of the aspects that make The Pale King such an appealing example for me is that 
some of the themes in the book mirror my discussions in the first part of this dissertation. In 
fact, DFW explicitly asks his readers to let go of the idea that truth is accurate representation 
of reality.
373
 In the book, DFW takes issue with one of his colleagues on the grounds that this 
colleague fails to realise that different kinds of narratives produce different kinds of truth and 
that there is no universal criterion which makes one kind of truth intrinsically better than 
another. He writes:  
What a logorrheic colleagues like Fogle failed to understand is that there are 
vastly different kinds of truth, some of which are incompatible with one 
another. Example: A 100 percent accurate, comprehensive list of the exact size 
and shape of every blade of grass in my front lawn is ‘true,’ but it is not a truth 
that anyone will have any interest in. What renders a truth meaningful, 
worthwhile, & c. is its relevance, which in turn requires extraordinary 
discernment and sensitivity to context, questions of value, and overall point—
otherwise we might as well all just be computers downloading raw data to one 
another.
374
 
 
In this paragraph, DFW clearly mirrors, or to be more accurate foreshadows, the concerns 
with homo economicus. DFW clarifies that there is no unique perspective that can somehow 
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be used to evaluate the world. Unlike the idea of homo economicus, which relies on one right 
perspective, all perspectives are contextual. This contextuality highlights the need for 
solidarity, rather than objectivity in Rorty’s sense. 
DFW asks the reader to accept his book as saying something true, in the sense as 
saying something relevant, about contemporary American society, even though, as a novel, 
the book is invented. To this end, DFW wants to eradicate the border between narrator and 
author. He wants to insist that even though the narrating persona is fictitious, an invention of 
out of thin air, there is also a real body occupying time and space, the author. For the 
purposes of this book, the voice of the narrator is the same as the voice of the author. It is his 
voice. Unconventionally, therefore, DFW addresses the reader directly in a foreword on page 
69.
375
  
Author here. Meaning the real author, the living human holding the pencil, not 
some abstract narrative persona. Granted, there sometimes is such a persona in 
The Pale King, an entity that exists just for legal and commercial purposes, 
rather like a corporation; it has no direct, provable connection to me as a 
person. But this right here is me as a real person. David Wallace, age forty, SS 
no 997-04-2012, addressing you from my Form 8829-deductible home office 
at 725 Indian Hill Blvd. Claremont 91711 CA, on the fifth day of spring 2005, 
to inform you of the following: All of this is true. This book is really true.
376
 
 
 The reason why DFW cannot just speak with his bodily persona is that the 
bureaucratic legal structures of contemporary American society will not allow him to be 
heard. DFW points to the legal disclaimer at the beginning of the book, which reads: “The 
characters and events in this book are fictitious. Any similarity to real persons, living or dead, 
is coincidental and not intended by the author.”377 In any book, part of the task of the narrator 
is to set the terms through which the novel is to be understood. Yet, the copyright law in the 
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beginning of the book essentially disempowers DFWs narrator to assume the position the 
author would like him to take.  
DFW demonstrates in a very clear way how different power structures, in this case the 
United States legal system, shape the nature of language and information. They influence 
what can be said and how. The narrator is not allowed to be identified with the real persona 
of David Foster Wallace. To DFW, the legal disclaimer at the beginning of the book 
forecloses certain possible realisations for him as an author and also for the reader. The 
fictitious nature of the narrator, the characters, and the story does not mean that the reader 
should not accept the book as saying something true.  
Even more interestingly, though, DFW is able to subvert these power structures. In 
being open about how these power relations shape his work and what can be done, in creating 
an awareness on part of the reader, the narrator is able to assume the position which the legal 
structure claimed was impossible. This, however, is only possible so long as the reader is 
willing to invest some mental effort to understand DFW’s position: 
This might appear to set up an irksome paradox. The book’s legal disclaimer 
defines everything that follows it as fiction, including this Foreword, but now here 
in this Foreword I’m saying that the whole thing is really nonfiction; so if you 
believe one you can’t believe the other, & c., &c. Please know that I find these 
sorts of cute, self-referential paradoxes irksome, too – at least now that I’m over 
thirty I do – and the very last thing this book is some kind of clever metafictional 
titty-pincher. That’s why I’m making it a point to violate protocol and address you 
here directly, as my real self.
378
 
 
DFW is aware that he is asking a lot from the reader but through this awareness, DFW also 
highlights that true meaning and connections can come about no matter how powerful the 
structures which attempt to foreclose such possibilities. All that matters in the end is the 
willingness to be heard and the willingness to listen. As long as these abilities are fostered 
and cultivated, no institutional structure will be able to prevent the reaching of an 
understanding between two willing interlocutors. Put differently, by appealing directly to the 
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reader, DFW also tenderly develops an image of homo communicandis for the reader. He 
tries to connect to the reader, tries to tell her that he is trying to say something important for 
how to live one’s life. Not only that, but DFW also tries to convey the importance of the fact 
that he is trying to make this connection: that making connections is ultimately what people 
do (unlike his logorrheic colleague Fogle). 
Following DFW, or his narrator, requires nothing short of suspending a particular 
understanding of truth – whereby all statements are either true or false. Legally speaking, 
what DFW is writing is false. In terms of how it generates meaning for the reader, it is true. 
Even more interestingly, there is a near complete reversal between truth and fiction: 
Normally, a law would be considered true and a novel a kind of lie, or at least as not-true. 
One way of escaping particular power structures may therefore be to recognise that there 
nothing inevitable about a law always being seen as more truthful than fiction.
379
 It depends 
on the law and the questions under consideration:  
The only bona fide ‘fiction’ here is the copyright page’s disclaimer—which, 
again, is a legal device: The disclaimer’s whole and only purpose is to protect 
me, the book’s publisher, and the publisher’s assigned distributors from legal 
liability. The reason why such protections are especially required here—why, 
in fact, the publisher has insisted upon them as a precondition for acceptance of 
the manuscript and payment of the advance—is the same reason the disclaimer 
is, when you come right down to it, a lie.
380
 
 
DFW is keen to emphasise that power structures shape the nature of how narratives are 
produced. Because their nature is so omnipresent, power structures do not just influence 
narratives on the margin. Rather, they are integral to the very production of truth and 
narratives:   
The point I’m trying to drive home here is that it’s still all substantially true – i.e. 
the book this Foreword is part of – regardless of the various ways some of the 
forthcoming §s have had to be distorted, depersonalized, polyphonized, or 
otherwise jazzed up in order to conform to the specs of the legal disclaimer. This 
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is not to say that this jazzing up is all just gratuitous titty-pinching; given the 
aforementioned legal-slash-commercial constraints, it’s ended up being integral to 
the book’s whole project.381 
 
DFW further decreases the distance between himself as author and the reader by helping the 
reader understand why he choose to write this book. And what truly stands out here is the 
honesty which DFW brings to this task. DFW portrays the book as the result of an 
intermeshing of commercial and artistic interests. He wants to produce art but he also wants 
to make a living: 
The simple truth is that I, like so many other Americans, have suffered reverses in 
the volatile economy of the last few years, and that these reverses have occurred at 
the same time that my financial obligations have increases along with my age and 
responsibilities; and meanwhile all sorts of US writers -  some of whom I know 
personally, including one I actually had to lend money to for basic living expenses 
as late as spring 2001 – have recently hit it big with memoirs and I would be a 
rank hypocrite if I pretended that I was less attune and receptive to market forces 
than anyone else.
382
  
 
The first point to emphasise is the exceptional degree of honesty in the paragraph. But 
perhaps more interestingly is how strange it is to be struck by such honesty in the first place. 
It is pretty much unimaginable that an undergraduate economics textbooks opens with the 
admission that the author was motivated by the multi-million dollar advance offered by the 
publisher. Most textbook authors make it seem as if their book was only written for the 
erudition of students when in fact the income from textbooks sales was almost certainly also 
a point of consideration. And most informed students and teachers know this. The same goes 
for most academic writings. There is hardly a reference to be found about how an article or 
book was written to satisfy particular demands for career-advancement. Yet, we all know that 
this plays a role. So why the silence on these issues? Why the hypocrisy? 
 I think part of the reason is that for most people there still exist tensions between 
commercial interests and artistic or scholarly worth. And there clearly are such tensions. But 
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the right way to go about these tensions is to admit their existence and not to attempt to 
silence them out of existence. Not all works suffer from this tension equally – one can still 
produce works of great artistic or scholarly worth whilst also benefiting financially. And to 
openly admit this is the case. As our society becomes more thoroughly commercialised, 
making such a shift is important. For the only way to produce commercially non-viable 
products in a thoroughly commercial system is to leave the system entirely. But some of the 
best work usually has the danger of being commercially non-viable and we, as a society, risk 
losing such work if we do not make sure that there are some safeguards for those who want 
to take such risks. We should also demand more honestly from academic authors. It is quite 
probable that there is a strong correlation between those authors who remain silent on their 
commercial interests and those who have most commercial interests at stake. It is ok to have 
a commercial interest but commercial interests should not override all other interests. Again, 
this position is a very far cry from what economic theory would teach us. The value of any 
product is its price – or its commercial viability. Therefore products are produced with this 
end in mind. But it never occurs in this story that producing products solely for sale might 
somehow decrease the quality of the product: 
As all mature people know, it’s possible for very different kind of motives and 
emotions to coexist in the human soul. There is no way a memoir like The Pale 
King could be written solely for financial gain. One paradox of professional 
writing is that books written solely for money and/or acclaim will almost never be 
good enough to garner either. The truth is that the larger narrative encompassing 
this Foreword has significant social and artistic value. That might sound 
conceited, but rest assured that I wouldn’t and couldn’t have put three years hard 
labour (plus an additional fifteen months of legal and editorial fuzzing) into The 
Pale King if I were not convinced this was true.
383
 
       
Another dimension to DFW’s discussion is that it also rejects the notion that financial gain is 
the only reason why people work. Unlike homo economicus, who only enjoys financial gains, 
homo communicandis is concerned with other issues as well. In fact, DFW suggest that true 
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artistic accomplishment cannot be the solely the result of the profit motive. The second point 
is that DFW is aware of the fact, and wants the reader to be aware of this fact, that what he is 
writing about and how he has chosen to express himself is also a reflection of the larger 
economic, cultural and political context. The spirit of DFW’s discussion here mirrors my 
own in chapter four. At the heart of understanding how works of fiction can be used to study 
economic, cultural and political systems is that they share a particular context with the 
reader, enabling works of fiction to question how this context is to be seen and understood. 
DFW emphasises in this regard that his book can also be understood as another manifestation 
of the erasure of the line between public and private, or between the private and the 
performative: 
One disadvantage of addressing you here directly in the cultural present of 2005 is 
the fact that, as both you and I know, there is no longer any kind of clear line 
between the personal and the public, or rather between the private and the 
performative. Among the obvious examples are web logs, reality television, cell-
phone cameras, chat rooms….not to mention the dramatically increased popularity 
of the memoir as a literary genre. Of course popularity is, in this context, a 
synonym for profitability. 
384
 
 
DFW highlights that what appears to get lost in the erasure between public and private 
as part of an all-encompassing commercialisation is that it is harder to accomplish the 
satisfaction derived from a task that has successfully been completed. This touches upon 
another aspect that does not receive any attention in modern economic theory. The standard 
story says that people work, and produce, in order to earn an income. If there are no controls 
in place, individuals will produce poor quality work. Because work is, after all, work and 
what individuals want is leisure. Leisure is the only thing that is pleasurable. But why can’t 
work also be intrinsically pleasurable? DFW emphasises that one can also find pleasure in 
work. He gives the example of his father: 
Well, my dad used to like to mow the lawn in little patches and strips….It took a 
little while to realise he did this with the lawn because the liked the feeling of 
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being done. Of having a job and feeling like he did it and it was done. You know? 
By dividing the lawn into like seventeen small little section, which our mom 
thought was nuts as usual, he could feel the feeling of finishing a job seventeen 
times instead of just once.
385
  
 
At one level, much of The Pale King is an exploration of the extent to which this simple 
pleasure of a job well done can still be attained in a modern bureaucracy. The impression one 
gets from reading the book is that whilst this is still possible, it is much more difficult. DFW 
raises the point that in a modern bureaucracy, the list of tasks appears to be endless. Because 
of its size and complexity, there is no end to the amount of work that can potentially be 
achieved. Unlike a lawn which once it is mowed, stays mowed for at least a little while, 
modern work is potentially never ending. DFW suggests that the awareness of this knowledge 
of never-being-finished makes it much harder for one to enjoy the feeling of being actually 
having accomplished something. DFW comments about the checking of particular tax forms 
that “an average 1040 takes around twenty-two minutes to go through and examine and fill 
out the memo on…. Each completed job gives you that solid little feeling. The thing here is 
that the returns never stop. There’s always the next one to do. You never really finish.”386 
 Another important aspect which seems to contribute to the difficulty of enjoying work 
is the increase in complexity and arcane detail of much of the performed work. DFW does 
not just tell the reader that this may be the case but shows how it is the case. The Pale King 
powerfully evokes the feeling of auditing tax records, and by going into miniscule details 
about the daily operations, the reader is left with a vivid sense of what it must mean to do 
such work for 8 hours a day, every day, for years. For example, he gives the following 
example of how a particular tax return is to be checked:  
RM §781(d) AMT Formula for Corporations: (1) Taxable income before NOL 
deduction, plus or minus (2) All AMT adjustments excepting ACE adjustment, 
plus (3) Tax preferences, yields (4) Alternative Minimum Taxable Income before 
NOL deduction and/or ACE adjustment, plus or minus (5) ACE adjustment, if 
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any, yields (6) AMTI before NOL deduction, if any, minus (7) NOL deduction, 
if any (Ceiling at 90%), yields (8) AMTI, minus (9) Exemptions, yields (10) 
AMT base, multiplied by (11) 20% AMT rate, yields (12) AMT prior to AMT 
Foreign Tax Credit, minus (13) AMT Foreign Tax Credit, if any (Ceiling at 90% 
unless Exceptions 781(d) (13-16) apply, in which case attach Memo 781-2432 
and forward to Group Manager), yields (14) Tentative Alternative Minimum 
Tax, minus (15) Standard tax liability before credit minus standard Foreign Tax 
Credit, yields (16) Alternative Minimum Tax.
387
 
 
The nature of these tasks thus gives rise to a very peculiar work environment. Again, DFW 
describes the environment in such vivid detail that it is worth reproducing it at some length:  
‘Irrelevant’ Chris Fogle turns a page. Howard Cardwell turns a page. Ken Wax 
turns a page. Matt Redgate turns a page. ‘Groovy’ Bruce Channing attaches a 
form to a file. Ann Williams turns a page. Anand Singh turns two pages at once 
by mistake and turns one back which makes a slightly different sound. David 
Cusk turns a page. Sandra Pounder turns a page. Robert Atkins turns two 
separate pages of two separate files at the same time. Ken Wax turns a page. 
Lane Dean Jr. turns a page. Olive Borden turns a page. Chris Acquistipace 
turns a page. David Cusk turns a page. Rosellen Brown turns a page. Matt 
Redgate turns a page. R. Jarvis Brown turns a page. Ann Williams sniffs 
slightly and turns a page. Meredith Rand does something to a cuticle. 
‘Irrelevant’ Chris Fogle turns a page. Ken Wax turns a page. Howard Cardwell 
turns a page. Kenneth ‘Type of Thing’ Hindle detaches a Memo 402-C(1) from 
a file. ‘Second-Knuckle’ Bob McKenzie looks up briefly while turning a page. 
David Cusk turns a page. A yawn proceeds across one Chalk’s row by 
unconscious influence Ryne Hobratshck turns a page. Latrice Theakston turns 
a page. Rotes Group Room 2 hushed and brightly lit, half a football field in 
length.
388
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“Howard Cardwell shifts slightly in his chair and turns a page. Lane Dean Jr. traces his jaw’s outline with his 
ring finger. Ed Shackleford turns a page. Elpidia Carter turns a page. Ken Wax attaches a Memo 20 to a file. 
Anand Singh turns a page. Jay Landauer and Ann Williams turn a page almost precisely in sync although they 
are in different rows and cannot see each other. Boris Kratz bobs with a slight Hassidic motion as he 
crosschecks a page with a column of figures. Ken Wax turns a page. Harriet Candelaria turns a page. Matt 
Redgate turns a page. Ambient room temperature 80° F. Sandra Pounder makes a minute adjustment to a file so 
that the page she is looking at is at a slightly different angle to her. ‘Irrelevant’ Chris Fogle turns a page. David 
Cusk turns a page. Each Tingle’s two-tiered hemisphere of boxes. ‘Groovy’ Bruce Channing turns a page. Ken 
Wax turns a page. Six wigglers per Chalk, four Chalks per Team, six Teams per group. Latrice Theakston turns 
a page. Olive Borden turns a page. Plus administration and support. Bob Mc-Kenzie turns a page. Anand Singh 
turns a page and then almost instantly turns another page. Ken Wax turns a page. Chris ‘The Maestro’ 
Acquistipace turns a page. David Cusk turns a page. Harriet Candelaria turns a page. Boris Kratz turns a page. 
Robert Atkins turns two separate pages. Anand Singh turns a page. R. Jarvis Brown uncrosses his legs and turns 
a page. Latrice Theakston turns a page. The slow squeak of the cart boy’s cart at the back of the room. Ken Wax 
places a file on top of the stack in the Cart-Out box to his upper right. Jay Landauer turns a page. Ryne 
Hobratschk turns a page and then folds over the page of a computer printout that’s lined up next to the original 
file he just turned a page of. Ken Wax turns a page. Bob Mc-Kenzie turns a page. Ellis Ross turns a page. Joe 
‘The Bastard’ Biron-Maint turns a page. Ed Shackleford opens a drawer and takes a moment to select just the 
right paperclip. Olive Borden turns a page. Sandra Pounder turns a page. Matt Redgate turns a page and then 
almost instantly turns another page. Latrice Theakston turns a page. Paul Howe turns a page and then sniffs 
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Even by merely reading this section, one gets a sense of an almost life-stifling monotony. 
DFW manages to make the reader feel what it must be like to work in such an atmosphere. 
One gets a sense of an atmosphere that somehow feels oppressive and claustrophobic. In 
allowing the reader to feel what it must be like, or at least to get a sense of what it must be 
like, to process tax returns, DFW fosters a sense of empathy with these workers. When a 
standard economics textbook invites us to think about as work as the result of a conscious 
calculation about the trade-off between income and leisure time, it becomes very difficult to 
feel genuine empathy for anybody. After all, the trade-off must work out for a particular 
person, otherwise she would have made a different choice. But there are many aspects of 
work that are not up to a particular individual – working hours, working atmosphere, 
colleagues, etc. It is only once we consider that work is an important aspect to a person’s life, 
that it is part of their identity and part of how they derive meaning for their life that we can 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
circumspectly at the green rubber sock on his pinkie’s tip. Olive Borden turns a page. Rosellen Brown turns a 
page. Ken Wax turns a page. Devils are actually angels. Elpidia Carter and Harriet Candelaria reach up to their 
Cart-In boxes at exactly the same time. R. Jarvis Brown turns a page. Ryne Hobratschk turns a page. ‘Type of 
Thing’ Ken Hindle looks up a routing code. Some with their chin in their hand. Robert Atkins turns a page even 
as he’s crosschecking something on that page. Ann Williams turns a page. Ed Shackleford searches a file for a 
supporting document. Joe Biron-Maint turns a page. Ken Wax turns a page. David Cusk turns a page. Lane 
Dean Jr. rounds his lips and breathes deeply in and out like that and bends to a new file. Ken Wax turns a page. 
Anand Singh closes and opens his dominant hand several times while studying a muscle in his wrist. Sandra 
Pounder straightens slightly and swings her head in a neck-stretching arc and leans forward again to examine a 
page. Howard Cardwell turns a page. Most sit up straight but lean forward at the waist, which reduces neck 
fatigue. Boris Kratz turns a page. Olive Borden raises the little hinged flag on her empty 402-C box. Ellis Ross 
starts to turn a page and then stops to recheck something higher up on the page. Bob McKenzie hawks mucus 
without looking up. ‘Groovy’ Bruce Channing worries his lower lip with a pen’s pocket clip. Ann Williams 
sniffs and turns a page. Matt Redgate turns a page. Paul Howe opens a drawer and looks inside and closes the 
drawer without taking anything out. Howard Cardwell turns a page. Two walls’ paneling painted over in Baker-
Miller pink. R. Jarvis Brown turns a page. One Chalk per row, four rows per column, six columns. Elpidia 
Carter turns a page. Robert Atkins’s lips are soundlessly moving. ‘Groovy’ Bruce Channing turns a page. 
Latrice Theakston turns a page with a long purple nail. Ken Wax turns a page. Chris Fogle turns a page. 
Rosellen Brown turns a page. Chris Acquistipace signs a Memo 20. Harriet Candelaria turns a page. Anand 
Singh turns a page. Ed Shackleford turns a page. Two clocks, two ghosts, one square acre of hidden mirror. Ken 
Wax turns a page. Jay Landauer feels absently at his face. Every love story is a ghost story. Ryne Hobratschk 
turns a page. Matt Redgate turns a page. Olive Borden stands and raises her hand with three fingers out for the 
cart boy. David Cusk turns a page. Elpidia Carter turns a page. Exterior temperature/humidity 96°/74%. Howard 
Cardwell turns a page. Bob McKenzie still hasn’t spit. Lane Dean Jr. turns a page. Chris Acquistipace turns a 
page. Ryne Hobratschk turns a page. The cart comes up the group room’s right side with its squeaky wheel. 
Two others in the third Chalk’s row also stand. Harriet Candelaria turns a page. R. Jarvis Brown turns a page. 
Paul Howe turns a page. Ken Wax turns a page. Joe Biron-Maint turns a page. Ann Williams turns a page.” 
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fully appreciate what it means to work as part of a modern bureaucracy. This appreciation is 
entirely lacking in how the nature of work is understood in standard economics. 
One of DFW’s suggestions in The Pale King appears to be that the crucial feature of 
working in modern bureaucracies is an increased exposure to dullness and boredom. DFW 
suggests that the rise of the availability of information has also lead to an increase in the need 
to distinguish the relevant from the irrelevant. In DFW’s eyes, most individuals in a modern 
economy need to shift through ever increasing amounts of pure data, in order to find 
something that is relevant for their lives. DFW writes how he learned to navigate boredom 
like a terrain and that talking about the dull appears to be a non-topic in his conversations 
with friends and popular culture in general: 
The memoir-relevant point here is that I learned, in my time with the Service [the 
IRS], something about dullness, information, and irrelevant complexity. About 
negotiating boredom as one would a terrain, its levels and forests, and endless 
wastes. Learned about it extensively, exquisitely, in my interrupted year. And now 
ever since that time have noticed, at work and in recreation and time with friends 
and even the intimacies of family life, that living people do not speak much of the 
dull. Of those parts of life that are and must be dull. Why this silence? Maybe it’s 
because the subject is, in and of itself, dull,…only then we’re back to again right 
back where we started, which is tedious and irksome. There may, though, I opine, 
be more to it, as in vastly more, right here before us all, hidden by virtue of its 
size.
389
 
 
DFW tries to resolve the irksome paradox of why talking about the dull, is in and of 
itself, dull, by suggesting that exposure to boredom forces us to face deep existential 
questions about ourselves. Once again, seeing individuals in this light is a far cry from the 
kind of person that is found in economics textbooks. In an economics textbooks, individuals 
are portrayed as making conscious choices about what to do and how they life. DFW suggests 
that underneath the realm of everyday living and choices, is another darker realm that many 
of individuals do not like to access too much or too often. One advantage of the increase in 
entertainment options, the increasing in working hours in some professions, or the 
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information society in general is therefore that it allows individuals greater possibility of not 
having to face such existential anxieties: 
To me, at least in retrospect, the really interesting question is why dullness 
proves to be such a powerful impediment to attention. Why we recoil from the 
dull. Maybe it’s because dullness is intrinsically painful; maybe that’s where 
phrases like ‘deadly dull’ or ‘excruciatingly dull’ come from. But there might be 
more to it… but surely something must lie behind not just Muzak in dull or 
tedious places anymore but now also actual TV in waiting rooms, supermarkets’ 
checkouts, airports’ gates, SUVs’ backseats. Walkmen, iPods, BlackBerries, cell 
phones that attach to your head. This terror of silence with nothing diverting to 
do. I can’t think anyone really believes that today’s so-called ‘information 
society’ is just about information. Everyone knows it’s about something else, 
way down.
390
 
 
Increasing exposure to boredom, on the one hand, and the difficulty of dealing with it, 
on the other hand, leads DFW to suggest that the key ability to succeed in a modern 
bureaucracy is the ability to withstand boredom. This is a fascinating suggestion and 
radically different from the kind of abilities that are suggested for success in any economics 
textbook. Again, DFW invokes the notion that working in an atmosphere of a tax office is 
devoid of any kind of vitality. But the kind of person who can do so successfully, without 
taking physical harm, is the true winner of modern bureaucratic societies. In DFW eyes, the 
person who is immune to boredom becomes the new Superman: 
I discovered….the real skill that is required to succeed in a bureaucracy. I 
mean really succeed: do good, make a difference, serve. I discovered the key. 
This key is not efficiency, or probity, or insight, or wisdom. It is not political 
cunning, interpersonal skills, raw IQ, loyalty, vision, or any of the qualities that 
the bureaucratic world calls virtues, and tests for. The key is a certain capacity 
that underlies all these qualities, rather the way that an ability to breathe and 
pump blood underlies all thought and action. The underlying bureaucratic key 
is the ability to deal with boredom. To function effectively in an environment 
that precludes everything vital and human. To breathe, so to speak, without air. 
The key is the ability, whether innate or conditioned, to find the other side of 
the rote, the picayune, the meaningless, the repetitive, the pointlessly complex. 
To be, in a word, unborable. ….It is the key to modern life. If you are immune 
to boredom, there is literally nothing you cannot accomplish.
391
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But in framing the issues this way, DFW also highlights that the vast majority of 
people are not immune against boredom and dullness. There is an evocative chapter in the 
Pale King which depicts a report written by the Assistant Commissioner for Human 
Resources of the IRS which lists symptoms which staff have experienced on postings longer 
than three years:  
Conclusion of ACIRHRMSOEAPO Survey/Study 1-76—11-77: 
AMA/DSM(II)-authorized syndromes/symptoms associated with Examinations 
postings in excess of 36 months (average term of posting on report: 41.4 
months), in reverse order of incidence (per medical/EAP service claim per 
IRSM §743/12.2(f-r)):  
Chronic paraplegia 
Temporary paraplegia 
Temporary paralysis agitans 
Paracatatonic fugues 
Formication 
Intracranial edema 
Spasmodic dyskinesia 
Paramnesia 
Paresis 
Phobic anxiety (numerical)  
Lordosis 
Renal neuralgia 
Tinnitus
392
 
 
DFW suggests that the transformation in the work environment which many people are 
experiencing is also making them psychologically and physically sick. DFW has certainly hit 
upon an empirical reality that is hard to explain. Despite its wealth (and growth in wealth 
over time), the United States is experiencing what has been called an epidemic in anxiety 
disorders with surveys suggesting at least twenty-five percent of American adults suffer from 
one form of anxiety disorder at some point in their life.
393
 The WHO also notes that the US 
has by far the largest prevalence of mental disorders of any of fourteen developed countries 
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and that this rate has strongly increased over the last fifty years.
394
 A number of 
commentators have offered different suggestions as to why this might be the case. Richard 
Wilkinson and Kate Pickett, for example, argue that what is missing in the US is equality. 
According to their view, inequality leads to anxiety and mental disorders.
395
 Avner Offer, by 
contrast, suggest that “affluence breeds impatience, and impatience undermines well-
being”.396 Jane Twenge argues that it is “decreases in social connectedness and increases in 
environmental dangers” which explain increases in anxiety.397 I think DFW’s suggestion 
about the nature of work in a modern economy is as good a suggestion as any of the others 
and it would be worthwhile to consider just how dealing with boredom and monotony affects 
the psyche of individuals.  
DFW also tries to highlight that the issue of boredom goes far beyond the personal 
realm. Because individuals try their hardest to avoid dullness, there is an opportunity for 
cunning politicians and corporate managers to get the public into not caring about issues 
which they should care about. In other words, dullness can be exploited as a very effective 
tool for governance. If questions of governance can only be made dull enough, citizens will 
be unwilling to engage with the issue:  
if sensitive issues of governance can be made sufficiently dull and arcane, there 
will be no need for officials to hide or dissemble, because no one not directly 
involved will pay enough attention to cause trouble. No one will pay attention 
because no one will be interested, because, more or less a priori, of these issues’ 
monumental dullness. …398 
 
DFW suggests that this issue of boredom is intrinsically related to the issue of personal 
responsibility in the United States. DFW notes a distinct tendency to engage less with 
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difficult questions in an intricate and complex world. Individuals only think of themselves as 
consumers – as suggested by economic theory. But individuals also have obligations in a 
democracy. They need to be willing to engage with big and difficult questions in order to 
elect the right officials to govern on their behalf. But this, DFW suggest, is no longer 
happening. Rather, individuals are abdicating their responsibility to decide on what kind of 
society they would like to live in to the government and increasingly also to corporations. 
There is something very interesting about civics and selfishness, and we get to 
ride the crest of it. Here in the US, we expect government and law to be our 
conscience. Our superego, you could say. It has something to with liberal 
individualism, and something to do with the capitalism, but I don’t understand 
much of the theoretical aspect – what I see is what I live in. Americans are in a 
way crazy. We infantilize ourselves. We don’t think of ourselves as citizens, -- 
parts of something larger to which we have profound responsibilities. We think 
of ourselves as citizens when it comes to our rights and privileges, but not our 
responsibilities. We abdicate our civic responsibility to the government and 
expect the government, in effect, to legislate morality. I am talking mostly 
about economics and business here, because that’s my area.399 
 
DFW suggests that this is a worrisome development. He warns that it is not possible to 
run a vibrant democracy in the image of a corporation. Profit making cannot be the only and 
final end of social interactions. He also warns that corporations and other influences are 
seducing individuals into thinking that this is indeed the right way to go about life. But if this 
trend continues, the character of the United States as an open democracy may, or already has, 
become a mere appearance: 
Citizens ate constitutionally empowered to choose to default and leave the 
decisions to corporations and to a government we expect to control them. 
Corporations are getting better and better at seducing us into thinking what they 
think – of profits as the telos and responsibility as something to be enshrined in 
symbol and evaded in reality. Cleverness as opposed to wisdom. Wanting and 
having instead of thinking and making….We’ll either wake up and take our 
freedom or we’ll fall apart utterly. Like Rome – conqueror of its own people.400 
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Conclusion 
I use this chapter to show how contemporary novels reflect, reproduce and question economic 
ideas. I want to highlight the sophisticated ways in which novels take up economic and social 
issues. I use both Jonathan Franzen’s Freedom and DFW’s The Pale King to highlight how 
individuals derive meaning for their life through economic activity and how both novels 
incorporate reflections on what it means to be a responsible individual in contemporary times. 
As such, the discussion is also a concrete example of what it takes to offer a serious case for 
the vision of homo communicandis. In the case of Freedom, I focus on how an author can use 
different characters and the interrelationships between those characters to question many of 
the underlying ideas which one finds in economics textbooks. In The Pale King, by contrast, I 
focus on how DFW describes the nature of work and how it affects individuals and society in 
general. What unites both works, however, is that they reject the notion of homo economicus. 
In fact, both novels are highly critical of the extent to which the image of homo economicus 
and Rorty’s objectivity have taken hold in American society. Instead, they offer a vision of 
subjectivity very much in line with the Smithian notion of sympathy which is also connected 
to the vision of homo communicandis which I try to advocate in this thesis. Both Franzen and 
DFW are interested in how to create solidarity amongst people without appeal to some kind 
of objective truths (in Rorty’s sense). In the next part of the dissertation, I am going to 
conclude the discussion by focusing on two select concepts and how they are implicated in 
the discussion of homo economicus vs homo communicandis. 
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In this final part of the dissertation, I would like to give special attention to two issues that 
have been touched upon throughout the thesis but that I have never been able to address in 
the appropriate detail. I have argued in part one of this dissertation that knowledge is not the 
result of accurate representation of reality but of becoming socialised into a particular 
epistemic community. I also argued that language plays a crucial part in such socialisation 
processes. In the second part, I examined two ways of being socialised into economic ideas: 
Economics textbooks and contemporary novels. However, until now I have mostly remained 
at a fairly general level of abstraction and I have not really tried to show just in what ways 
language is used to socialise economic ideas and with what consequences. I would like to 
rectify this issue in this part, the third and final part of this dissertation.   
In chapter six, I analyse one of the central economic concepts of our times: the 
concept of the market. I argue that the concept of the market is used in economics as a means 
to foster a particular idea of how economic and social interactions work, and also should 
work. As such, the concept of the market is the essential piece in the construction of the 
image of homo economicus. It teaches that markets are arenas of competition where products 
are bought and sold. As a result, markets are portrayed as if they were impersonal institutions 
who ran according to their own inalterable logic. However, the market also has a variety of 
different meanings in everyday language. I will appropriate a heuristic found in Jürgen 
Habermas’ Theory of Communicative Action to show that the concept of the market can be 
used to make three very different type of claims. By pretending as if the concept of the 
market only had one particular meaning, economic theory bewitches us into thinking of 
markets in a much more narrow way than we would otherwise. Habermas’ heuristic can be 
used to lift the bewitchment and thus allows for a recognition of the versatility of the concept 
of the market. By recognizing the versatility of the concept of the market, with its deeply 
contextual meanings, I once again want to draw attention to the image of homo 
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communicandis and how the conception of the market partakes in acts of communication and 
how communication can foster solidarity in the Rortian sense.  
 In chapter seven, I want to explore another way of thinking about the 
difference between the image of homo communicandis and homo economicus. I want to 
explore if there is an argument to be made about the fact that it is somehow problematic to be 
socialised in the image of homo economicus, even from the perspective from the individual 
concerned. I begin the chapter by reviewing some data which suggests that the US is 
experiencing something akin to a public health epidemic. I then hypothesise that the cause for 
this development may be the kind of socialisation that is taking place in the US – which is 
socialisation in the image of homo economicus. In order to make this claim, I appropriate 
Johan Galtung’s theory of violence as the difference between potential and actual to argue 
that socialisation processes are the chief way in which potential individualities become 
actualised. All socialisation is therefore violent but some processes are more violent than 
others. In fact, I would like to suggest that the socialisation of economic ideas through 
economics textbooks is more violent than through novels. 
I would like to conclude this dissertation with a discussion of some of the things I 
have learnt during the process of researching and writing. I also comment on some of the 
limitations of an autobiographical approach for the study of economic ideas and knowledge. I 
do so by revisiting some of the issues which Judith Butler raised in her Giving an account of 
oneself. I highlight how this dissertation has given me a much greater appreciation for my 
own contingency but how the autobiographic method is also dangerous if it slips into a self-
glorifying narcissism. The best cure against narcissism, however, is a continual emphasis of 
the relation of the self with others.  
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Chapter 6: 
Speaking about markets 
Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to examine one of the key concepts, maybe even the single most 
important concept, which is employed to foster and socialise the image of homo economicus: 
that of the market. My suggestion that the concept of the market is central to economics is not 
overly controversial. Even the suggestion that the concept of the market is problematic would 
be accepted by all but the most narrow-minded economic thinkers. In fact, scholars have used 
a wide variety of perspectives to argue for the centrality of the concept of the market and its 
inadequacies. What all of these accounts have in common, however, is that they employ the 
strategy of claiming that the problem with the definition of markets is that it does not 
adequately capture the reality of markets. In other words, economics defines markets one way 
but in reality they are something different. Therefore, a revised account is needed that is 
somehow closer to reality. Whilst this type of intervention has its place, a more fundamental 
problem thus far has not received attention: that in defining markets to be a certain way, 
economics also socialises individuals into looking at the world in a particular way. In other 
words, economics does not just describe the world but it also informs as to what the world 
should be seen as. Economics therefore also fosters the image of homo economicus. My hope 
in writing this dissertation is to show that we can practice economics and also foster the idea 
of homo communicandis. In fact, there is a notable disjuncture between sophisticated account 
of markets found in critical academic journals and the simplistic ways of teaching them in 
economics textbooks and the public sphere.  
 Consequently, this chapter proceeds in three sections. In the first section, I use the 
example of Gregory Mankiw’s Principles to show how readers of his book are socialised into 
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thinking of markets as arenas of competition. This conceptualization has wide-ranging 
consequences for how society and politics are envisioned. In the second section, I review 
some select contributions which have called attention to the ways in which this kind view of 
perceiving markets is inadequate. In the third section, I provide a different way of framing the 
problem with the way markets are introduced in economics, namely that individuals are 
socialised into thinking of the market in one way. They get seduced into thinking of this way 
as the only possible way when in fact they also use the concept of the market in everyday 
speech in completely different ways. In order to highlight the variety of ways in which the 
concept of the market can be used, I appropriate a heuristic found in Habermas’ Theory of 
Communicative Action. I attempt to show that no single conceptualization of the market can 
account for the various conversational contexts in which it is used. What is therefore needed 
is a conceptual framework that allows us to envision the concept of the market in a variety of 
ways. The most promising framework for doing so it to regard the concept of the market as 
operating in three distinct spheres: An objective sphere, a social sphere, and a subjective 
sphere. The kind of justification, and thus also the kind of legitimization, that can be expected 
in each sphere is markedly different. Understanding the different ways the concept of the 
market is actually used can be a first step to prevent the narrow definition of markets in 
economics from bewitching the mind. 
 
Markets as arenas of competition 
To begin the discussion, it may be worthwhile to return to the example of Gregory Mankiw’s 
Principles of Economics which was already the subject of discussion in chapters three and 
five. I want to highlight that the concept of the market does not only function descriptively, 
i.e. solely to describe reality. Rather, the concept of the market, like other concepts, partly 
constitute reality – they are a lens through which reality becomes understandable. The market 
is a crucial concept for how economic and social processes are made understandable and I 
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use the following section to show how Mankiw’s constructs a particular understanding of the 
world through the way in which he defines the concept of the market. 
Mankiw introduces the notion of markets as “a group of buyers and sellers of a 
particular good or service. The buyers as a group determine the demand for the product, and 
the sellers as a group determine the supply of the product.”401 Mankiw acknowledges that 
different groups of buyers and sellers can operate according to different organizational 
principles but that the outcomes of all organizational structures are always determined by 
demand and supply.  
Markets take many forms. Some markets are highly organised, such as the 
markets for many agricultural commodities. In these markets, buyers and sellers 
meet at a specific time and place, where an auctioneer helps set prices and 
arrange sales. More often, markets are less organised….. consider the market for 
ice cream in a particular town….. the group of ice-cream buyers and ice-cream 
sellers forms a market.
402
 
 
The idea is that since buyers want to pay as little as possible and sellers want to charge as 
much as possible, it is the existence of a price that ultimately structures market interaction. In 
this way, the operation of the price mechanism appears to ensure three levels of competition. 
First, there is competition within the group of buyers to receive the best possible deal because 
the buyer who pays the least to a seller will have an advantage over other buyers. Second, 
there is competition amongst the group of sellers for the best possible deal because the seller 
who receives the most will have an advantage over other sellers. And third, there is 
competition amongst each pair of buyers and sellers to compensate as little and receive as 
much as possible.  
 In framing the issue this way, Mankiw is able to bypass many considerations that also 
have a bearing on the issue of how markets become constituted. For starters, how is it 
possible that there are already groups of buyers and sellers in the first place? Nobody is born 
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to sell a particular product and nobody is born to buy it either. Rather, we become buyers and 
sellers of products and services through multiple processes of socialisation that teaches us 
what can be bought and sold and how. It is obviously true that the conception of markets as 
arena of competitions was not invented by Mankiw. In fact, one could go back to Adam 
Smith, or even further, and find similar descriptions of the marketplace as a physical place of 
exchange where buyers and sellers compete for wares. What differentiates Mankiw’s 
conception of the market from conceptions in earlier political economy is that market activity 
is no longer seen as embedded within a broader culture and sociality.
403
 In Smith, we find a 
vision of homo communicandis, who as part of communicating and participating in a 
community, also receives and acts upon price signals. Communication, for Smith, is a 
necessary precondition for the pricing system. Mankiw essentially reverses this situation. 
Price signals are now seen as a precondition for communication. It may only be a small 
exaggeration to claim that in Mankiw’s world, the disappearance of prices would also mean 
that humans have no longer any basis or reason for interacting. This assessment is also shared 
by William Davies who writes that “price provides a logical and phenomenological ideal of 
how human relations can be mediated without the need for rhetorical, ritualized or 
deliberately performative modes of communication. Indeed, price may even suggest that 
peaceful human interaction is feasible without speech at all.”404 For homo economicus, price 
signals matter because they are ultimately what humans care about so as to maximize their 
utility. No considerations of a broader culture or sociality have any relevance. 
 Mankiw attempts to support this vision of homo economicus by asking students to 
think of markets only in terms of commercial exchange where there are buyers and sellers. 
But markets exist wherever there is exchange amongst humans. Commercial exchange is but 
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a small sub-section of the exchange we undertake. We exchange goods, but we also exchange 
opinions, favors, and glances and I think it is no coincidence that we use the same word to 
describe each of these connections. Even economists who try to be more reflective about the 
nature of markets, like Israel Kirzner, fundamentally fall into the trap for regarding all 
markets as commercial exchange. Kirzner writes for example: 
Society consists of individual human beings. Each human being is eager to act 
to improve his position, whenever this appears possible. In order to satisfy his 
desires, a man may act on his own (as, for example, when he paints his house by 
himself), or he may fulfill his ends indirectly through exchange (as when he 
pays another man to do the painting).
405
 
 
We can see here that Kirzner starts on the right track. The whole reason why we have markets 
is because we are social beings. Society comes first, not the individual. But this also means 
that there can be no useful distinction between fulfilling desires directly or indirectly. How do 
you directly fulfill your desire for conversation without involving another person? So in 
framing markets as commercial exchange, Mankiw seduces us into looking at the world as if 
there were no types of exchange other than commercial exchange. Given the definition, it 
becomes easy to forget that there exists a much broader conception of market activity which 
we can also appeal to.
406
 
 Mankiw subsequently expands on this conception of markets to argue that the prices 
of commercial markets also determine resource allocation. In other words, given this concept 
of the market, he is trying to get his readers to regard transactions as somehow resulting in a 
natural allocation of resources. Since, for Mankiw, all exchange happens on the basis of 
prices, it makes sense for him to assert that “supply and demand determine prices in a market 
economy and….prices, in turn, allocate the economy’s scarce resources.”407 He uses his 
conception of markets as a foundation to make it appear as if prices somehow automatically 
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allocate resources. But they clearly do not. Supply and demand determine prices but the 
allocation of our resources is not determined by price. Humans determine the allocation of 
our resources, given prices. The question of how we allocate our resources is a statement that 
that does not concern commercial exchange but how we want to structure this exchange 
instead. And in framing the concept of markets in the way Mankiw does, it can easily seem as 
if there is actually nothing to structure. We can just leave all transactions to themselves and 
somehow a socially optimal allocation of resources will result.  
Mankiw himself offers a number of examples to supposedly illustrate this point. He 
asks us to think of the following:   
When a cold snap hits Florida, the price of orange juice rises in supermarkets 
throughout the country.  
When the weather turns warm in New England every summer, the price of hotel 
rooms in the Caribbean plummets. 
When a war breaks out in the Middle East, the price of gasoline in the United 
States rises….408 
 
Mankiw’s suggestion certainly seems plausible enough but he is curiously silent on the 
question of allocation of resources. In framing his conception of markets as commercial 
exchange, Mankiw implicitly is trying to argue that the ability to pay is the only relevant 
criterion why anybody should have access to a resource. It is one thing to note that the price 
of orange juice gas done up, and quite a different matter to decide who gets to have access to 
this orange juice. Price can never be a justification for how a resource is to be allocated – 
which is what Mankiw wants us to believe. Consider the following counter-example:  
(1) When you ask me why orange juice costs $10 a liter, I can justify the price by 
pointing out that there was a cold snap and so there is only very little juice which makes it 
more expensive. 
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(2) If you can no longer afford to buy any orange juice at that price but I still can,  and 
you ask me to justify why it is that I still get to drink orange juice and you do not, I cannot 
justify myself by saying there was a cold snap.  
(3) You would right point out that the cold snap has nothing to do with you not getting 
any orange juice. After all there is still orange juice and I am getting it. So why don’t I share 
my orange juice with you? 
(4) I would then have to explain that I ought to have all the orange juice because I alone 
can pay for it. And the ability to pay entitles me to the orange juice (a moral principle). 
In framing the concept of the market thus, Mankiw is trying to get us to believe that the 
ability to pay is the only appropriate consideration in all transactions.  It is for this reason that 
Mankiw believes and wants us to believe that “the forces of supply and demand allocate 
resources efficiently. That is, even though each buyer and seller in a market is concerned only 
about his or her own welfare, they are together led by an invisible hand to an equilibrium that 
maximizes the total benefits to buyers and sellers.”409 But this statement only makes sense if 
you accept that the ability to pay ought to be the only determinant of the potential life which 
somebody gets to enjoy. This principle cannot be given by nature but needs to be accepted by 
the member of the community as valid. It is a norm. The point is not that this needs to be an 
intrinsically bad arrangement but that it needs to be recognised that there are arguments for 
and against such a norm. So when commentators present efficiency as a fact about the world, 
they try to immunize their view of the world from criticism. They try to make it appear as it is 
somehow natural and the only correct way of looking at the world. They are constructing a 
vision of what the world ought to be like. This particular construction should be resisted. For 
if it is not, the ability to pay may over time become the overarching moral principle of our 
society. And I think it is not a particularly good principle for our society.  
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Mankiw provides a further elaboration of the ability to pay principle in an article 
written in defense of the 1%. Mankiw advocates a philosophical position which he calls ‘just 
deserts theory’ based on the principle that “people should get what they deserve. A person 
who contributes more to society deserves a higher income that reflects those greater 
contributions.”410 Based on this theory, Mankiw sees the problem of inequality as the 
problem of “the extent to which the high incomes of the top 1 percent reflect high 
productivity rather than some market imperfection.”411 After providing no support for this 
assertion whatsoever, Mankiw concludes that “my own reading of the evidence is that most 
of the very wealthy get that way by making substantial economic contributions, not by 
gaming the system or taking advantage of some market failure or the political process.”412 
Mankiw is only able to come to this conclusion because he has already decided that the 
only kind of contribution to society is high income. But there is nothing natural about valuing 
high earnings above all other traits or abilities: as a society, we could value artistic talent, 
ascetic talent, or modesty as the most important contribution to society. There is nothing 
natural about seeing earnings as the only contribution to society. It is just another permutation 
of the ability-to-pay principle. Mankiw also completely disregards that particular social 
norms enable and legitimise particular individuals to make a high income on the basis of 
exploitation. No gaming of the system or market failure is necessary. Take plantation owners 
in the Southern United States before the Civil War. They had a very efficient system of 
planting, harvesting, and selling cotton. And so according to Mankiw, the high income of a 
plantation owner would have to count as justified. But this high income was only possible 
because of a social system which enabled the ownership of slaves. But there is nothing 
natural, inevitable (or desirable in my opinion) about the social norm of slavery. As a result, 
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the theory of just deserts, as the ability to pay principle, is always necessarily an excuse for 
whatever the status quo happens to be. 
 Mankiw himself provides another immensely misguided discussion of this point. He 
takes up the idea of a market for organs. He notes that “our society makes it illegal for people 
to sell their organs. In essence, in the market for organs, the government has imposed a price 
ceiling of zero. The result, as with any binding price ceiling, is a shortage of the good.”413 In 
other words, here we have a market where the ability to pay does not trump other norms. So 
far, we have decided that ability to pay is irrelevant to whether you get access to fresh organs. 
We judge actual human flesh to fall outside possible considerations of commercial 
transactions, no matter what demand and supply happen to be. So do most economists want 
to realise that there are indeed other moral considerations except the ability to pay? Judging 
from Mankiw’s rhetorical answer, I think not. He writes: 
Many economists believe that there would be large benefits to allowing a free 
market in organs…. Such a market would lead to an efficient allocation of 
resources, but critics of this plan worry about fairness. A market for organs, they 
argue, would benefit the rich at the expense of the poor because organs would 
then be allocated to those most willing and able to pay. But you can also question 
the fairness of the current system. Now, most of us walk around with an extra 
organ that we don’t really need, while some of our fellow citizens are dying to get 
one. Is that fair?
414
 
 
We can see clearly here how Mankiw argues that only a state of affairs where organs can be 
exchanged on the basis of price could be efficient. All other arrangements are deemed 
inefficient, and thus inferior. So in Mankiw’s opinion, the current system which seems to be 
based on fairness (nobody is forced to sell organs for cash) is not really fair since there are 
those who would be able to pay a lot of money but are not getting any organs. The point is 
that both ways could be valid ways of organizing a society. But in presenting the discussion 
in the way he does, Mankiw is trying to get students to look at the world like him.  
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 As the above example demonstrates, Mankiw realises that commercial transactions 
can also be subject to societal regulations which he subsequently summarises under the 
concept of the state. Mankiw writes that the “economy is governed by two kinds of laws: the 
laws of supply and demand and the laws enacted by governments.”415 But he then goes on to 
say that the laws of government are also determined by demand and supply. He writes that 
“the basic lessons of this chapter will not change: When analyzing government policies, 
supply and demand are the first and most useful tools of analysis.”416 This seems perplexing. 
How can supply and demand have anything to say about government policies? They say 
something about the price of a particular product but nothing about how we ought to live our 
life. What we see here again, as we saw on the previous example, is that Mankiw takes the 
ability to pay as the only and overarching norm of all societies. We can see this idea come out 
even more clearly in Mankiw’s discussion of taxation. There, he writes: 
Here we have seen that when the government imposes taxes on buyers or sellers 
of a good, society loses some of the benefits of market efficiency. Taxes are 
costly to market participants not only because taxes transfer resources from those 
participants to the government but also because they alter incentives and distort 
market outcomes. 
417
 
 
Mankiw implicitly assumes that the ability to pay is the most important societal 
consideration, hence why he calls a tax a loss to society. It is only because Mankiw already 
has taken this idea for granted, and because he wants the reader to take it for granted as well, 
that he believes governments should only think about how their policies will affect demand 
and supply.  
I hope to have given some insight with this discussion how Mankiw manages to use 
the concept of the market to try to get readers to look at the world in a particular way. In 
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Mankiw’s world, the ability to pay is the only relevant criterion for all interaction. Any 
regulation that restricts the ability of those with money to buy the goods and services they 
want at the lowest possible price will therefore be deemed inappropriate. But the point is that 
we do not need to subscribe to this worldview. And one way to realise that we do not need to 
subscribe to it is to call into question the definition of the market and the supposed 
consequences Mankiw has drawn from his definition. In the following section, I review some 
contributions that have already provided such an analysis. In the third section, I then offer a 
different way of conceptualizing the market – one that emphasises the constructive role of 
language and the concept of the market.  
 
Criticisms of the simple concept of the market 
Ha-Joon Chang has argued for a framework he calls institutionalist political economy. He 
argues that “in the neo-liberal discourse, the market is seen as a ‘natural’ economic 
phenomenon that grows spontaneously out of the universal human nature of exploit gains 
from trading.”418 For Chang, we have to focus on different institutions in order to understand 
how markets work. This focus should consist of three dimensions: 
all markets are based on institutions that regulate who can participate…Second, 
there are institutions which determine the legitimate objects of market exchange 
(and, by implication, ownership)….Third, even when the legitimate participants in 
and the legitimate objects of exchange have been stipulated, we need institutions 
that define what exactly each agents rights and obligations are in which 
areas….Finally, there are numerous institutions that regulate the process of 
exchange itself.
419
 
 
Aleksandr Buzgalin and Andrey Kolganov have similarly argued that “most theoretical 
economists in their everyday work reduce the economy as a whole to the market. This goes 
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unnoticed and at the same time is not questioned.”420 The problem is that “the market-centric 
model of economic theory cannot provide the answers to fundamental questions of modern 
economy.”421 In order to avoid this shortcoming, they argue for “a critical redefinition both of 
classical political economy and of the Marxist approach”422 which they term Post-Soviet 
School of Critical Marxism. 
 William Jackson also finds the concept of the market highly problematic. Jackson 
highlights how economics lacks any appreciation of how markets actually become constituted 
in reality and that markets are always guided by underlying social structures: 
Markets have always been central to economics, yet they remain strangely ill-
defined and amorphous. Economic theory often conflates them with other 
activities and says little about how they are constituted of whether they have an 
underlying social structure. People are assumed to act naturally as competitive 
sellers and buyers without pre-existing structures or institutions; a market then 
reflects spontaneous individual behavior rather than structured social 
relationships.
423
  
 
Jackson suggests the need for a layered theory that reflects different personal and social 
relations of individuals. He states: “In a layered theory, markets consist of social structures 
among buyers and sellers, together with the trading behavior of individual agents. Trading 
takes personal or anonymous form, and agents may feel constrained by market roles and 
activities or enables by them.”424 
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 Matthew Watson’s central problem, by comparison, is that “the market is treated as an 
actor within its own environment.”425 As a result of framing the concept of the market in this 
way, commentators loose  
any sense of conscious human agents seeking to impose a particular type of 
market relations, which produce the effects that are then misattributed to the 
market itself….If it is simply ‘the market’ that creates these effects there are no 
conscious human agents to hold to account….it is impossible to identify those 
who are to blame for the effects that the process enacts.
426
 
 
 For Watson, “however enticing [it] may be as an analytical shortcut, no real analytical 
meaning can be derived from treating ‘the market’ as a willful political actor in its own 
right.”427 
 All of these criticisms rightly point out that the concept of the market as presented in 
economics misdescribes reality in certain ways. And I think it is important to call attention to 
this fact. Another point, however, has not received nearly as much attention, namely that the 
concept of the market also constitutes how we see reality. Siobhan Austen and Therese 
Jefferson have recently tried to make this point based on a case study of Australia’s equal 
remuneration hearings. However, rather than focusing on the concept of the market 
specifically, they have tried to analyse economic theory in its totality. They have tried to do 
so using the umbrella term ideology to capture the various ways in which economic theory 
influences speech and thought. They follow Tony Lawson who distinguishes two types of 
ideology: 
1) Ideology1: a relatively unchallenged set of (possibly distorted or misleading) 
background ideas that every society or community possesses which forms the 
basis of, or significantly informs, general opinion or ‘common sense’, a basis that 
remains somewhat invisible to most of its members, appearing as ‘neutral’, resting 
on preconceptions that are largely unexamined. A consequence is that viewpoints 
significantly out of line with these background beliefs are intuitively seen as 
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radical, nonsensical or extreme no matter what may be the actual content of their 
vision. 
2) Ideology2: a set of ideas designed, or anyway intentionally employed, in order 
to justify, preserve or reinforce some existing state of affairs, where this state of 
affairs is preferred, perhaps because it facilitates or legitimates various advantages 
for some dominant or privileged group, and where these ideas mostly work in the 
manner described by way of intentionally masking or misrepresenting the nature 
of reality.
428
   
 
Austen and Jefferson argue that Australia’s equal remuneration hearings [FWA] helped to 
reveal the ideological underpinnings of economics.
429
 In reviewing the type of debates 
between different economists, Austen and Jefferson allow a first glimpse about how 
economic theory does not just describe reality but how reality is approached. Austen and 
Jefferson describe how Austen had to defend her position against another economist, 
Deborah Cobb Clarke. In her attack, Cobb Clarke argues: 
Based upon a review of the Associate Professor’s [Austen’s] curriculum vitae 
I note that she is amongst other things an Associate Professor in the Department 
of Economics and Finance at Curtin University of Technology. As an economist 
the notion of ‘undervaluation’ has a particular meaning which requires 
comparison of ‘like with like’. . . . From an economist’s perspective, the 
information which is contained within Article 1 [by Cobb-Clark and Tan] is not 
detailed enough to draw conclusions in relation to whether undervaluation is 
present or whether the differences in wages are due to market conditions. . . . 
From an economist’s perspective wages should be equal to the value of what you 
are producing [at the margin].
430
 
 
This example vividly demonstrates how economic theory also involves a way of viewing the 
world. And this way of looking at the world is learnt by anybody who successfully learns and 
internalises economic theory. Cobb Clarke appeals to this way of viewing the world and 
cannot accept that anybody, least of all an economist, could dare to look at the world in a 
different way. In this vein, Cobb Clarke  
claimed several times the institutional approach was ‘not sensible’; and that the 
only way to understand wage outcomes is in terms of the individual characteristics 
                                                          
428
 Lawson, Tony, “Mathematical Modelling and Ideology in the Economics Academy: competing explanations 
of the failings of the modern discipline?”, Economic Thought, 1, 2012, p.5.  
429
 Austen, Siobhan and Therese Jefferson, “Economic analysis, ideology, and the public sphere: insights from 
Australia’s equal remuneration hearings, Cambridge Journal of Economics, 39, 2015. 
430
 Austen, Siobhan and Therese Jefferson, “Economic analysis, ideology, and the public sphere: insights from 
Australia’s equal remuneration hearings, Cambridge Journal of Economics, 39, 2015, p.413. 
237 
 
of workers, their jobs and what they produce. She expressed surprise that an 
economist could view the issues in any other way, and she sought to call into 
question the expertise of any economist who did not subscribe to the same 
worldview.
431
 
 
Even though no obvious reference to the market is made, I think it does not go too far to 
suggest that Cobb Clarke uses the conception of the market as presented by Mankiw. And 
clearly this conception of the market bears upon how reality is understood. But as Austen and 
Jefferson highlight, economic theory also constitutes how we look at the world.  
 Without explicitly making this link, Austen and Jefferson effectively reiterative what 
has become known as performativity.
 432
 The term performativity is employed in a number of 
different ways by different scholars but a good starting point is Donald MacKenzie who 
writes that the “academic discipline of economics does not always stand outside the 
economy, analyzing it as an external thing; sometimes it is an intrinsic part of economic 
processes. Let us call the claim that economics plays the latter role the performativity of 
economics.”433 MacKenzie goes on to distinguish between four levels of performativity – 
generic, effective, Barnesian, and counter-performativity. By generic performativity, 
MacKenzie means that “an aspect of economics (a theory, model, concept, procedure, data 
set, etc.) is used by participants in economic processes, regulators, etc.”434 Effective 
performativity means that “the practical use of an aspect of economics has an effect on 
economic processes”435 and Barnesian performativity means that the “practical use of an 
aspect of economics makes economic processes more like their depiction by economics.”436 
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Counter-performativity means that the “practical use of an aspect of economics makes 
economic processes less like their depiction by economics.”437 Put into the language of 
performativity, Austen and Jefferson argue that the discipline of economics has a 
performative role at least in the effective sense in the FWA hearings in Australia.  
 Michel Callon prefers to use the term performation to describe how economics plays a 
role in bringing about a particular picture of how market interaction becomes constituted. His 
image of performation is performativity of the generic or effective kind. He highlights that 
economics as a discipline plays a role in how the functioning of markets is envisioned:   
By ridding ourselves of the cumbersome distinction between economics (as a 
discipline) and the economy (as a thing) and showing the role of the former in the 
formatting of markets, we find ourselves free from a positivist or, worse still, a 
constructivist conception of law. Market laws are neither in the nature of humans 
and societies-waiting for the scientist, like a prince charming, to wake and reveal 
them-nor are they constructions or artefacts invented by social sciences in an 
effort to improvise simple frameworks for explaining an opaque and complex 
reality.
438
 
 
Callon highlights that if one gets rid of this separation between economics and the economy, 
the concept of the market takes on a different form. Rather than being seen as an embodiment 
of some kind of transcendental logic, the performative perspective highlights that the 
conceptualization itself partakes in the variety of practices that constitute market interactions: 
As Callon states: “The market is no longer that cold, implacable and impersonal monster 
which imposes its laws and procedures while extending them ever further. It is a many-sided, 
diversified, evolving device which the social sciences as well as the actors themselves 
contribute to reconfigure.”439 Callon urges sociology not to complicate the vision of homo 
economicus but to abandon it all together: “What we expect from sociology is not a more 
complex homo economicus but the comprehension of his simplicity and poverty.”440 Given 
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the emphasis on a vision towards homo communicandis in this dissertation, I can only 
wholeheartedly agree with Callon’s assessment. However, one of the problem’s with Callon’s 
and MacKenzie’s approach to performativity is that one still gets the impression as if there is 
a way to directly approach empirical reality. In other words, empirical reality was seen as one 
way, then economic enters the scene, and empirical reality changes. As good as Callon’s and 
MacKenzie’s work undoubtedly is, they underappreciate the ways in which concepts 
contribute the constitution of empirical reality in the first place. 
Judith Butler’s account of performativity does not lack this shortcoming. Butler 
highlights that by reemphasizing the idea of markets as autonomous processes in different 
settings, it is economic theory which brings about the idea of the market economy. Butler 
calls this the ‘market presumption’:  
economic theory contributes to the making of the sphere of economics and, in 
particular, economic theory can be understood as one of the processes that 
performatively bring about the market, or what we might call ‘the market 
presumption’. In the place of a methodological assumption of something called 
‘the market economy’ we have a set of processes that work to fortify that very 
assumption, but also to call into question its pre-given ontological status as well as 
the supposition that it operates by causal necessity.
441
 
 
In other words, Butler highlights how it is “a series of discursive and non-discursive practices 
and institutions [that] re-constitute the idea of the market as an existing and autonomous 
reality.”442 By constituting the idea of the market as an autonomous reality, economics also 
invites us to look at the world in this way and to behave as if markets really were 
autonomous. The consequence is that society becomes more like it is envisioned in 
economics. In the next chapter, I will suggest that a further consequence of this view of 
markets may be that it contributes to the mental health epidemic in the US. 
Performativity, as developed by Butler, is another way of phrasing and framing the 
central concerns and issues of this dissertation. It highlights how language contributes to the 
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constitution of reality which means that one of the central propositions of positivism must be 
misleading. We can thus study our vocabularies to explore just what kind of realities these 
vocabularies bring about. As Butler writes: 
Performativity seeks to counter a certain kind of positivism according to which we 
might begin with already delimited understandings of what gender, the state, and 
the economy are. Secondly, performativity works, when it works, to counter a 
certain metaphysical presumption about culturally constructed categories and to 
draw our attention to the diverse mechanisms of that construction. Thirdly, 
performativity starts to describe a set of processes that produce ontological 
effects, that is, that work to bring into being certain kinds of realities or, fourthly, 
that lead to certain kinds of socially binding consequences.
443
 
 
I would like to use the next section to highlight in just how many ways the concept of the 
market contributes to the way we think and talk about economic and social processes.  
 
Distinguishing claims about markets into three spheres 
Having reviewed a number of different criticisms about how markets are portrayed in 
economics, I would now like to add my voice to this debate. Even though I share the ethos of 
the commentators reviewed in the last section, I think it is also necessary to approach the 
issue from a different angle. The commentators reviewed in the last section (with the 
exception of Butler) follow a strategy of pointing out that the conception of markets in 
economics does not capture how markets operate in reality. My strategy, by contrast, is to 
look at how the concept of the market as it is used in everyday speech in order to see how the 
concept is actually used. I highlight that the concept of the market can be used in a number of 
very different ways. One of the problems with insisting on a single definition of the market is 
that it seduces us into thinking of the market only in those terms – when we are in fact also 
using the concept quite differently. I think it can be of great help to keep in mind the variety 
of meanings attached to the concept of the market. It helps each person who uses the concept 
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to get a closer understanding of their own presuppositions but it can also be of help when 
trying to understand how other commentators might arrive at opposing arguments.  
I attempt to show that no single definition of the market can account for the various 
meanings it takes in conversational contexts. However, I think it is possible to differentiate 
three very different types of claims in which the concept of the market is employed. This 
heuristic was first suggested by Karl Popper in “Epistemology without a Knowing Subject” 
where Popper differentiates between three worlds of knowledge: 
We may distinguish the following three worlds or universes: first the world of 
physical objects or physical states ; secondly, the world of states of 
consciousness, or of mental states, or perhaps of behavioural dispositions to 
act; and thirdly, the world of objective contents of thought, especially of 
scientific and poetic thoughts and of works of art.
444
 
 
This idea was subsequently adopted by a number of scholars, most notably Ian Jarvie and 
Jürgen Habermas.
445
 For my purposes, the work of Jürgen Habermas, especially in his Theory 
of Communicative Action, is the most useful starting point and I closely follow his 
characterization. I highlight that the concept of the market is employed within each of the 
three worlds. The kind of justification, and thus also the kind of legitimization, that can be 
expected in each sphere is markedly different. Failing to understand these distinctions and the 
different ways of justification that go hand in hand with them is probably one of the chief 
reasons why different commentators often talk past one another when discussing the concept 
of the market.   
However, I should caution at the outset that I appropriate this distinction in ways that 
are quite foreign (even opposed to) to the way Habermas envisions. As I make no intention of 
providing any sort of commentary on Habermas’ work except for my own purposes, I shall 
keep this comment brief. But I want to prevent any confusion that although I freely use his 
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work, I do not share the ultimate goal which Habermas tries to accomplish.
446
 I agree with 
Habermas’ attempts to work out the conditions of possibility of coming to an agreement and 
thereby showing what needs to be entailed for us to justify and accept a statement in different 
circumstances. I disagree with Habermas that it makes sense regard these rules of justification 
as providing an ultimate foundation on which the entire edifice of reason can be constructed. 
Habermas posits that “the rationality inherent in this [communicative] practice is seen in the 
fact that a communicatively achieved agreement must be based in the end on reasons”. But 
how could this be? Wittgenstein always cautions that “Explanations come to an end 
somewhere”447 Any rule or justification we give, always presupposes a way of life: “What 
people accept as a justification is shown by how they think and live”448 Wittgenstein asks 
further, “How am I able to obey a rule? – if this is not a question about causes, then it is about 
the justification for my following the rule in the way I do. If I have exhausted the 
justifications, I have reached bedrock and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: This 
is simply what I do.”449 Wittgenstein tries to show the absurdity of desperately trying to find 
a concept that could ground all others: “So in the end when one is doing philosophy one gets 
to the point where one would like to just emit an inarticulate sound. – But such a sounds is an 
expression only as it occurs in a particular language game, which should now be 
described.”450 Tully puts this point wonderfully when he writes: 
Activities (language games) of justification, of giving reasons, are themselves 
grounded in customary or conventional uses of words; in what is not called into 
question in the course of our activity of asking and answering question, of 
offering, rejecting, and accepting reasons. A critical activity that frees us from 
customary usage itself rest on other customary usages and cannot justify these in 
turn, on pain of infinite regress.
451
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Bearing in mind the fact that all theories of justification are themselves customary, we 
can nevertheless use the three world distinction as elaborated by Habermas’ to shed light on 
how the concept of the market is used in each world of knowledge. Compare the following 
statements: 
1. Strawberries are more expensive than raspberries at the local market. 
2. The job market for teachers is not very good at the moment. 
3. The new Ferrari is the most beautiful car in the market.  
I hope to show that even though all three statements use the term ‘market’, we should not be 
lead astray to conclude that the term has the same meaning in each instance or that the same 
rules guide each application. In fact, I hope to demonstrate that the term has a very different 
kind of meaning in each instance. Each of these instances concerns a different world, namely 
the objective world, the social world; the subjective world.
452
  
Each world possesses a different requirement for believing a given assertion to be 
justified. In the case of the objective world, it makes sense for us to inquire as to the objective 
truth of a proposition. The question whether a strawberries are more expensive than 
raspberries at the market does have an objectively true answer. We are able to point to the 
world as we find it to provide this answer. In the case of the subjective sphere, no claim can 
be evaluated according to such a standard. The assertion “I believe a Ferrari is the most 
beautiful car” cannot be evaluated with reference to an objective world. There can be no 
grounds for disagreement about what I feel. The case of the social world is the most 
interesting because here claims are justified with reference to norms. The claim the ‘job 
market for teachers is not very good’ can only be justified by making reference to other 
norms which an interlocutor either shares or does not share.  
This has two crucial ramifications: First, as far as the social sphere is concerned, the 
concept of the market is inherently connected with a larger theory of morality and ethics. By 
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highlighting the connection between the concept of the market and questions of morality, I 
also highlight that the narrow conception of markets as arenas of competition blinds us to 
these ethical connections. If the ethical connection is taken seriously, the image of homo 
economicus becomes difficult to maintain. Highlighting the connection is thus another way of 
emphasizing the image of homo communicandis.    
Second, genuine disagreement about markets is not only possible but inevitable: 
Disagreement about markets are disagreements about what kind of life is worth living. So the 
aim of our conversations should not be to attempt to find an all-encompassing definition of 
markets. Rather, we should become cognizant of the varying moral standard each of us 
employs when making claims about markets. The fact that moral standards differ is another 
way to underline the image of homo communicandis. Only by engaging in genuine 
communication and conversation with others can we come to appreciate those differences. I 
now turn to a more in depth exploration of each of the three spheres. 
 
Objective World 
Wittgenstein states “the world is all that is the case.”453 How we approach this world is a 
different, highly complicated matter. But it should not detract from the realization that we 
undeniably share the same world, being endowed with very nearly identical biological 
qualities. This sharing of the same life space and our biological similarity provides a number 
of regularities which we can all relate to.
454
 We all experience the regular rhythm of day and 
night; every one of us has to innate ability to learn a language; we know what it means to be 
cold and hot; we know the sensation of hunger and thirst; we have all once been young and 
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will all die one day. In short, there really is a lot we have in common with the rest of 
humanity.
455
 
Michael Pollner coined the term “mundane reasoning” to describe this ability to relate 
to each other’s life experience. Pollner emphasises that it is because we inhabit a commonly 
shared world with being who are similar to us that communication becomes possible:   
The assumption of a commonly shared world does not function for mundane 
reasoners as a descriptive assertion. It is not falsifiable. Rather, it functions as 
an incorrigible specification of the relations which exist in principle among a 
community of perceivers' experiences of what is purported to be the same 
world…. In very gross terms, the anticipated unanimity of experience (or, at 
least of accounts of those experiences) presupposes a community of others who 
are deemed to be observing the same world, who are physically constituted so 
as to be capable of veridical experience, who are motivated so as to speak 
‘truthfully’ of their experience, and who speak according to recognizable, 
shared schemes of expression.
456
 
 
Because of this shared world, we can communicate in some respects with an objective basis. 
This is because for the purpose of talking about the objective world, we are able to invoke a 
concrete set of standards which we consider the right and relevant standards under 
consideration. As a result, the usual response to a disagreement amongst two interlocutors is 
not that the world is somehow variable but that one of the interlocutors has got it wrong. 
Pollner explains: 
That a community orients itself to the world as essentially constant , as 
one which is known and knowable in common with others, provides that 
community with the warrantable grounds for asking questions of a 
particular sort of which the prototypical representative is: How come, he 
sees it and you do not?
457
 
 
When the language game under consideration is concerned with the objective sphere, 
we are generally interested in how far our pictures correspond to reality, thereby evaluating 
                                                          
455
 I do not want to forget here that even though we all share some of the same capabilities, the ability to enjoy 
those capabilities is currently hugely unequal. There are millions of people around the world who sadly will 
never know the sensation of fullness. 
456
 Pollner, Melvin, Mundane Reason: Reality in Everyday and Sociological Discourse, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010, pp.47-8. 
457
 Pollner, Melvin, Mundane Reason: Reality in Everyday and Sociological Discourse, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010, p.40. 
246 
 
statements according to propositional truth. The reason why we can do this is that within 
these particular language games, our concepts are taken to have a fixed identity.
458
 
Sometimes these concepts are called natural kinds. For some of our concepts and as long as 
they are part of certain games, we have laid down criteria for unequivocally identifying them. 
There is a process of matching the criteria with the appearance of the entity. If I have learnt 
that carnivorous animals with a mane are called lions, I can justify calling something a lion 
by pointing to its mane and carnivorous nature. Of course, somebody else’ criteria for 
identifying a lion may be different, say that it lives in a pride and has brown/orange fur but. If 
our criteria momentarily give opposing answers whether an entity is a lion, there is a way to 
identify whose criteria are correct. In the case of a lion, this could be a DNA test. Ronald 
Dworkin explains this as follows: 
It seems settled now— no other assumption makes sense of our practices— that 
animal and mineral species are fixed by the most basic biological or chemical 
properties of these natural kinds: the animal’s DNA and the metal’s molecular 
structure. If I insist that some animal before us is a small lion rather than a very 
large pussy cat, even after I had grasped genetics and learned that the beast had 
the DNA of a cat, this would show either that I had misunderstood what a lion is 
or that you and I appeal to different concepts when we speak of a “lion”.459 
 
The decision procedure for natural kinds within games that concern the objective 
sphere is of paramount importance. There can be no genuine disagreement about what a lion 
is. Once we agree on the facts under consideration, there can be no uncertain or indeterminate 
conclusion. This is important because when people disagree in a conversation about whether 
something is a lion, there truly is an answer to be found. One unique answer. It makes no 
sense to say that I think it’s a lion, you think it’s a tiger. It’s either one or the other. Dworkin 
writes: 
People do not share a concept of [a natural] kind unless they would accept a 
decisive test— a kind of decision procedure— for finally deciding when to apply 
the concept (except in cases they agree are marginal). Genuine disagreement 
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about application is ruled out once all pertinent facts are agreed upon. We would 
not share the concept of a lion if we disagreed about the lionhood of an animal 
even when we agreed that it did or did not belong to the biological species 
historically designated as lions.
460
 
 
It is important to remember though that these decision procedures function within 
certain games – not across games. If a little child aims to dresses up as a lion for carnival and 
some other child thinks she dressed up as a tiger, there is no longer a unique decision 
procedure to decide if the child dressed up as a lion or a tiger. Very frequently, however, 
participants would and do accept that there is unique decision procedures which guide the 
usage of a concept in a particular game. Decision procedures also change over time since 
criteria underlying the procedures get revised and transformed. This means it was objectively 
true that prior to 2006, Pluto was a planet, and that it is also objectively true that since 2006 it 
is no longer a planet. Asking what Pluto is really like, in some transcendental way, however 
is not a question that can be answered. Habermas makes this point by invoking the notion that 
the limits of our language are the limits of our world: 
For members of the same culture the limits of their language are the limits 
of the world. They can broaden the horizon of their form of life in an ad hoc 
manner, but they cannot step out of it; to this extent, every interpretation is 
also a process of assimilation. Inasmuch as worldviews refer to totalities, 
we cannot get behind them as articulations of an understanding of the 
world, even if they can be revised.
461
 
 
If we apply these ideas to instances when we use the concept of the market, we realise 
that many instances of using the concept revolve around natural kinds, permitting exact 
decision procedures. When I claim that there is no demand for a combine Harvesters in the 
UK in January, we both implicitly agree that if you found certain farmers who do require 
these machines at that time, I would have to revise my statement. Because the identity of 
natural kinds is fixed and because natural kinds partake in other regular cycles, there are a 
many aspects that we can understand in the objective sphere. Strawberries grow in the 
                                                          
460
 Dworkin, Ronald, Justice for Hedgehogs, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011, p. 160. 
461
 Habermas, Jürgen, Theory of Communicative Action: Reason and the rationalization of society, Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1984, p.58. 
248 
 
summer, so there are more strawberries in summer than in winter, so I am quite justified to 
claim that strawberries usually are cheaper in summer than in winter. If you compiled data 
from a lot of supermarkets which showed that strawberries were actually cheaper in winter 
than in summer, I would have to admit that this strikes me as odd and that I want to check 
your data collection and evaluation. But if no mistake is found, I would have to concede that 
this is indeed the state of affairs and at least during the period of data collection, strawberries 
were cheaper in winter than in summer. In the objective sphere, utterances of markets take 
the form of descriptive statements about how the world currently is. It is not saying anything 
about how the world ought to be, has been, or will be.  We can and do talk about markets as a 
descriptive reflection about the world as we find it.  
This is an important aspect to understanding the concept of the market. Our current 
usage in many instances would literally be quite senseless if we did not believe in such an 
objective sphere. However, quite often different commentators seem to believe that the 
concept of the market is only used within the objective sphere. This is a grave 
misunderstanding. There are two other types of games in which the concept of the market 
figures predominantly and neither of these is concerned with evaluating statements according 
to propositional truth and fixed decision procedures. Many economists are particularly guilty 
of this confusion.  
 
The subjective world 
I next want to turn to games within the subjective sphere. They are concerned with the inner 
experience of a person. Feelings and desires appear to be quite different from natural kinds. 
Habermas correctly observes that “a subject capable of expression does not “have” or 
“possess” desires and feelings in the same sense as an observable object has extension, 
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weight, color, and similar properties.”462 One way in which this difference is vocalized is to 
say that there are no accepted criteria for when it is appropriate to feel a certain emotion or 
desire. You may truly be upset that your football team lost a big game, and I may comment 
that the loss of a football team is completely irrelevant to your life. I may have grounds for 
urging you to put the loss into the larger perspective of life but clearly this is not sufficient 
grounds for thinking you are actually not upset about the loss. I have no basis on which to 
evaluate your feeling since feelings truly are subjective: “They cannot be expressed 
otherwise, cannot enter into relation with the external world, whether the objective or the 
social.”463 Because there are no criteria against which feeling can be assessed, it makes sense 
to distinguish the type of validity claims we make in the subjective world from the claims we 
make for the objective world. 
An important related point is that strictly speaking, like in the objective sphere, there 
is no room for genuine disagreements. A speaker’s utterance either was or was not sincere in 
comparison to how she truly felt. The problem is that we have no access to the true feeling. 
We therefore need to judge a person’s apparent actions and compare these with the purported 
feelings. If both actions and purported feelings agree, we have good grounds for believing 
somebody to be sincere. But again, there are no criteria for what actions are appropriate, 
given certain feelings. Even worse, we frequently do not know what we actually feel. Not 
only are our feelings hidden from other members of the species, certain type of feelings also 
appear quite hidden from ourselves. I may think that the reason why I find it difficult to talk 
to a particular woman is that I somehow cannot stand her. But it may also be the case that the 
reason why I find it difficult to talk to this woman is that I am actually in love with her. Thus, 
the subjective world also involves questions of sincerity and authenticity. Even though there 
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is no room for genuine disagreement about how I am feeling, there are ample grounds of 
disagreement for why one feels a certain way. And given the intrinsic relation between the 
nature of a feeling and its cause, knowledge of the subjective world can be highly fragile and 
subject to multiple reinterpretations.  
As other people have no access to our subjective experience, we need to perform our 
experience for them. In this way, the inner experience of a person is always related to its 
manifestation, how this experience is performed in everyday life. In other words, 
“performance enables the actor to present himself to his audience in a certain way; in 
bringing something of his subjectivity to appearance, he would like to be seen by his public 
in a particular way.”464 This idea of the performance brings out the idea of self-image: The 
fact that each of us has an identity (each of us has a vision of who we want to be as a person) 
and that our daily actions reflect that identity in some way. In performing ourselves, we are 
able to share who we are, try to be, or want to be with others. Goffman wrote as far back as 
1959: 
When an individual plays a part he implicitly requests his observers to take 
seriously the impression that is fostered before them. They are asked to believe 
that the character they see actually possess the characteristics he appears to 
possess, that the task he performs will have the consequences that are 
implicitly claimed for it, and that, in general, matters are what they appear to 
be.
465
 
 
We can use the above considerations to throw additional light for an understanding pf 
the market. In many instances, the concept of the market is used within the subjective sphere. 
When somebody states their preference for Coca-Cola over Pepsi or for Samsung over Apple 
products, we really cannot evaluate their statements in the same way as we do in the objective 
sphere. All we can judge is whether their statement is sincere or not whether it fits with the 
overall view of the person. But even though we cannot evaluate the claim as to its truth in a 
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straightforward manner, our appeal to a conceptualization of markets in the subjective sphere 
is clearly important. When people talk about why they prefer certain brands, why they choose 
to practice one profession or another, they are enacting their self-image. Personal identity is 
thus at the heart of certain understandings of markets. Interestingly, some economists have 
started to explore this dimension in more detail, most notably George Akerloff in his Identity 
Economics where he writes that “People’s identity defines who they are—their social 
category. Their identities will influence their decisions, because different norms for behavior 
are associated with different social categories.”466 But Akerloff overlooks in this discussion 
the constitutive character of language in the generation and transmission of norms. Bearing in 
mind the subjective sphere of the concept of markets is thus essential to any understanding to 
the number of ways in which the concept can be used.  
 
Social world 
Language games within the social sphere are concerned with moral and normative statements 
and questions. From a collective point of view, morality is not given. It has to be constructed 
by each community and is subject to constant revisions. But at the same time, it is true that all 
individuals living at a specific moment in time construct their own moral personality, given 
the environment in which they find themselves. The social word consists of institutions and 
norms which a person internalises, acts upon, and reflects upon. Validity claims in this sphere 
therefore can only be evaluated against what a person can justify to the community in 
question. But a community will not just accept any kind of claim.  Habermas explains that we 
can think of certain norms as having “social currency”: 
as the meaning of the objective world can be elucidated with reference to the 
existence of states of affairs, the meaning of the social world can be elucidated 
with reference to the existence of “norms”…..a norm exists, is in force, or enjoys 
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social currency, when it is recognised as valid or justified by those to whom it is 
addressed
467
  
 
As in the objective world, the social world is subject to alteration and change. This change 
may be instigated by individual members of a community but it will take time for these 
changes to spread throughout the social sphere. So the stock of norms in any community at 
any point in time is a fluid field of different norms. Some claims may serve as a justification 
to some members of a community but not suffice for others.  
There is, however, a grave complication with the view of norms having social currency. 
The value of $5 is $5. It would take quite a contrived example to find disagreement about 
whether a $5 bill is really worth $5. This comes back to the fact that there is an agreed 
decision procedure for what counts as $5. Because of the existence of agreed criteria, there 
cannot be any genuine disagreement. By genuine, I mean that we both hold equally valid 
reasons for believing in our position without there being any test that could decide which of 
our positions is actually better. Dworkin put this nicely when he asks:   
We must ask: When do people share a concept so that their agreements and 
disagreements are genuine? We share some concepts because we agree, except 
in cases we all regard as borderline, about what criteria to use in identifying 
examples. We mainly agree about how many books there are on a table, for 
example, because we use the same tests in answering that question. We don’t 
always agree because our criteria are sometimes slightly different: we might 
disagree because you count a large pamphlet as a book and I don’t. In that 
special borderline case our disagreement is illusory: we don’t really disagree.468  
 
Many of our norms, such as freedom, equality, fairness, justice do not appear to have such 
criteria attached to them. We may agree that freedom is indeed a value we want to embrace 
but we could differ markedly on what freedom actually consists in. It is as if we agreed to 
accept the dollars as our currency without printing any nominal amounts on them (or other 
identifying characteristic). We would seem to agree on their value, just not on what this value 
actually is. I might take a blank dollar to represent $100 and you might think it only 
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represents $10. I might even call on a friend to support my take on its value by having him 
say that I accepted it as $100 and so you have an obligation to accept it as such as well. But 
would you really have to accept that as a justification (and if so, what would be the basis)? 
I think this example demonstrates our situation quite nicely. Even though we agree on 
the desirability of the concept of freedom, liberty, human rights, justice, happiness, the actual 
guidance for action we take away from in embracing these values differs markedly between 
people. And there seems to be no decision procedure for deciding whether your vision of 
freedom is better than mine. Dworkin makes this point very convincingly:  
How can I show that one conception of equality or liberty or democracy is 
right and rival conceptions wrong? We must pause to consider what political 
concepts are and how we might be said to agree or disagree about their 
application. If you and I mean something entirely different by “democracy,” 
then our discussion about whether democracy requires that citizens have an 
equal stake is pointless: we are simply talking past one another.
469
 
 
The fact that conversational partners assume they share a concept when they use the word 
freedom or liberty, when in fact they really have quite different conceptions of what this 
concept entails, is one of the reasons why much political discussions and commentary is so 
hopelessly misguided. The point is not that we disagree about the value of freedom but what 
freedom actually means for the way we live. Dworkin implicates much of the Western 
political science tradition in mistakenly assuming the existence of concepts where none can 
be found: 
There is nothing to be said for the standard definitions of equality, liberty, and 
democracy proposed by Mill, Rawls, and most political scientists. They do not 
track the criteria everyone uses when he identifies egalitarian policies, liberal 
societies, or democratic institutions. There are no such shared criteria; if there 
were, we would not argue in the way we do. Some philosophers who assume 
that all concepts are criterial conclude that the failure of agreement makes the 
concepts useless and that we should manage without them. We should ask not 
what is democratic but what system of government is better on the whole; not 
whether equality or liberty is good but what distribution of resources or 
opportunities is best. This reductive approach is deceptive, however. It is 
appropriate only for those who already hold some theory, like the more fantastic 
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versions of utilitarianism, that offer a single factual metric of political value 
against which all policies and institutions can be tested. Without such a fantasy 
we are left with no rudder in the current. How do we even begin to decide what 
form of government or distribution of resource is better, if we have no 
background ideals to guide us?
470
  
 
Dworkin uses the term interpretive concepts to distinguish concepts used in the social word 
from those of the objective world. These interpretive concepts have very strong family 
resemblances, meaning they appear in many of the same language games. Frequently, one 
conception is called upon to support another. Similar conceptions of freedom tend to be 
combined with similar conceptions of equality. Dworkin highlights how on one level the 
resemblances between interpretive concepts make the process of interpretation into a holistic 
enterprise. It makes little sense for me to hold a conception of freedom which regards the 
existence of a government only as a possible disruption of our freedom and also to hold that it 
is the duty of government to ensure that the minimum needs of every citizen are met. Given 
the interconnections, changing our vision of one interpretative concept therefore can lead to a 
reevaluation of our entire worldview.  
Interpretation is pervasively holistic. An interpretation weaves together hosts of 
values and assumptions of very different kinds, drawn from very different kinds of 
judgment or experience, and the network of values that figure in an interpretive 
case accepts no hierarchy of dominance and subordination. The network faces the 
challenge of conviction as a whole; if any one strand is changed, the result may be 
locally seismic.
471
 
 
However, at another level, the local nature of all language games means a certain insularity of 
different interpretive concepts – or even of the same concept. So I think Dworkin slightly 
overstates the degree of interconnection. Unlike in standard economic theory, where an 
agent’s preferences are perfectly transitive, actual people are often torn between different 
visions of the same interpretive concept in various circumstances. At times, they may appeal 
to one vision; at other times to another, even without being aware that such a shift has in fact 
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taken place. In other words, interpretive concepts function as part of a variety of language 
games and the rules that guide the application in the different games does not necessarily 
have to be the same – nor is it in practice. 
Within the social sphere, the concept of the market also functions as an interpretive 
concept. It is tied to other moral and political concepts, such a fairness, equality, and 
obligation. Conceptualizations of the market in the social sphere are necessarily tricky 
because they reflect different views of morality at large. Statements such as market allocate 
resources most effectively appear to be descriptive statements but they are actually moral 
claims about the world. Very often, people use who the market as an interpretive concept are 
not even aware that they are doing this. I could give a whole list of examples but let me just 
offer three different cases of respected economists using the concept of the market in the 
social sphere without being aware that they are doing so.  
A first example is Gary Becker who argues that the decision to get married is 
exclusively concerned with considerations of income. As he states, “my analysis of marriage 
markets implies that the incentive to remain single depends on income while single relative to 
income expected if married.”472 Becker seems to forget that the norms that guide whether 
people decide to get married are socially constructed and there may be conflicting visions as 
to what kind of norms ought to guide this decision. There is no such thing as a neutral and 
eternal criterion which people turn to in order to decide whether to get married (nor is there 
such a criterion that decides what kind of commitments a marriage involves from the 
respective partners). Put differently, here we have a clear case where the image of markets as 
arenas of competition blinds somebody, and a Nobel prize-winning economist for that matter, 
into complete disregard for the social structures that ultimately provide the foundation of 
market activity (marriage markets in this case). 
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Another useful example comes from Mankiw’s Principles. Mankiw states that 
competitive markets automatically remedy any discrimination by employers. He writes: 
“Competitive markets contain a natural remedy for employer discrimination. The entry into 
the market of firms that care only about profit tends to eliminate discriminatory wage 
differentials” what counts as discriminatory?”473 What Mankiw forgets is that what exactly 
counts as discrimination, or a discriminatory wage differential, is a social norm. There are 
conflicting visions as to what counts as justifiable discrimination. Should a graduate of 
Harvard University receive a higher salary than somebody from a no-name school? Is it 
justifiable to pay woman less for the same job? Again, Mankiw uses the image of markets as 
arenas of competition to portray market outcomes as an automatic result. When in fact the 
results just reflect whatever norms are currently being widely accepted (or in the particular 
company). And these norms themselves are not given by the market but by a more general 
vision of what life ought to be like. 
 As a final example, Frank and Bernanke provide a very similar sort of discussion on 
the housing market. According to Frank and Bernanke, the only reasons to demand rent 
controls is if one does not understand the issues or if one somehow stands to benefit from 
such regulation. They write: 
In their opposition to rent controls and similar measures [in the housing market], 
are economists revealing a total lack of concern for the poor?  Although this claim 
is sometimes made by those who don’t understand the issues, or who stand to 
benefit in some way from government regulations, there is little justification for it. 
Economists simply realise that there are much more effective ways to help poor 
people than to give them apartments and other goods at artificially low prices.
474
 
  
Frank and Bernanke somehow overlook the fact that there are also people who benefit from 
the absence of rent controls. So why should those people benefit while others cannot afford 
housing? Frank and Bernanke clearly believe that the absence of such controls is somehow 
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more natural. But the question whether a society wants to enact rent controls also reflects 
particular social norms. Frank and Bernanke, like Becker and Mankiw in the earlier 
examples, confuse making statements about markets which concern the objective world with 
those that concern the social world. 
Each of the three previous examples contributes to a vision of market activity which 
emphasises a Rortian image of objectivity. Somehow there exists an objective procedure 
which automatically solves social questions in an optimal way. And this optimal way is a 
unique solution that does not reflect any subjective or social dimensions. As a result, all three 
examples also contribute to the image of homo economicus. As there is an optimum that is 
objectively guaranteed by the market mechanism, there is no need for discussion and 
compromise. All that is required is the exact solution be calculated and implemented. By 
emphasizing that statements about markets can include issues of the subjective and the social 
world, which need to be communicated to and performed for others, the three world heuristic 
also stresses the idea of homo communicandis. Because the kind of action that is deemed to 
be acceptable within a given market context is variable, there is a need to discuss just what 
kind of behaviors and what kind of norms a given society wants to regard as appropriate. This 
also requires that these norms are publicly and privately discussed which is just what the 
image of homo communicandis invites us to consider. 
Another effect is that the uniform appearance of the term market often functions to 
obscure our moral commitments from ourselves and others. Only by paying greater attention 
to what we and others actually mean when we use the term ‘market’, can we begin “a debate 
internal to modern capitalist society in which both the advantages and disadvantages of 
capitalism as a form of ethical life are directly confronted.”475 This debate necessarily 
includes a discussion of the conception of truth and the ways in which our language reflects 
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and reproduces particular cultural commitments. In this way, this dissertation should also be 
read as an attempt to contribute to a postcolonial conception of truth. In the social sphere, it is 
not a matter of giving evidence but of making a case for a particular vision of the world. 
Dworkin writes:  
We have touched on a postcolonial conception of truth many times in this book: in 
explaining why politics needs truth, unmasking external scepticism, defining 
moral responsibility, locating truth in interpretation, distinguishing interpretive 
concepts, and finally, in taking truth to be itself an interpretive concept. Our 
journey has been steadily one of liberation. Ethics and morality are independent of 
physics and its partners: value is in that way freestanding. We cannot certify the 
truth of our value judgments through physical or biological or metaphysical 
discoveries; no more can we impeach them that way. We must make a case, not 
supply evidence, for our convictions, and that distinction demands a kind of 
integrity in value that in turn sponsors a different account of responsibility.
476
 
 
The concept of the market is intrinsically involved in many arguments about a particular 
vision of the world. It is often unconsciously used to state and propagate some of our deepest 
moral convictions. Reflecting on the way in which the concept of the market is employed by 
others, and by ourselves, is a way to uncover those convictions. Being aware of what kind of 
world we actually want, and are advocating for, is one way in which to increase the 
sophistication of contemporary discussions of the economic and social system. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I try to highlight the ways in which the concept of the market partakes in the 
construction of economic ideas and knowledge. I make three interrelated arguments. My first 
argument, and one that goes back to the argument in chapter three, is the economics textbook 
do not just describe reality but construct economic ideas. I turn to the concept of the market 
as a case in point and highlight how this seemingly-descriptive concept is ultimately used to 
argue that the ability to pay is the only relevant ethical consideration for our society. The 
problem with such a definition is not only that it is ethically and socially questionable. A 
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problem is also that this definition of market overpowers the other ways in which we 
continue to use the concept as part of everyday speech. My second argument is that many 
different scholars have highlighted inadequacies of how the concept of the market is 
presented in economics but these criticisms have mostly focused on how economics 
misdescribes reality. After reviewing some prominent ways in which the concept of the 
market has been criticised, I move onto my own argument where I try to show in what ways 
the concept of the market constructs meaning. I appropriate Popper’s three world distinction, 
as developed by Habermas, to show that the concept of the market can be used to make three 
very different kinds of knowledge claims. Learning the concept of the market as presented in 
economics seduces us into superimposing this particular definition on the different ways in 
which the concept is actually used and thus often confuses and impoverishes debates about 
the advantages and disadvantages of particular social arrangements. In the next chapter, I turn 
to the question of whether the conception of markets as arenas of competition can also be said 
to contribute the impoverishment of mental health in the contemporary US.  
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Chapter 7: 
The violence of socialisation 
Introduction 
In this final chapter, I want explore how one could think about the burden of being socialised 
along the lines of homo economicus rather than homo communicandis. In other words, from 
the perspective of a single individual, are there reasons why it would be preferable to be 
asked to act along the lines of homo communicandis rather than homo economicus? I suggest 
that there are, because I argue that socialisation in the image of homo economicus is 
inherently more violent against the self than in the image of homo communicandis. I know 
that this is a large claim to make and I am only able to offer some preliminary points in order 
to support this assertion. But I think it is still a point worth considering. 
The chapter proceeds in three sections. In the first section, I offer some further 
arguments as to why it may be important to think about the burden of socialisation of the 
image of homo economicus. I review some data which suggests that the United States (and 
the United Kingdom) is currently experiencing a public health epidemic and that no accepted 
explanation has emerged which can explain this trend. My hypothesis is that this trend can be 
understood once we understand the violence intrinsic to socialisation. In order to develop this 
claim further, the second section reviews how previous scholarship has conceptualised 
violence. I argue that many conceptualisations have ended up unable to give an account of the 
nature of violence. In the third section, I argue that violence needs to be fundamentally 
reconceptualised in the manner suggested by Johan Galtung. Rather than seeing violence as 
an avoidable act, Galtung sees violence as an ontological condition of the world where 
violence is the difference between potential and actual. Using this perspective on violence 
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allows one to appreciate how socialisation in the image of homo economicus may be more 
violent than in the image of homo communicandis.  
One further advantage of Galtung’s approach to violence is that it also complements 
the autobiographical approach I have chosen. For it was only after having encountered 
Galtung’s work that I started to ask myself about the different ways in which I have tried to 
become actualised. In order to become the person I am today, I had to enact a type of 
violence against myself. It is this violence which forges the processes of becoming. As I 
mentioned in the prologue, I have encountered many different regimes of socialisation – be it 
by living in different countries or by working for different organisations. Galtung’s work also 
led me to ask myself about the different amounts of violence each of these regimes of 
socialisation asks one to commit. In this way, Galtung approach for the first time gave me a 
way of conceptualising just what makes drastic change (be that changing jobs or changing the 
country one lives in) psychologically difficult to bear. With each change in circumstances, 
our potential also changes. With each drastic change, our pervious personality is in need to 
adapt to the new situation and in order to adapt, we also have to enact a type of violence 
against ourself. Galtung’s approach gave me an entirely new perspective on the question of 
the burden of socialisation and the nature of violence. It is a perspective that may well be 
useful to examine the nature of capitalism more generally which is what I attempt to do in 
this chapter.  
 
The mental health crisis in the US and the problem of modernity 
There appears to be a perplexing and disturbing discrepancy between material and mental 
welfare in the United States today.
477
 Americans have come to enjoy unprecedented material 
abundance – both comparatively as well as historically. The US not only has the largest Gross 
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Domestic Product (GDP) of any country but its GDP / capita ratio has also increased about 
three-fold since the 1950s.
478
 In a very real sense, things could not be, and have never been, 
any better. At the same time, looking at the mental and emotional health of the country yields 
exactly the opposite picture. A whole number of issues could be mentioned but the following 
description by Kalle Lasn provides a pretty good picture of the situation: 
If you add up all the psychological ailments Americans complain of, the portrait 
that emerges is of a nation of basket-cases. Ten million suffer from Seasonal 
Affective Disorder. Fourteen million are alcoholics. Fifteen million are 
pathologically socially anxious. Fifteen million are depressed. Three million 
suffer panic attacks. Ten million have Borderline Personality Disorder. Twelve 
million have "restless legs." Five million are obsessive/compulsive. Two million 
are manic-depressive. Ten million are addicted to sex. Factoring in wild-card 
afflictions like Chronic Fatigue Syndrome and multiple chemical sensitivity, and 
allowing for overlap (folks suffering from more than one problem), Windolf 
concluded that "77 percent of the adult population is a mess." With a couple of 
new quantifiable disorders, "everybody in the country will be officially nuts.
479
 
 
Some scholars have suggested that this apparent crisis should not be taken too 
seriously. The somewhat plump argument is that the rise in mental health issues reflects the 
fact that Americans have nothing else to worry about and so invent these ailments in order to 
preoccupy themselves. Lasn also considers this as a possibility: 
Americans are turning into annoyingly self-absorbed hypochondriacs. Why? 
Because they can. Go ahead and cry, says the prevailing psychological wisdom. 
Any trifling discomfort you might feel has been legitimized. Your pain is valid. If 
you think you're sick, you are. There may be a grain of truth to this. People who 
live in a time relatively free of crises, amidst widespread peace and a galloping 
economy, will sometimes manufacture crises, inflating minor irritants into major 
traumas.
480
 
 
However, like Lasn, I believe the explanation that Americans are inventing these symptoms 
simply out of boredom is unlikely to account for the entire phenomenon. Although given the 
discussion of boredom provided by David Foster Wallace in chapter five, it is certainly 
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possible to imagine that boredom also has something to do with these issues. So what is 
driving this phenomenon? 
It may be worthwhile putting this discussion within the context of the question of 
modernity. Many commentators, especially those in the economics profession, appear to hold 
the view that living in the contemporary world cannot possibly have any disadvantages 
compared to living in less modern times. A highly industrialised, high-income society 
involves no trade-off. Economic progress, measured in terms of rising real GDP/capita, 
seems to be the only thing that is unequivocally beneficial. Scholars from numerous other 
disciplines have questioned this view. Even though they readily acknowledge the advances 
which modern societies have made in numerous domains – just think of health care, 
affordable transportation, instant communication networks, and leisure opportunities – they 
are keen to emphasise that these advances also extract a heavy burden on individuals.  
Yet, what exactly these costs consist of is much less clear. Foucault argues that the 
costs are borne out through an increased individual exposure to disciplinary power;
481
 Beck 
argues that the costs are reflected in the way that individual lives are increasingly seen in 
terms of risk assessment;
 482
 Giddens highlights the disappearance of ontological security for 
the individual;
483
 Bauman points out how there is a disturbance to the relationship between 
space and time;
484
 and Sennett argues that individuals suffer from being unable to form 
lasting commitments.
485
 Appadurai captures the underlying spirit of such commentary when 
he writes that there is a radical rupture between today and earlier times.
486
 The modern world 
is not only different, it is different in kind from earlier times. 
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 What makes the discussion of modernity so relevant to my argument is that the very 
nature of modernity appears to be defined by the rise of the image of homo economicus and 
by the need to enact this image in an ever greater variety of circumstances in our daily life. In 
other words, the image of homo economicus as advanced by what we today term 
neoliberalism is at the heart of the entire phenomenon we call modernity. One of the first 
definitions of neoliberalism, given in the Walter Lippmann Colloquium in 1937, defined it as 
“the priority of the price mechanism, the free enterprise, the system of competition, and a 
strong and impartial state”487. I think this definition is still very much applicable today. If we 
compare this to a contemporary definition of modernity, we recognise that the basic spirit 
appears to be exactly the same. Giddens, in what is a widely-accepted definition of 
modernity, defines it as:  
A shorthand term for modern society, or industrial civilization. Portrayed in more 
detail, it is associated with  
(1) a certain set of attitudes towards the world, the idea of the world as open to 
transformation, by human intervention [free enterprise]; 
(2) a complex of economic institutions, especially industrial production and a 
market economy [the priority of the price mechanism, the free enterprise, the 
system of competition];  
(3) a certain range of political institutions, including the nation-state and mass 
democracy [a strong and impartial state].  
Largely as a result of these characteristics, modernity is vastly more dynamic than 
any previous type of social order. It is a society—more technically, a complex of 
institutions—which, unlike any preceding culture, lives in the future, rather than 
the past.
488
  
 
William Davies correctly notes, however, that “neoliberalism is clearly not a unified 
doctrine….”489 A number of different ideas have been advanced as to how to differentiate 
between different aspects of neoliberalism. Steven Gill has suggested the term “disciplinary 
neoliberalism” to capture that “neoliberal forms of discipline are not necessarily universal 
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and consistent.”490 Jamie Peck and Adam Tickell contrast what they call “roll-back 
neoliberalism” with “roll-out neoliberalism”.491 By roll-back neoliberalism, Peck and Tickell 
mean “the philosophical project of the early 1970 when the primary focus as on the 
restoration of a form of free-market thinking with the economics profession.
492” Roll-out 
neoliberalism, by contrast, refers to the “neoliberal transformation…in the early 
1990s…associated with the political foregrounding of new modes of “social” and penal 
policy making.”493 For my purposes, however, Davies characterisation of neoliberalism is by 
far the most helpful. Davies argues that the  
origins of the neoliberal movement can be traced to the contributions of Hayek 
and Ludwig Von Mises to the ‘socialist calculation debate’ of the 1920s 
and1930s. The intellectual project of reinventing liberalism was scattered 
between London, New York, Chicago, Freiburg and Vienna, up until the 
1970s. The application and adaptation of these ideas spread no less 
haphazardly, serving various masters as they went.
494
  
 
Davies emphasises that even though there are multiple ways of telling the history and 
neoliberalism, and multiple dimensions which are worth examining, the central feature of 
commonality between the different accounts is that they share a hostility towards ambiguity 
of political categories: 
But what, I suggest, is the common thread in all of this – and what makes the 
term ‘neoliberalism’ a necessary one – is an attempt to replace political 
judgement with economic evaluation, including, but not exclusively, the 
evaluations offered by markets. Of course, both political and economic logics 
are plural and heterogeneous. But the central defining characteristic of all 
neoliberal critique is its hostility to the ambiguity of political discourse, and a 
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commitment to the explicitness and transparency of quantitative, economic 
indicators, of which the market price system is the model.
495
 
 
Putting this issue into the vocabulary I have been using, we can say that it is also the belief in 
unmediated experience which underlies the vision of homo economicus which gives rise 
toward this feeling of hostility towards ambiguity. The image of homo communicandis, by 
contrast, is meant to emphasise that the ambiguity and plurality of perspectives and political 
categories is not an intrinsic weakness that somehow needs to be rectified but that it is an 
necessary precondition for allowing the coexistence of different visions of life. The image of 
homo economicus is therefore also intrinsically related to the image of the neoliberal subject 
and the modern subject.
496
  
I think the various discussions on the burden of modernity are both enlightening but 
also ultimately limited. Beck, Giddens, Bauman and others demonstrate wonderfully that 
there is a price to be paid for modernity and that the economists’ dream of a phenomenon 
without a trade-off remains just that: a dream. Modernity clearly places various burdens on 
the lives of individuals and these burdens are different from earlier times. However, it mostly 
remains a mystery how the psychic burden of modernity, or to put it in my own vocabulary, 
the psychic burden of enacting an image of homo economicus, is processed by the individual. 
I hope by putting this burden within a theory of socialisation, I can help to provide a slightly 
deeper explanation of this issue. 
Given a broad conception of socialisation as “the comprehensive and consistent 
induction of an individual into the objective world of a society or a sector of it”497, it would 
appear that the psychological ailments of America must in one way or another be related to 
the way in which Americans are socialised. Putting the issue this way leads to two important 
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questions. First, what exactly causes these effects of socialisation in America? Second, is 
there a basis for arguing that it is better to be socialised in one country, rather than another? 
As with most explorations in this dissertation, there is an autobiographical angle to this 
question. I have spent my formative years in three different countries - Germany, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States. I have been socialised in all manner of overlapping ways 
which makes it impossible for me to say which part of my personality is related to which 
experiences. But it does make me wonder what kind of person I would have become if I had 
not lived in one of these countries. Would I be a happier/better person today by some 
standard? I do not hope to provide any definite answers in the following discussion but I wish 
to provide a new perspective to how this problem could be understood and framed. 
 An important dimension to this discussion is the role which language plays in 
processes of socialisation. As I have argued throughout this dissertation, language is an 
important vehicle through which we become socialised. In fact, I argued in chapter six that 
the concept of the market is central to how the image of homo economicus becomes 
popularised. Thinking about socialisation through language is also another way of saying that 
language does not just describe reality, but that it helps to constitute it (as I have tried to show 
in chapter one and two). But as part of this constitution, language also deeply affects how 
individuals feel and are made to feel. If this is the case, then there may also be value in saying 
that the language that fosters homo economicus is also fundamentally violent. I turn to this 
issue in more detail in the third section of this chapter. 
 Another issue is that there are nearly an infinite number of ways (often also 
contradictory) in which we are and become socialised: Interactions with family, parents and 
friends, popular culture (films, computer games, television, books, magazines), formal 
education (kindergarten, high school, university), sports, employment, technology, and just 
living on an everyday basis. Despite the near endless variety of sources of socialisation, I 
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think there is a dominant theme: namely that all of this is somehow related to the vision of 
humanity as presented by economics. This argument has also skilfully been made by Stephen 
Marglin who argues that “the presuppositions of this now worldwide culture are the 
assumptions of economics. Economics, this book has argued, is the formalisation of the 
dominant world-view of the modern West….a common human nature is assumed:…a homo 
economicus striving to maximise his well-being as a self-interested individual.”498 So this 
chapter should also be read in the light that it may be this vision of what it means to be 
human fostered by economics that causes such psychological problems for people. In other 
words, the vision of what it means to be human that underlies economic theory is one that is 
particularly hard to realise for many people. Hence the effects. 
 In this third section, I develop this argument further by using a particular conception 
of violence. For most people, the image of violence is that of physical harm. One way of 
potentially understanding the experience of the United States requires a much broader notion 
of the nature of violence. I follow Johan Galtung who argues that violence is the difference 
between potential and actual. Rather than viewing violence as the result of particular acts, 
Galtung’s view makes violence an ontological condition of the world. In this view, violence 
becomes something ever-present that is necessary and constitutive of our experience of the 
world. This also shifts the question of violence from a binary opposition (i.e. violence vs non-
violence) to a question of the degree of violence involved.  
What makes this view so appealing is that it links perfectly with the nature of 
socialisation. Socialisation is the way in which our potential personalities become actualized. 
This also means that all socialisation is inherently violent – but this violence is necessary for 
us to become a person at all. I suggest that not all socialisation is equally violent – some types 
of socialisation are more burdensome than others. I am speculating, then, that the nature of 
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socialisation in the United States has become more violent over the last decades and is also 
somehow more violent than the nature of socialisation in other countries. I speculate that it is 
ultimately greater exposure to the violence of socialisation which explains the rise in psychic 
disorders. 
This way of framing violence also has three further useful side effects. First, to 
reconceptualise violence is also a way to think about the problem of modernity. By 
examining the nature of violence and how it operates in modernity, we can come to a better 
understanding of what modernity means for the life of individuals. In fact, I argue that one of 
the central features of modernity is a transformation in the kind of violence which is inflicted 
in society.  
Second, one of the oversights of many writings on socialisation is that the question of 
socialisation for an individual is frequently reduced to the dimension of how successful the 
process has been.  One offshoot of such a way of framing the problem of socialisation is that 
all ways of being socialised appear equally desirable. As a result, within the different 
literatures on socialisation, it is very hard, if not impossible, to find any kind of criterion that 
would allow for an adjudication between better and worse ways of being socialised. We 
could also rephrase this problematic into the standard terminology of economics by asking 
what is the trade-off between one way of socialisation and another? Clearly, there can never 
be a single criterion that can tell us about the desirability of socialisation. Even if was 
desirable to be socialised as a fascist, homophobic bigot from the perspective of a particular 
individual, there are ample other criteria which would argue that such a socialisation is 
ultimately not desirable. But I think it would be a starting point to at least begin to think 
about how the trade-off between different types of socialisation could be conceptualised. 
Third, some commentators have recently concluded that violence has decreased 
noticeably over time. Stephen Pinker, for example, writes that: “Believe it or not—and I 
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know that most people do not—violence has declined over long stretches of time, and today 
we may be living in the most peaceable era in our species’ existence.”499 Pinker is exclusively 
concerned with physical violence. If, however, violence is the difference between potential 
and actual, Pinker’s arguments do not follow. We could have experienced a shift in violence 
from physical harm to other kinds of violence. As a result, the total amount of violence 
experienced by society may have stayed the same, or even increased. It is also possible to 
make a stronger criticism of violence as physical harm. If our way of conceptualisation 
violence routinely blinds us to various instances in which violence is committed, it 
unwittingly helps to condone these acts. Willem Schinkel rightly points out that “not noticing 
violence when it nonetheless exists – albeit not in a way that conforms to the prevalent 
legalistic definition of violence – is to silently condone it, to ratify and legitimize it.”500 In 
order to appreciate why viewing violence as an ontological condition of the world may be 
useful, I begin the argument by reviewing some previous scholarship which has tried to come 
to terms with the problematic nature of violence before further elucidating on Galtung’s 
definition of violence.
501
  
 
The problem of violence 
In order to appreciate why a reconceptualization of violence may be desirable, it is worth 
recalling that the actual nature of violence, what makes an act violent, is far from understood. 
The most frequent image of violence is that of physical harm but this image may be too 
narrow to account for the different ways in which violence can be experienced. A quick 
thought experiment may help to clarify this issue. According to the view of violence as 
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physical harm, violence is an act perpetrated by a person on another person. Yet, if we think 
about this image in more detail, it becomes confusing. Imagine I punch another person. In 
this case, it would appear that the violence of the act is entailed by the fact that I physically 
hurt this person. But now imagine that I do not actually punch the other person but just very 
aggressively shout in their face and threaten to punch them, without actually doing so. Is this 
situation necessarily less violent than the first? Or to put it another way, would I necessarily 
feel less violated in the second case? My feeling, and this appears to be shared by many 
others, is that these situations may very well be judged equally violent. So what does the 
violence of these two acts actually consist in? One response might be that it is the threat of 
violence that really matters. But this does not really seem to work either. In the first instance, 
there is no threat, just a punch. Add to this the fact that we regularly speak of people having 
their dignity violated, their rights violated, or how they were wounded by words and it 
becomes apparent that it is really quite unclear what exactly the nature of violence is in each 
of these instances.    
 Because of these theoretical confusions, the concept of violence has been met with 
continuous unease over the last century. George Sorel wrote as far back as 1908 that “the 
problems of violence still remain very obscure”.502 Hannah Arendt, writing 60 years later, 
remarked that “what Sorel remarked…is as true today as it was then”.503 Fast forward another 
25 years, and Zygmunt Bauman essentially remarked the same thing saying that “virtually all 
writers attempting to come to grips with the phenomenon of violence find the concept either 
under-, or over-defined, or both”.504 
This does not mean, however, that conceptions of violence have undergone no change. 
One important contribution was to begin differentiation between violence and power. 
Traditionally, this had not been the case. Max Weber, in one of his most famous definitions, 
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says that the state is “the rule of men over men based on the means of legitimate, that is 
allegedly legitimate, violence.”505 An even stronger formulation of this view is given by C. 
Wright Mills who writes that “all politics is a struggle for power; the ultimate kind of power 
is violence.”506 Hannah Arendt tried to break with this view. She writes that “power is indeed 
of the essence of all government, but violence is not.”507 For Arendt, power but not violence 
is an inherent aspect to human communities. A democratically elected state exercising power 
is justified and legitimate, but resorting to violence is not. “Violence can be justifiable, but it 
never will be legitimate.”508 For Arendt, “power and violence are opposites; where the one 
rules absolutely, the other is absent.”509 Even though the differentiation of violence and 
power may have had important ramifications, it actually does nothing to solve the problem of 
the nature of violence. It still remains unclear what exactly violence consists in or of. Johan 
Galtung was the first to tackle this problem and I shall turn to his contribution in the next 
section. 
 
Johan Galtung’s approach 
According to Galtung, what is needed is an extended concept of violence that moves away 
from the narrow focus on physical harm. Galtung rightly suggests that in order to understand 
the nature of violence, it is not sufficient to merely equate violence with undesirable states of 
affairs: “Hence, an extended concept of violence is indispensable but that concept should be a 
logical extension, not merely a list of undesirables.”510 Galtung goes on to say that “violence 
is here defined as the cause of difference between the potential and the actual, between what 
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could have been and what is.”511 Equipped with this conception, Galtung broadens our 
perspective to the different kind of agencies that can commit violence, saying that “we shall 
refer to the type of violence where there is an actor that commits the violence as personal or 
direct, and to violence where there is no such actor as structural or indirect.”512  
Despite Galtung’s brilliant reconceptualization, there appear to be two crucial 
ramifications of his own work which he was unwilling to fully embrace.
513
 The first point is 
that he is unable to come to term with the fact that his way of conceptualising violence makes 
it into an ever-present phenomenon. Even though Galtung subsequently extends his definition 
of structural violence to include what he terms cultural violence, he is not able to appreciate 
the full ramifications of his work. For Galtung, cultural violence includes “the symbolic 
sphere of our existence - exemplified by religion and ideology, language and art, empirical 
science and formal science that can be used to justify or legitimatize direct or structural 
violence.”514 Even though he admits that structural violence is “built into the social 
structure”, he paradoxically is not ready to abandon the idea that violence is avoidable: “I see 
violence as avoidable insults to basic human needs, and more generally to life, lowering the 
real level of needs satisfaction below what is potentially possible.”515 But how could this be 
the case? It would imply a state of affairs where there is no difference between potential and 
actual with regards to anything. Everything would have needed to already have reached its 
potential. Time would have ended. Clearly, this is not a state of affairs humanity can aspire 
to. Rather, violence is an omnipresent part of human existence. It is not a question of whether 
or not violence is present in any situation but merely a question of as to what degree. 
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The second realisation is that Galtung never elaborates the point that his conception of 
violence manages to escape the pitfalls of having to posit some fixed idea as to what is 
entailed in human nature. Under the conception of violence as physical harm there is often a 
tendency to disregard that which might otherwise be considered violent practices on the basis 
that they are considered normal. Typical examples of this include violence against women or 
children or violence at workplaces. My point is not that these practices should not be 
considered violent, because they are, but that they should be regarded as violent without 
necessarily having to posit a standard which all human behaviour everywhere has to obey. 
Galtung, in an important way, connects the issue of violence to a postmodern conception of 
man which has its roots in Hegel. The Hegelian idea is that man produces himself through 
thought and human nature was therefore compatible with different forms of living. In other 
words, there is always already a difference between the life we actually live and the life we 
could potentially live. We therefore need to resist the temptation to begin theorizing with an a 
priori theory of the subject, a theory of how humans universally behave. This is also very 
strongly emphasised by Foucault who writes: “I had to reject a certain a priori theory of the 
subject in order to make this analysis of the relationships which can exist between the 
constitution of the subject or different forms of the subject and games of truth, practices of 
power and so forth.”516 This assessment of Galtung’s work is also shared by William 
Schinkel who writes that Galtung finally “breaks with a dogmatic notion of the subject as an 
autonomous agent whose intentional actions can be traced back to this cognitive unity”.517 
Returning to the previous examples, it becomes much easier to appreciate the nature of 
violence. Punching somebody in the face, or just threatening to do so, are both violent actions 
because both situations had the potential to be different. In this particular case, both situations 
could have been less violent without the punch or the threat. But it was not the acts itself that 
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constitute the violence. Rather, the violence is constituted in the fact that some potential 
options have been forgone. The greater the distance between this actual and potential, the 
greater the amount of violence which any situation entails.  
Willem Schinkel furthers elaborate and extends Galtung’s work. Schinkel asks if 
violence is truly seen as the difference between the actual and the potential, what is it that 
makes this situation problematic in some way? The obvious answer seems to be that some 
kind of lessening has taken place – a reduction of some sort. Galtung himself writes that 
“violence is present when human beings are being influenced so that their actual somatic and 
mental realizations are below their potential realizations.”518 But what exactly does it means 
that realizations have been reduced? Well, that obviously depends on the situation, but 
generally it is exactly the very nature of the situation that is reduced in one way or another – 
the general nature of being has somehow been reduced.  
Schinkel and Galtung are both following Heidegger’s conception of being. For 
Heidegger, “man, as being, is Dasein.”519 Humans are characterised by the fact that we 
inherently have the potential to become different kinds of persons. And we can constantly be 
aware of this fact. Heidegger writes that in  
determining itself as an entity, Dasein always does so in the light of a possibility 
which it is itself and which, in its very Being, it somehow understands. This is the 
formal meaning of Dasein's existential constitution. But this tells us that if we are 
to interpret this entity ontologically, the problematic of its Being must be 
developed from the existentiality of its existence.
520
   
 
Humans at birth, and to a lesser extent throughout their life, have the possibility of 
developing a vast variety of personalities – of becoming somebody different. Schinkel argues 
that in selecting to become a particular type of person, we need to enact violence against 
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ourselves. Existence (heaving learnt one language rather than another, having been born at 
one place and one time rather than another, etc.) forces us to forgo all these potential ways of 
being and this sacrifice of our different types of potential is violence. In the process of 
sacrificing various potential ways of being we reduce our ontological horizon and thus 
become an actual person.  
But at the same time, we always need to enact this violence against others as well. In 
our interactions with other people, we always have the possibility of acting in various ways. 
But because we have to act one way, existence once again forces us to relinquish those 
potential ways of acting. The loss of this potential is both violence against ourselves but also 
violence against the other person. As Schinkel writes: “Violence is precisely that aspect of 
human interaction which consists of a reduction of being, of selection of ontological aspects 
and simultaneous non-selection of others.”521 Schinkel provides this wonderful passage in 
which he highlights how the need to select and reduce complexity inherently gives rise to the 
reduction of both self and other:  
social beings operate under the pressure of selection, of reduction of complexity. If 
no aspects are selected the other is not allowed to be, which is a reduction itself. 
That is how I feel a fundamental insight is gained when violence is defined as the 
reduction of being. Violence is always present, yes, but all is not violence. The 
level of violence, the degree to which ‘violence’ is highlighted as an aspect of a 
certain praxis, or – in frozen perspective – social situation, is precisely the degree of 
reduction of that horizon and of the possibility of a change of aspect(s). This 
involves the basic reduction of an ontological horizon by means of selection of 
aspect(s) and the reduction of the possibility of aspect-change. The latter is 
therefore the reduction of the possibility of another reduction of that ontological 
horizon. To be is to be reduced, objectified as a subject, by both self and other.
522
 
 
 Because every instance of selection is also an instance of violence, the question of 
which aspects of any situation are selected is crucial to the violence of any situation. Schinkel 
states that “the question of violence now hinges on the potential to realise potential, that is, on 
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the possibility of changing the aspect of the other.”523 He goes on to say that “any interaction 
entails a selection of some aspects of being of those involved in interaction and non-selection 
of other aspects, that is, that any interaction involves a reciprocal reduction of the ontological 
horizon of those involved in interaction…”524 Schinkel gives the example of how the 
relationship between a professor and student normally becomes constituted saying that the 
“professor is a professor to a student. He or she is not usually a friend, lover or neighbour of 
the student. In their interaction, the student reduces the other to a professor, whereas the 
professor is much more than that.”525 This means that in the end “both are constrained by the 
need to regard the other as professor or student, and this causes some things to be banned 
from interaction.”526 The question therefore becomes if the other can “be seen in light of any 
aspect of his or her being, or can alternative aspects of being not be actualized?”527 Schinkel 
notes that on many cases professors and students are able to accomplish this task, “to change 
the aspect of the other when interaction requires this, to see the other in a different light. They 
then retain the richness of the other’s being. When they do so to a lesser degree, a more 
severe reduction of being takes place. The further the ontological horizon of the other is 
reduced, the more violently the other is treated.”528 This means that violence can be regarded 
as a continuum along a sliding scale where the amount of violence inherent in a situation is 
inversely proportional to the ease with which the participant allows for a change of aspect to 
take place. Schinkel writes that:  
Violence is as severe as the reduction of an ontological horizon that entails a 
reduction of the possibility of changing the aspect within that horizon. Therefore, 
to call someone a name constitutes a lesser violence than to throw sticks and 
stones at him or her. To kill a person is an extreme violence in which only the 
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material aspect of someone’s being is highlighted, without the possibility of a 
change of aspect.
529
 
 
It strikes me that Schinkel’s idea of allowing for a change of aspect for a situation is 
very close to Adam Smith’s idea of sympathy. For Smith, it is sympathy which gives us the 
ability to put us in somebody else’s shoes – to experience what they are experiencing. But to 
experience a situation as another is just another way of allowing for a change of aspect to 
take place. In many ways, Schinkel’s conception of violence also unwittingly tries to revive 
the notion of sympathy as found in Adam Smith.  
The previous quote also highlights the importance of language. Language is 
inherently intertwined with and co-constitutive of violence. Schinkel writes that “violence is 
supported by language and language by violence.”530 Language functions by reducing and in 
order to reduce the complexity of the world. In the process of categorizing the world around 
us, by naming something as this rather than that, humans draw divisions. These divisions are 
a necessary precondition for our existence but the important fact is that these divisions are not 
given by nature. Since learning a language is not learning the definition of a term but the 
rules for how different terms are employed, we also learn to subjectify and to objectify 
through language. This is the basis of violence. Schinkel writes that “violence is the very 
subjectification and objectification that precedes the situational existence or appearance of a 
subject. Before one can speak of a subject, there has been violence.”531 Schinkel makes the 
nice comparison about how violence is a precondition for existence in the same way as the 
rules of chess are a precondition for playing chess. He writes that only “the rules of chess 
provide the freedom to play chess, they are a necessary precondition for it. Violence is 
productive in a similar fashion: it is an ontological precondition of ontic being.”532 
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 One advantage of this view of violence is that it emphasises the power relations that 
are constituted through language and practice. Schinkel highlights how in the process of 
reducing another, in ascribing a particular identity to another, we simultaneously establish a 
particular power relation between us and the other. At the same time as we socialise others 
towards particular identities, and are socialised into our identity by others, we participate in 
various fields of power relations. This also means that the issue of identity is at the heart of 
the problem of violence and socialisation. In becoming socialised into a particular person, 
and in deciding to contribute to the socialisations of others, we participate in the formation 
and maintenance of particular identities and this contribution is an inherently violent process.   
 A direct consequence of this view is that academic research and teaching is deeply 
complicit in processes of violence. Schinkel points out that the social sciences teach many of 
the tools and ways through which social interactions become understood. But in teaching 
these ways, the social sciences also teach which aspects of any situation should be selected. 
They therefore teach us just what kind of violence to enact. But practitioners in the social 
sciences are by and large not aware of this issue and how they blindly contribute to 
reproducing particular types of violence. Schinkel writes that “Especially where the concepts 
of social science are not fully metatheoretically developed, chances are that these concepts 
contribute to a status quo which necessarily involves a structural violence that is at times 
significantly highlighted.”533 
 Schinkel highlights that better social science means practicing social science with 
more awareness of what one is doing as a social scientist. Social Scientists need to be more 
reflexive. I have tried to follow Schinkel’s advise by following an autobiographical approach. 
By brining my own subjectivity to the centre of the analysis, I have tried by be more reflexive 
about how my own subjectivity informs my work. So I think Schinkel is right to suggest that 
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more reflexivity in social science research means greater ability to change the aspect of issues 
under consideration: “Reflexivity in social science means being prepared to change the aspect 
of social science by changing the aspect of the object of social science. It is in this sense that 
the aspect of violence of a reflexive social science is less highlighted than it would be in case 
of lesser reflexivity.”534  
 An implication of this point is that the image of homo economicus appears to invite 
little self-reflection. After all, what is there to reflect on? I have my preferences and my 
primary goal as a human is to satisfy them to the greatest extent possible. How I came to hold 
these preferences, and whether they are good preferences for me to hold is completely 
irrelevant for homo economicus. It is exactly for this reason that Becker and Murphy can 
describe drug addiction, even to heroin, as the result of a rational calculation: “Does an 
alcoholic or heroin user maximize or weigh the future?....we claim that addictions, even 
strong ones, are usually rational in the sense of involving forward-looking maximization with 
stable preferences.”535 In other words, it should never matter to me as a person what 
preferences I happen to hold, even if this preference happens to be addiction to heroin.
536
 If 
heroin addiction is not a cause to reflect on one’s life decisions, clearly very little else is 
worth wondering about. It probably does not go too far to argue that in the image of homo 
economicus as advocated by Becker and Murphy, self-reflection is a near impossibility.  
  But because there is no need, or possibility, for self-reflection, there is also no need to 
reflect upon the fate of others. Since I automatically maximise my preferences, I know that 
every other person must also be doing that. There can therefore be no ground to ever judge 
anybody else’s judgements, since, by definition, they are doing what is best for them. In this 
way, the image of homo economicus also stands in the way of a sense of solidarity with the 
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suffering of others. The image of homo economicus thus stands in the way of fostering a 
Rortian sense of solidarity or a Smithian sense of sympathy. In this way, violence is enacted 
in multiple dimensions: through the socialisation as well as through the practices done in the 
name and through the justification of the image of homo economicus.  
But this lack of reflexivity also holds true for the supposedly purely empirical research 
done in economics and other social sciences. Schinkel highlights how the frequent dismissal 
of conceptual or theoretical research in favour of empirical work in violence research is one 
of the ways in which social science blindly fosters various preconceptions without allowing 
these issues to be examined:  
All the dismissiveness towards ‘conceptual work’ because it is not ‘practical’, 
‘empirical’, ‘implementable’ and ‘societally relevant’ prevents the social science 
of violence from in fact becoming what its name suggests. For without a solid 
conceptual ground that utilizes concepts not arbitrarily defined, or borrowed from 
a semantics of violence that is the handmaiden of a status quo, whatever 
‘empirical’ work is done will involve not only aspect blindness, but also its 
violence, doubled by the violence of the blindness to aspect blindness.
537
 
 
I think Schinkel’s assessment also very much holds true for research beyond violence. In fact, 
I would say this dismissiveness towards conceptual research and the consequent blindness is 
nowhere as developed as it is in economics.  
Through this dismissiveness and blindness, research and teaching in economics also 
propagates violence. In particular, it is now possible to appreciate that economics textbooks 
entail a significant degree of violence. Economics textbooks teach students what aspects of 
any situation to select. In other words, they teach what kinds of violence to enact. But 
economics textbooks are also very stringent in framing all particular situations in one way. 
Every situation is supposed to be assessed in terms of whether resources are allocated 
efficiently. But in insisting that every situation is assessed in those terms, economics textbook 
outlaw and prohibit any change of aspect from taking place. Every situation is only ever seen 
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through one perspective and it is suggested that this is in fact the only perspective. But in 
order to do justice to our humanity – to allow for a recognition that we always have the 
potential to be and become somebody different – it is pertinent that the ability to change 
aspect is fostered and supported. Economics textbooks, as they are currently written, 
undermine this ability. As vehicles of socialisation, they teach students to ignore the 
importance of allowing for a change of aspect to take place and even provide a rationale of 
justification and legitimation for doing so.  
One of the suggestions of this dissertation is that economic ideas and knowledge 
could be taught less violently by relying on works of fiction, rather than economics 
textbooks. Novels are much more open in enabling the reader to appreciate any situation from 
a number of different angles. In this way, novels can help to create an awareness of the 
importance of allowing for changes of aspect to take place. As I hope to have demonstrated in 
chapter six, novels are able to incorporate sophisticated economic ideas without forcing a 
reader to subscribe to these ideas in the terms suggested by the novel. Teaching in economics 
would greatly improve if greater use was made of material that is less prescriptive in the kind 
of subjectivity it wants to bring about.   
 Seeing violence as reduction of being also allows for a reframing of the problem of 
living with large bureaucracies. It now appears that there are good grounds for judging 
interactions with large bureaucracies to be more violent than smaller institutions. When 
interacting with a large bureaucracy, a person becomes reduced to the bare minimum. Only 
those aspects relevant to the interaction with the bureaucracy are usually admitted by the 
representative of the bureaucracy. We are just a number on a screen. It does not matter if we 
are a man or a woman, sad or happy, in a rush or have time. The representative of the 
bureaucracy just follows the predefined operating procedures. The situation in a smaller 
organisation can be markedly different. In our interaction with somebody from a small 
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organisation, there remains the possibility that it is recognised that we are not just a customer 
in this particular transaction. A great example of this image could be the local butcher or 
baker who is aware that we fulfil many more roles than just being a customer and who will 
treat customers differently depending on various contexts. This willingness to consider 
alternative ways of behaving in any situation is one way in which we can allow for a potential 
change of aspect. So far, large bureaucracies have been entirely incapable of allowing or 
fostering practices which would allow changes of aspect even to be considered, let alone be 
practiced.  
  
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have tried to round up the discussion which I began in the prologue of this 
dissertation. I began by wondering how economic ideas and knowledge become socialised 
and how these issues are related to questions of personal identity. I then argued in the first 
part of this dissertation that a particular image of knowledge, ideas, and methodology – 
fostered by positivism and a naïve belief in the scientific method – fundamentally stand in the 
way of our understanding of these issues. This image of knowledge, ideas, and methodology 
is the precondition for the belief in a particular kind of objectivity and the idea of homo 
economicus. In the second part of the dissertation, I looked at ways in which the idea of homo 
economicus becomes socialised. For this purpose, I examined undergraduate economics 
textbooks and contemporary novels. I highlighted that the openness of novels also enables a 
questioning and subversion of the idea of homo economicus. In the third part of the 
dissertation, I looked at particular ways in which the idea of homo economicus is socialised. I 
looked at the language which underlies the idea of homo economicus, especially the idea of 
the market as an arena of competition. In this chapter, I finally asked if there are grounds for 
believing that the very socialisation along the lines of homo economicus is problematic. I 
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argued that if we understand violence as a reduction of being, we can appreciate that the 
reduction of being that needs to be undertaken to enact the image of homo economicus is 
much greater than that required to bring about an image of homo communicandis. This is also 
because there is no room for self-reflection and no room for compassion for others. I 
suggested that socialisation in the image of homo economicus may be the reason why the 
United States is currently experiencing what has been described as a public health epidemic. 
It may also be the case that the issue of homo economicus is the defining feature of the nature 
of modernity. As such, it may be the need to constitute oneself as a homo economicus that is 
at the heart of some of the dissatisfaction with contemporary life. Again, I would like to 
caution once more that the content of this chapter is highly speculative but I also think that a 
reconceptualization of violence gives at least a useful starting point to seriously consider the 
burden of socialisation in general, and the burden of becoming homo economicus in 
particular. In writing this dissertation in the way I have done, I hope to both argue for and 
practice a version of homo communicandis. I try to appreciate that my own subjectivity has 
important ramifications for how I think about the world and that others have good grounds 
for thinking about the world in ways different from mine. This is also one of the reasons why 
I adopted an autobiographical method in this thesis. For clearly, there are few ways of 
emphasising one’s subjectivity more than in an autobiography. I would next like to conclude 
this dissertation with a discussion of some of the things I have learnt during its writing as 
well as some of the limitations of an autobiographical approach for the study of economic 
ideas and knowledge.  
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Conclusion 
Having arrived at this point, it may be worthwhile to begin the conclusion with a 
consideration about what I have learnt about myself in choosing to attempt to understand the 
production and transmission of economic ideas in the light of an autobiographical method. 
This is a very tricky question to answer so I will turn to what is probably one of the best 
discussions of the issues that concern me here: Judith Butler’s Giving an account of oneself.  
At the most general level, I think I have gained an appreciation for the contingency 
with which I tell stories about myself. In other words, because I have chosen to write a 
dissertation about the production and transmission mechanism of economic ideas, I have 
come to understand an important aspect of my own subjectivity within the terms I have used 
for this purpose. But this means that I have simultaneously forsaken other ways of 
understanding myself. In the introduction, I spoke of this issue in terms of the image of an 
Escherian stairwell. One can always keep on going but there seems no way to truly step 
outside of the self. Judith Butler puts this point very nicely, when she writes about the work 
of Foucault that any reflexive action takes place within the context of some kind of 
rationality: 
There will be a reflexive action of a subject, and this action will be occasioned by 
the very rationality to which it attempts to conform or, at least, with which it 
negotiates. This form of rationality will foreclose others, so that one will become 
knowable to oneself only within the terms of a given rationality, historically 
conditioned, leaving open and unaddressed what other ways there may have been, 
or may well yet be, in the course of history.
538
 
 
One concept that plays a particularly important role both when one attempts to provide 
an account of oneself and when one attempts to provide an account for how economic ideas 
become accepted is the notion of truth. In the first and second chapters, I took issue with the 
notion of truth as accuracy of representation. Instead, I urge a vision of truth as justified 
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belief within particular language games. In this way, I have tried to highlight the need to 
move beyond a very narrow conception of methodology as a procedure for arriving at truth 
which is at the heart of positivism. I argue that this vision of methodology still informs much 
research and teaching in economics and that it blinds us to how ideas and knowledge are 
produced as a result of particular interpretive and epistemic communities which act within 
various fields of sociality. I argue furthermore that this vision of methodology also 
contributes to the vision of homo economicus as a coldly calculating asocial being. When I 
introduced the notion of language games in chapter two, my aim was to emphasise this social, 
communicative nature of humans. My aim was to move the image of human nature from 
homo economicus to homo communicandis and thus to revive an older tradition of political 
economy, as found in Adam Smith. This vision also gives preference to solidarity over the 
striving for objectivity, as Rorty has suggested. 
The notion of truth might also lead to a problem when one is trying to understand what 
one has learnt or, to phrase the same issue another way, how one has become a certain way. I 
would again like to go back to Judith Butler’s very interesting discussion of this point in 
relation to Foucault’s attempts to provide his intellectual autobiography. Butler argues that in 
order to tell the truth about oneself, in order to provide an autobiography at all, one also 
needs to suspend a critical relation with the regime of truth in which one happens to live: 
For Foucault, it seems, there is a price for telling the truth about oneself, 
precisely because what constitutes the truth will be framed by norms and by 
specific modes of rationality that emerge historically and are, in that sense, 
contingent. Insofar as we do tell the truth, we conform to a criterion of truth, 
and we accept that criterion as binding upon us. To accept that criterion as 
binding is to assume as primary or unquestionable the form of rationality 
within which one lives. So telling the truth about oneself comes at a price, 
and the price of that telling is the suspension of a critical relation to the truth 
regime in which one lives.
539
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What strikes me about this passage is that if Butler is correct, and that the price of 
telling the truth about oneself is the inability to think critically about the regimes of truth that 
produce oneself, is that I may not have been telling the truth about myself after all. My 
purpose in this dissertation was, first and foremost, to explore the regimes of truth which I 
have been, and continue to be, subjected to. I was hoping to use myself as an example 
through which to understand these regimes of truth. So maybe, in trying to understand these 
regimes of truth, I have misunderstood myself. Possibly, however, the situation is not as bad 
as Butler suggests. Maybe the point is that the truth to be found out about oneself is somehow 
of a different kind than the truth about the regimes that produce us. So that while it is never 
possible to subsume these different truths under a single overarching truth, and in telling one 
kind of truth we also lose the ability able to tell another kind at the same time, just maybe the 
price is not quite as high as Butler would suggest. 
In the second part of the dissertation, I tried to highlight how different kinds of 
economic truths get produced through different texts. Another way of saying this would be to 
say that I have explored some of the sites in which the regime of economic knowledge 
operates and which in turn operate on the regime of economic knowledge. I chose the site of 
the economics textbook and the site of the contemporary novel as a comparison. My choice 
of books was meant to represent examples that have had a noticeable impact on my own life. 
An important aspect to knowledge production is learning what criteria to bring to bear on a 
particular question, novels also contribute to production and transmission of economic 
knowledge. I know that for many classically trained social scientists and philosophers the 
idea that fiction produces knowledge just sounds like complete nonsense. But this is because 
they are still wedded to a picture of truth as accurate representation of reality. Once we let go 
of this idea of truth, in favour of truth as justified beliefs, the idea of novels as producing 
knowledge seems quite natural. Popular novels often present characters who find themselves 
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in situation not too dissimilar from our own. In being presented the characters’ course of 
action, as well as their justification for having taken this particular course, a reader learns 
what criteria might be considered relevant in a given situation. In being shown the 
misfortunes of a particular character, a reader might also be told something about the 
inadvisability of using particular criteria to make certain choices. What can differentiate 
novels from economic textbooks as vehicles for socialisation is that novels tend to be less 
prescriptive about the exact nature of the criteria that are to be used. They have less authority 
over the position to be taken by the reader. Whereas textbooks emphasise the spirit of 
objectivity in Rorty’s sense, novels are better at fostering a spirit of solidarity. They are better 
at creating an awareness of the other – and of allowing one to accept the other as other. But it 
can also be the case that since novels present protagonists within an explicit social and 
economic context, the identification of a reader with the characters in the text can be of a 
much deeper and thorough nature. If this identification is deep enough, a character’s way of 
seeing the world can become a model to be emulated in one’s own personal life. And if a 
particular novel fosters the image of homo economicus as the image of human action to be 
emulated, particular novels can be even more forceful in fostering this particular way of 
looking at the world than textbooks. In fact, it may not go too far to suggest that Ayn Rand’s 
novels were as important for Alan Greenspan’s outlook on the economy as any formal 
textbook he read.
540
   
As I began thinking about awareness of others, I realised that this awareness was 
particularly absent from economics and homo economicus. It is a big claim to make, 
especially as I am not going to substantiate it further, but it strikes me that all understanding 
might be relational at its core. We ultimately understand one thing only via another.
541
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corollary of this is that I can only understand myself via, or through, others. It only makes 
sense to speak of an ‘I’ if there is a ‘you’ somewhere to be spoken to. This means that the 
very writing of this dissertation already assumed the existence of another, somewhere. The 
other is an ever present shadow, hovering not only over, behind, and on the edges of my 
writing and understanding. Rather, the other is infused into the very core of my being. So at 
the same time as this dissertation serves as an account of myself and of the economic ideas 
and the economic knowledge I have encountered, the account only makes sense in light of 
somebody who might hear the account. The fact that hardly anybody might read this account, 
or that I might be misunderstood is beside the point. What matters is that any account only 
makes sense if there is in principle another to be spoken to. Butler makes this point very 
eloquently in her Giving an account of oneself: 
If I am trying to give an account of myself, it is always to someone, to one 
whom I presume to receive my words in some way, although I do not and 
cannot know always in what way. In fact, the one who is positioned as the 
receiver may not be receiving at all, may be engaged in something that 
cannot under any circumstances be called ‘‘receiving,’’ doing nothing more 
for me than establishing a certain site, a position, a structural place where 
the relation to a possible reception is articulated. So whether or not there 
is an other who actually receives is beside the point, since the point will be 
that there is a site where the relation to a possible reception takes form. 
The forms this relation to a possible reception can take are many: no one 
can hear this; this one will surely understand this; I will be refused here, 
misunderstood there, judged, dismissed, accepted, or embraced.542 
 
Obviously, a PhD dissertation is very peculiar piece of writing. After all, it will almost 
certainly be the case that this piece of writing has some very influential readers: the PhD 
examiners.
543
 They get to decide if this piece of writing fundamentally represents an ‘original 
contribution to knowledge’ and thus warrants the award of a degree. However, and this 
comes back to what I wrote in the introduction, I do not think that the way a contribution to 
knowledge is generally framed in social science research is necessarily a useful way of 
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thinking about knowledge production and transmission. It invites the image of knowledge 
production as a linear and cumulative process which happens according to some objective 
criteria of truth – when in fact knowledge production is a matter of playing particular 
language games within particular epistemic and interpretive communities. So even though my 
examiners in one sense are the most important readers of this dissertation, I must admit that 
the image of the other as an examiner has not really been important in how I decided to write 
this thesis.
544  
Rather, the image of the other that has been driving this thesis is the particular members 
of the epistemic and interpretive communities who I interact with. Or, to put it in less 
formalistic terms, my friends, supervisor, and colleagues. So it would be more correct to say 
that the other has influenced this dissertation not in the shadows but in the flesh and blood: In 
the conversations in cafés, hallways, and on Skype, during conferences, at parties. I have 
tried to find ways of saying something important and interesting about the nature of economic 
phenomena to the people who surround me and who I talk to.
545
 Because my friends and 
colleagues are based in many different disciplines – economics, law, philosophy, politics, 
sociology, anthropology, etc. – this project necessarily was written outside the boundaries 
and vocabularies of any one discipline. Instead, I have tried to find ways of speaking and 
framing the issues that reach across disciplines. In order to do this, I had to sacrifice being 
able to comment on the breath which with different disciplines have taken up relevant points 
of discussion and I also had to abandon any consideration of the finer nuances of different 
positions within larger debates.  
As substantial a sacrifice as this undoubtedly represents for a PhD, I think much can be 
gained by it. The questions which animate this dissertation – the content and status of 
economic knowledge – is of central importance for the way in which we organise our society: 
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how we write laws, how we design institutions, and how we treat others. And as I have tried 
to suggest, too much authority is granted to the discipline of economics to speak for and 
about these issues. Any serious attempt that tries to bring together scholars from different 
disciplines to highlight the shortcomings of the particular understandings of rationality and 
human agency as advanced by contemporary economics is therefore worth whatever losses in 
disciplinary specificity have to be taken into account.  
But in a very real sense this dissertation has also been written for another other: myself. 
It sounds slightly strange to put it like this but it also strikes me as true. Writing this 
dissertation has also given me an opportunity to see the other within myself. What I mean by 
this is that in having gained a greater appreciation for my own contingency, for that fact that I 
also could have become, and still can become a genuinely different type of person, I also 
carry within me the seeds of an other. An other me. Writing this dissertation with an 
autobiographical angle has given me manifold more reasons to think about the various ways 
in which I have been socialised than I had occasion to do at any other point in my life. And 
these reflections have somehow meant I have gotten to know some other me’s in some very 
limited ways. The recognition that had I taken a different fork in the road at different times, I 
would today also be a different kind of person, somehow also taught me something about 
who I am today. So that in writing this dissertation I both learnt about myself as me who I 
currently am, as well as about myself as other – about who I could have become, might yet 
become, and will never become.   
Given the multiple dimensions with which the other partook in this dissertation, it is 
doubly striking just how much the other is absent in economics as it is currently practiced. 
The image of homo economicus continuously asks us to think of human agency in terms of a 
Robinson Crusoe alone on an island. But, as Matthew Watson has highlighted, there is 
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something strange about this invitation.
546
 For if markets are arenas of competition, what is 
required are both sellers and buyers. But Robinson Crusoe solitary. How can he serve as an 
image of what it might mean to act economically? In other words, economics at the same 
time teaches the utter insularity of the individual whilst at the same time also assuming the 
existence of other people for the purposes of exchange. By introducing the notion of homo 
communicandis, I hope to have shown that economics can be practiced without the need to 
uphold this awkward paradox. In fact, I have argued that an economics which rejects the 
insularity of homo economicus for a vision of human beings in their full sociality is the only 
economics which can assume the responsibility which it has in virtue of the fact that it 
socialises individuals into a particular way of looking at the world.  
I hope to have made a case for the fact that political economy in its Western infancy, as 
practiced by Adam Smith, both had others as a core consideration and that it is desirable to 
return to this conception of economic agency. Economic agency along the lines of homo 
economicus can contribute to the erasure of much that makes human life enjoyable: Random 
acts of kindness, cooperation, unconditional friendship and love. All these acts involve and 
require an other and an economics that has no space for this other is not a healthy way of 
thinking for a social creature. 
The importance of the other also brought home the importance of humility. In some 
sense, one of the prerequisites for writing this dissertation in the way I have done is to 
appreciate my own contingency and limitations. This holds true in a number of different 
dimensions.  On one level, writing this dissertation required me to let go of ideas and things I 
formerly strongly believed. It required realizing that to a large extent, I believed whatever I 
believed partly as a result of historical contingency – if I would have been born in a different 
time, at a different place, I also would have believed different things. Appreciating one’s 
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contingency in this way becomes one of the requirements in order to unlearn something, 
rather than just to forget it. The awareness of one’s historical contingency also loosens one’s 
self-identity. I realised that the things I believed, which in some ways are related to the 
person I saw myself as, were also accidental. In other words, even though my beliefs are 
important to who I am, they cannot define me. If I would have been born at a different place 
and at a different time, say my parents decided to move to Papua New Guinea just before or 
after I was born, I would physically still be the same although intellectually I could have 
become somebody quite different.  
This discussion obviously echoes the problems of where the self is to be located, but 
the point I want to make is that unlike homo economicus, I do not have sole authorship of the 
person I am. The fact that I lack sole authorship, however, does not mean I have no input 
whatsoever. I have some input but it is heavily mediated by cultural and historical factors. 
The awareness of this contingency creates an associated awareness of the limits of knowing 
and how these limits are also reflected in the language we use to describe ourselves and 
others. In fact, trying to provide simultaneously an account of myself as part of economic 
ideas and of economic ideas as part of myself has also given me an appreciation for the fact 
that there comes a point when we reach the limits of language. Wittgenstein often spoke 
about how “explanations come to an end somewhere”547 and how “If I have exhausted the 
justifications I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: 
"This is simply what I do.””548 I have also reached this point a number of times during this 
dissertation - a point where I felt unable to go on inquiring further about the formation of my 
own self without somehow going back to where I started. Again, Butler provides some very 
nice further reflections on this point which I think are worth quoting at length: 
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To tell the truth about oneself involves us in quarrels about the formation of the 
self and the social status of truth. Our narratives come up against an impasse when 
the conditions of possibility for speaking the truth cannot fully be thematized, 
where what we speak relies upon a formative history, a sociality, and a 
corporeality that cannot easily, if at all, be reconstructed in narrative. 
Paradoxically, I become dispossessed in the telling, and in that dispossession an 
ethical claim takes hold, since no ‘‘I’’ belongs to itself. From the outset, it comes 
into being through an address I can neither recall nor recuperate, and when I act, I 
act in a world whose structure is in large part not of my making—which is not to 
say that there is no making and no acting that is mine. There surely is. It means 
only that the ‘‘I,’’ its suffering and acting, telling and showing, take place within a 
crucible of social relations, variously established and iterable, some of which are 
irrecoverable, some of which impinge upon, condition, and limit our intelligibility 
within the present. And when we do act and speak, we not only disclose ourselves 
but act on the schemes of intelligibility that govern who will be a speaking being, 
subjecting them to rupture or revision, consolidating their norms, or contesting 
their hegemony.
549
 
 
In the third part of the dissertation, I examined two particular concepts and how they 
can be used to understand different interrelations between the production of economic ideas 
and the formation of our own self. The first concept I explored is the concept of the market. I 
tried to show that the concept of the market is not merely used to describe a place of 
exchange but that it is used to express issues of personal identity and social norms. In inviting 
us to think of the market merely in terms of a place of exchange, economic theory also 
bewitches us into a narrow conception of what markets are and how they operate, even 
though we use the concept with entirely different meanings than the one attached in economic 
theory. One aspect of this view of markets as advocated by economic theory is that it already 
assumes a distinction between the economic and the social. Butler puts this very nicely when 
she writes that “it is not just that the apparently autonomous sphere of economic markets is 
produced on the condition that a conceptual distinction has been made between the economic 
and the social. Rather, that very distinction is performatively produced through a process of 
selection, elision, and exclusion.”550 By highlighting the different meanings attached to the 
concept of the market in everyday speech, I hope to be able to highlight just what kind of 
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selection and exclusion occurs in economic theory. And by being made aware of this 
selection and exclusion, I hope to be able to offer a remedy against a certain bewitchment by 
economic theory (and in fact, this way of viewing things has helped with my own 
bewitchment). 
 In the final chapter of the dissertation, I again picked up on Butler’s idea that there is 
a price to thinking and being one way rather than another and I began to explore just how this 
price might have to be paid. My idea is that the price we have to pay to become socialised 
into a particular way of being is that we have to enact a kind of violence against ourself. In 
framing the issue of violence this way, I follow the highly original idea of Johan Galtung who 
defines violence as the difference between potential and actual. Like Willem Schinkel, who 
already further elaborated on Galtung’s idea, I think it can be enlightening to think of 
violence as an ontological condition of being. Socialisation is one of the primary ways 
through which we actualise our being. As such, all socialisation can be considered violent – 
but that does not make all socialisation equally violent. Rather, some ways of being pose a 
heavier burden on the individual than others. I go on to suggest that being socialised in the 
image of homo economicus places a particularly high burden on the individual since it 
negates the need and desire for community, communication, and empathy, and since it 
presents one’s life outcomes as the sole responsibility of one’s own decisions. In other words, 
by negating all cultural, historical, and structural factors that shape the life outcomes of a 
person, an individual is invited to both give themselves too much credit in case things work 
out, and too much blame in case they do not. But the negation also contributes to a belief than 
sympathy, empathy, and solidarity are not necessary or even desirable in the end. 
Highlighting the violence of socialisation is another way of highlighting the need for empathy 
and sympathy which underlies the vision of homo communicandis.  
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 Having introduced the question of different ways of being socialised, one question 
that opens up is how representative is my way of having been socialised is? Or to put the 
same issue another way, how representative my account is for society in general.  This way of 
framing the issue also brings up the issue of narcissism. After all, thinking about the ethical 
aspects of homo economicus from an autobiographical perspective, does potentially lead to a 
reification of the self over others. As Butler cautions: 
If certain versions of self-preoccupied moral inquiry return us to a narcissism that 
is supported through socially enforced modes of individualism, and if that 
narcissism also leads to an ethical violence that knows no grace of self-acceptance 
or forgiveness, then it would seem obligatory, if not urgent, to return the question 
of responsibility to the question ‘‘How are we formed within social life, and at 
what cost?’’551 
 
As Butler suggests, one of the preoccupations of this dissertation has been to return exactly to 
this question. I have tried to argue that there are costs to be paid – individually on the basis of 
the violence of socialisation – and socially on the basis of a society that devalues 
communication, corporation, sympathy and solidarity. If my assessment of the situation is 
correct, then my personal account is also representative of certain trends of contemporary 
Anglo-Saxon society in general. But at another level, it also strikes me that my account is 
also unrepresentative. After all, I could take four years, during which time I was paid to read 
books and write this manuscript. There are very few people who ever get a chance to do this. 
Surely, there is something in having been granted this luxury that shapes my perspective in 
ways that are not representative of anybody who has not been granted such a chance. And 
having been granted this chance, as well as so many other chances, given how many people 
are constantly denied anything even remotely similar, also makes me think that the game is 
somehow stacked in my favour. So it seems difficult to say just what it may ultimately even 
mean to claim my account has been (un)representative. 
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 But as far as concerns the issue of narcissism, at least, I think a more definite answer 
can be given. This answer revolves around the issue of the other. Even a self-preoccupied 
moral inquiry, such as this dissertation undoubtedly represents, can avoid the charge of 
narcissism if the self is approached as one amongst many diverse equals, rather than one 
above all others. If a self-preoccupied moral inquiry manages to place the self within a larger 
framework of other selves that may, or may not, face similar issues, and if it is admitted that 
the perspectives of other selves may justifiably be different from our own, then I think an 
inquiry can avoid narcissism. And hopefully this is something I have accomplished in this 
dissertation. 
I also hope to have laid the foundation to undertake further research with this 
dissertation. In particular, this dissertation has given me an appreciation for the fact how 
economic knowledge and ideas are produced through a variety of mechanisms. I have also 
gained a much greater appreciation for the fact that economic concepts need to be constructed 
and that these constructions becomes part of larger narratives and discourses which in turn 
shape the nature of economic concepts.  
I would next like to extend my research to examine the role which popular media 
plays in these processes. I would like to start with daily newspapers and then potentially 
move onto TV-programs, movies, and possible even Social-media sites. The media is a 
fascinating case because it is another site where writers (or speakers) present a vision of how 
the ‘economy’ works and why particular social arrangements should be deemed beneficial or 
damaging. In particular, the media plays a key role in how economic and social issued are 
framed in popular debates. If one recalls the importance of framing (as discussed in the 
second chapter), this already makes the media of paramount importance. Writers in the media 
influence the terms in which an issue becomes publicly discussed. And the very terms that are 
chosen will influence the course of the public debate.  
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One particular example I would like to explore in this regard is the example of 
Quantitative Easing (QE). QE is a perfect case because it was a completely unknown concept 
until fairly recently. Even though the term was coined in the early 1990s to describe the 
actions taken by the Bank of Japan at that time, it was only in the aftermath of 2007 that the 
term started to be used in non-specialist literatures. QE was adopted by the Federal Reserve 
in November 2008 and by the Bank of England in March 2009. As QE comprises some 
highly technical operations, the media needed to find a way to construct knowledge about 
what constitutes QE in lay-terms.  
One idea is to undertake a discourse analysis of different broadsheets, say a major 
financial paper (The Financial Times) and one or two more popular papers, like The 
Guardian and The Times (or The Daily Telegraph), in order to examine in what ways QE is 
made understandable to the public and what criteria are used to assess its desirability. I am 
also quite interested if it is possible to detect systematic differences in how QE is presented in 
the various papers. There are two preliminary considerations: First, is there a difference, 
either in detail, or in content, between the financial paper and the popular broadsheets? 
Second, is there a difference in the assessment of the desirability of QE between the 
politically left-leaning Guardian and the politically more conservative Times/Telegraph. 
Without having done any systematic research, either scenario is imaginable: On the one hand, 
the differences in political outlook should be reflected in how QE is assessed. On the other 
hand, I could also imagine that the technical nature of QE gives rise to a narrative that the 
program is politically neutral. Clearly, any government program of such proportions as QE 
will have consequences. However, it is up to the media to construct a plausible narrative 
about what these consequences are going to be and whether these are desirable for society. 
QE is also an interesting case because it is an umbrella term for completely different 
practices. Even more, the practices that constitute QE vary from country to country. It would 
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be interesting to find out to what extent this realization is present in the media coverage. 
There is clearly a danger of miscommunication. If different commentators use the same term 
but mean to speak about different practices, confusion is likely to follow. So it will also be a 
point of investigation to try to analyse what practices are referred to when the term QE is 
used. The question of whether to emphasize the similarity of different forms of QE or their 
difference will therefore be of some interest to my research. 
A related point regards the historical specificity of QE. Most commentators seem to 
emphasize the fact that QE is historically unprecedented. What makes this move interesting is 
that to claim unprecedentedness already shapes the criteria than can be used in order to assess 
the program. By calling QE unprecedented, the program is already immunized to some extent 
against historical comparisons. The fact that a new term began to be used and propagated 
might reflect the desire to emphasize the novelty of the program but from a narrative 
standpoint this practice also has other ramification. Some scholars have already pointed out 
important similarities between QE and the Fed’s actions during the 1930s and 1940s  but the 
important point is that the actions undertaken by the program could have been reported under 
a term like expansionary Fiscal Policy, thereby allowing for a more obvious historical 
comparison. What this point therefore illustrates is the complex relationship between 
discourse and practice. By successfully naming the same practice differently, a different 
meaning can be established by which the practice is to be evaluated. 
Last, and this directly follows from the previous point, is that the meaning of QE is 
also connected to the meaning and the role of money. The concept of QE can only be made 
understandable against a background understanding of what constitutes money in an 
economy. For the most part, the popular understanding of money sees it simply as the notes 
and coins in our wallets, or possibly as the money we have deposited at banks. However, if 
we think of money as a means of payment or the means to settle a debt, all modern 
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economies rely on another type of money – central bank reserves. What makes this money 
special is that it is only made available to very few participants of an economy. In fact, in 
2007 there were only 59 financial and other institutions which held reserve accounts at the 
Bank of England. In other words, these 59 institutions have privileged access to a type of 
money not available or useful to anybody else. On the one hand, central banks reserves are 
clearly money as they are used to settle billions of debts every year but, on the other hand, 
they are also different from regular money because only a tiny fraction of participants of the 
economy can use them.  Seen in this way, QE opens up some very interesting questions about 
the purpose of money. Who is money created for? Why do these institutions deserve their 
own type of money? What does it mean to make a different type of money available at 
favourable conditions to a small fraction of an economy? As these questions indicate, I am 
also hoping to use my findings about the narratives of QE in daily newspapers as a 
foundation to examine some broader issues about how the nature of the economy is presented 
in the media. The methodological and theoretical work done in this dissertation should serve 
as an ideal foundation to undertake such type of work.  
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